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The Commission's 
Process 
This Report on the ethical, legal, and practical aspects of 
decisions to forego life-sustaining treatment draws on work 
done by the Commission in several areas over the past three 
years, along with testimony and public comment on the subject 
at  several public hearings and meetings. The conclusions of the 
Commission's reports on Making Health Care Decisions and 
on Securing Access to Health Care, in addition to consider- 
ations highlighted in the Commission's report Defining Death, 
were considered and applied to this Report. The topic of 
deciding about life-sustaining treatment was before the Com- 
mission at 12 meetings, and testimony and documentary 
materials were presented by physicians, nurses, social work- 
ers, patients and family members, philosophers, theologians, 
and lawyers by invitation and a s  witnesses during the public 
comment periods. The Commission's work was  greatly assisted 
by many letters of advice and critiques of drafts from 
concerned professionals and members of the public. Especially 
detailed and helpful critiques of each draft were provided by 
Dr. Ake Grenvik, of the University of Pittsburgh, and Dr. 
Ronald Cranford, of the Hennepin County Medical Center in 
Minneapolis. 
Former Commissioners 
These members served on the Commission while this study 
was  being conducted; their terms of service, which were 
completed before the Report was approved, are indicated in 
parentheses. 
Renee C. Fox (July 1979--Feb. 1982) 
Mario Garcia-Palmieri (July 1979-Aug. 1982) 
Frances K. Graham (May 1980-Jan. 1982) 
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Albert R. Jonsen (July 1979-Aug. 1982)
Patricia A. King (July 1979-May 1980) 
Mathilde Krim (July 1979-Oct. 1981) 
Donald N. Medearis (July 1979-Feb. 1982) 
Anne A. Scitovsky (July 1979-Aug. 1982) 
Carolyn A. Williams (Sept. 1980-Aug. 1982) 
Commission Hearings 
On April 9, 1981, the Commission held a hearing in Miami, 
Florida, with the Chairman presiding. A major focus of the 
session was the case of Abe (Al) Perlmutter, a 71-year-old 
Floridian who was striken with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis 
(Lou Gehrig's Disease), a progressive neurologic disease that 
causes muscle deterioration, eventuating in death. Perlmutter 
was last hospitalized in May of 1978 when he needed an 
artificial respirator to support his breathing. When his attend- 
ing physician declined to follow his wish that the respirator be 
disconnected, Perlmutter began a legal action, which eventual- 
ly stretched out over two years. He died five months after the 
initial court proceeding, 41 hours after his respirator was 
removed pursuant to an order of the Florida Court of Appeals; 
the courts continued to rule on the legal issues even after 
Perlmutter had died. 
The first witness before the Commission was David 
Hoines, the attorney who represented Perlmutter before the 
trial, appellate, and Florida Supreme Courts. Hoines explained 
that he had advised the Perlmutter family that they and the 
hospital staff could possibly be prosecuted for a second-degree 
felony under a Florida statute against "assisting self-murder" if 
they disconnected Al Perlmutter's respirator. In answer to 
questions, he stated that there were no Florida cases of which 
he knew in which family members or others had been 
prosecuted under comparable circumstances. (This conclusion 
was confirmed by the other attorneys who testified before the 
Commission during this hearing on the Perlmutter case.) 
Hoines stressed that Perlmutter did not seek to die, but 
preferred death to continuing to live in his debilitated condi- 
tion, and that he was steadfast in this wish. 
Dr. Marshall J. Brumer, a pulmonary specialist and one of 
Perlmutter's attending physicians, testified that he resisted the 
patient's decision to forego treatment because he believes that 
physicians have a duty to preserve life. He also believed that 
Perlmutter was depressed due to the death of his wife  shortly 
after he was admitted to the hospital; his mood and outlook
vacillated, and at times Perlmutter spoke of  his hope for 
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improvement. Dr. Brumer told the Commission that in all his 
years of practice he had never had a patient who held to his or 
her wish to cease treatment consistently enough to convince 
Dr. Brumer. He stressed that Perlmutter had always been free 
to sign out of the hospital "against medical advice" (and that 
the doctor would have helped make provision for respirator 
care at home). In his experience sick and depressed patients 
often expressed wishes to die, but he had never encountered a 
patient whose wish was steadfast or whose interests would be 
served by physician compliance. Dr. Brumer also explained the 
effects that the threat of legal liability had on his decisions. 
Judge John G. Ferris, trial judge of Broward County, 
Florida, told the Commission of his decisionmaking process, 
which upheld Perlmutter's right to refuse treatment. Judge 
Ferris said his opinion did not order Dr. Brumer to remove the 
respirator, but rather gave Perlmutter the option to have the 
respirator removed, based on his constitutional right of priva- 
cy. 
Charles Musgrove, who handled the appeal for the state, 
noted that the law in Florida was unclear, given the dearth of 
case law and the silence of the legislature. He maintained the 
need for further clarification of patients' rights in regard to 
decisions to forego life-sustaining therapy. Judge Patti Englan- 
der, who had been with the State Attorney's office in Broward 
County during the Perlmutter litigation, explained that this was 
the reason for continuing the appeal after Perlmutter died. She 
testified further that she had urged the Florida Supreme Court 
(successfully) to interpret the constitutional right to privacy 
narrowly: it should be applied only to those, like AlPerlmutter, 
who, as  competent, terminally ill adults, desire removal of 
extraordinary therapy and who have only adult children who 
agree with the decision. 
The Commission then turned to a discussion of autonomy 
and institutional options in the context of terminally ill 
patients. Testimonv was heard from Reverend Ronal Mudd,a 
hospital  chaplain who has counseled dying patients for '16 
years and who is one of the founders of the Methodist Hospice 
in Jacksonville, Florida. Rev. Mudd had recently been diag- 
nosed as  having cancer and noted that research shows that 
doctors, nurses, and clergy tend to spend less time with 
patients they know to be dying than with other patients. He 
suggested that the Commission ought to explore more fully the 
hospice concept of palliative and comprehensive care for the 
dying. 
Frank Repensek, Director of the Guardianship Program for 
the Elderly of Dade County, spoke on decisionmaking for 
incompetent patients. Repensek's staff of social workers act a s  
guardians for the elderly, a large number of whom are referred 
by area hospitals when patients are not in a condition to make 
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an informed choice about treatment. He noted that the laws of 
guardianship are clearer concerning property than concerning 
persons. 
Monsignor Bryan Walsh testified as  Director of the 
Catholic Charities, Archdiocese of Miami, on the attitude of the 
Church. He explained that, while rejecting "mercy killing" and 
suicide as universally wrong, the Church sanctions the omis- 
sion of medical procedures considered to be extraordinary or 
"disproportionate." These views were reiterated in the Vatican 
Declaration on Euthanasia of June 26, 1980. Monsignor Walsh 
cited the recently adopted policy and procedure statement of 
the Jackson Memorial Hospital as  an example of how such 
decisions are made and noted that the guidelines were 
designed to alleviate uncertainty on the part of hospital staff 
regarding its rights and duties. 
Mary Narvaez, a nurse who practices in the oncology unit 
of the University of Miami Hospital, discussed how nurses 
often find themselves torn among allegiances to the patient, the 
family, and the doctor. She concluded that education  in 
management of dying patients might be useful. Dr. Peter 
Mansell, an Associate Professor of Medical Oncology at the 
University of Miami Comprehensive Cancer Center, described 
the tendency, particularly among American doctors, to exhaust 
all therapies for patients who are dying of malignant diseases. 
He expressed doubt that broad rules, regulations, or legislation 
could be drafted that would apply to the wide variety of unique 
cases; he also warned against an  automatic assumption that 
spouses or close family members have the patient's "best 
interest" at heart. 
Dr. Warren Lindau, a cardiologist in private practice who 
is President of the Dade County Medical Society, testified that 
he routinely encounters problems in decisionmaking about 
ending life-sustaining treatment. He emphasized the difficulty 
of adequate communication in the face of depression and 
confusion, the difficulty of ascertaining the motives of family 
members, and the extraordinary costs of the medical interven- 
tions involved. Vynette McGlawn, administrator of the Jackson 
Heights Nursing Home in Miami, discussed the plight of the 
elderly patient, particularly the problems of finding appropri- 
ate surrogates for incompetent patients and of making good 
decisions regarding both life-sustaining treatment and routine 
medical care through some other means. 
The Commission also heard testimony on the subject of 
legislation at the state level that would authorize a "terminally 
ill patient" to execute a document directing physicians to limit 
treatment should a patient become so debilitated as  to be 
unable to continue to participate in decisionmaking about his 
or her care. A letter from Florida State Senator Paul B. 
Steinberg, sponsor of the "Directive of Natural Death Act," 
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was read into the record. Dr. James Farr, pastor of the Synder 
Memorial United Methodist Church of Jacksonville, Florida, 
spoke in favor of legislation to guarantee the right to refuse life- 
prolonging treatment, based on the doctrine of informed 
consent and the constitutional right of privacy. He also spoke 
of the need to immunize physicians and families from criminal 
and civil liability and the need to clarify rights with regard to 
insurance coverage. Dr. Farr expressed some reservations 
about "living will" legislation, saying that it must be drafted to 
protect vulnerable populations, especially the aged and severe- 
ly retarded. 
Thomas Horkan, an attorney testifying on behalf of the 
Florida Catholic Conference, opposed any legislation concern- 
ing the rights of dying patients. He said that decisions to omit 
or withdraw extraordinary treatment are best made by pa- 
tients or families in concert with physicians and clergy. 
Reverend Donald   McKinney, board member and founder of the 
national organization Concern for Dying, told the Commission- 
ers that his organization has concluded that legislation is 
unnecessary and perhaps even an  impediment to honoring 
patients' wishes. As a n  alternative to legislation, he suggested 
that educational efforts be strengthened. His organization 
does, however, endorse the concept of the "living will." Sidney 
Rosoff, a New York attorney who is President of the Society for 
the Right to Die, told the Commissioners of the efforts of his 
organization to promote living will legislation, because his 
group believes that legislation is preferable to litigation. 
Moving from the realm of legal rules, the Commission 
heard from Philippa Foot, Professor of Philosophy at UCLA and 
Senior Research Fellow at Somerville College, Oxford. To 
summarize her views, she provided the Commission with a 
"flow diagram" that listed pertinent questions in a fashion that 
permitted the appropriate questions to be asked of each 
presented case. Professor Foot stressed that these questions 
only help to sort out cases and do not provide any answers. 
During the time set aside for public comment, the Commis- 
sion heard from Dr. Walter Sackett, a pediatrician in private 
practice and a former Florida State Representative who had 
introduced the nation's first "death with dignity" bill more than 
a decade earlier. He encouraged the Commission to examine 
the full range of situations when foregoing therapy is appropri- 
ate. George Wallace-Barnhill, Chairman of the LegalIEthical 
Issues Committee of the Society for Critical Care Medicine, 
commented on the difficulty that these decisions pose for 
emergency room and critical care specialists. Carol Davis, a 
physical therapist, encouraged the Commission to develop 
some substantial guidelines on who should forego life-sustain- 
ing treatment. Jackie Matuseski, a social worker and adminis- 
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trator of a hospice program, advocated the provision of true 
choices for all patients, especially for dying patients. 
June 4, 1981 
The Commission next took up this subject during its 
hearings in Boston, which were presided over by the Chairman, 
because a remarkable number of noteworthy cases involving 
the termination of life-sustaining treatment for incompetent 
patients have come before the Massachusetts courts. Their 
decisions have sparked considerable debate within the medi- 
cal and legal communities over the role of courts in the 
treatment or nontreatment of dying patients. 
Dr. Marianne Prout, Director of the Division of Oncology at 
Boston University Hospital, described her work with terminal- 
ly ill patients, noting that fluctuations in competence are quite 
common. She explained that difficulties and delays in obtain- 
ing guardians for incompetent patients have led some physi- 
cians to continue life-sustaining treatment for what she feels is 
an  unjustified period. 
Leonard Glantz, Assistant Professor of Law and Medicine 
at Boston University School of Medicine, summarized the state 
of the law in Massachusetts, discussing the Saikewicz case, the 
role of the "substituted judgment" test, and the frequency with 
which recourse to courts must be sought. Dr. Arnold Relman, 
Editor of the New England Journal of Medicine, endorsed the 
social tradition of physicians and families deciding together 
about care for patients of diminished capacity. Professor 
Jonathan Brant, of the New England College of Law in Boston, 
countered by noting that physicians and families may have 
interests that conflict with those of incompetent patients. He 
urged court attention for decisions involving life-sustaining 
treatment for dependent people. 
The discussion then turned to questions of how institution- 
A ~- 
al policies can be framed to encourage appropriate care of 
terminally ill patients. Dr. Mitchell Rabkin, President of the 
Beth Israel Hospital in Boston, discussed his hospital's decade 
of experience with policies concerning "do not resuscitate" 
(DNR) orders. He said such orders have become generally 
acceptable. Dr. Albert Fine, Director of the Intensive Care Unit 
at Somerville Hospital in Massachusetts, compared the policy 
and experience of a community hospital, such as  his own, with 
those of a tertiary-care, teaching center, such as Beth Israel. He 
noted the reluctance of some older physicians to write DNR 
orders and warned that for some ethnic groups, explicit 
discussion of decisions not to resuscitate is very difficult and 
sometimes inappropriate. 
Dr. Ned Cassem, a psychiatrist who is Chairman of the 
Critical Care Committee at Massachusetts General Hospital in 
Boston, discussed the explicit patient classification scheme 
once used at that hospital. Under this procedure, decisions 
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about the extent of treatment were guided by the "class" into 
which a patient is placed, based on a number of interrelated 
medical and nonmedical criteria. David Spackman, counsel to 
Boston's Board of Health and Hospitals, told the Commission- 
ers that he has frequently received calls about the legal 
propriety of DNR orders and also noted that it has never been 
necessary for Boston City Hospital to seek court review for 
such an order. 
The Commission also heard from Paul Rogers, a lawyer 
and founder of Guardianship, Inc. in Amherst, Massachusetts. 
He discussed the option of forming corporations to provide 
guardianship for institutionalized patients. 
The final panel of witnesses consisted of clinicians who 
outlined medical considerations in foregoing life-sustaining 
treatment. Dr. Kevin McIntyre, a cardiologist at  West Roxbury 
V.A. Hospital in Massachusetts, said that where prognosis is 
very poor and the family and medical staff are in agreement, 
termination of life-sustaining therapy is appropriate. Gen 
Foley, R.N., Assistant Director of Pediatric Nursing at  Memori- 
al Sloan-Kettering Hospital in New York, discussed the poten- 
tial for meaningful long-term relationships with cancer pa- 
tients, especially children. Dr. Paul Hardy, a neuropsychiatrist 
a t  Paul Dever State School in Taunton, Massachusetts, used 
the case of Earle Spring (a demented patient in a nursing home 
whose wife and son wished to stop his kidney dialysis) a s  a n  
example that highlights the need for accurate professional 
assessment to undergird a determination of incompetence. The 
final witness was  Dr. Ruth Purtilo, Associate Professor of 
Health Care, Ethics, and Humanistic Studies at  Massachusetts 
General Hospital, who urged the Commission to look beyond 
high-technology measures in its consideration of life-sustaining 
care. 
September 12, 1981 
In Los Angeles, California, Commissioner Mario Garcia- 
Palmieri presided while testimony was taken from a panel of 
physicians and nurses who discussed their experiences with 
decisions about aggressive care. The panel included Sharon 
Imbus, a nurse at  the the Burn Center at U.S.C. Medical School 
in Los Angeles; Dr. Norman K. Brown, a physician from Seattle, 
Washington; and Gary Wolfe, Director for Ambulatory Ser- 
vices for Peninsula Hospital in San Pedro, California. Imbus 
discussed decisionmaking involving burned patients for whom 
survival is unprecedented, including the patient's authority to 
decline all life-sustaining care. Dr. Brown presented his 
findings regarding the accepted practice of nontreatment of 
fever at  proprietary and charitable nursing homes in Seattle. 
Wolfe reported that his hospital had assessed community 
needs two years previously and had found a substanti;~l 
perceived need for flexible and responsive care for d y i ~ r ~  
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patients. As a result, the hospital established a hospice, with 
emphasis upon symptom control, patient autonomy, and a 
multidisciplinary approach to comprehensive patient and fami- 
ly care. 
The day's second session was chaired by Commissioner 
Frances K. Graham; the witnesses were Steve Lipton, an  
attorney who had been a legislative assistant to Assemblyman 
Barry Keene when the Natural Death Act was passed; William 
Thompson, a Ph.D. candidate in psychology and a law student 
at Stanford University; Sister Corinne Bayley, director of 
bioethics teaching for a group of hospitals in California; Dr. 
Francis Healy, a private practitioner from Burlingame, Califor- 
nia, who chairs the California Medical Association (CMA) 
Committee on Evolving Trends; and Bruce Miller, a philoso- 
pher and assistant coordinator of the medical humanities 
program at  Michigan State University who worked on the 
proposed Michigan Medical Treatment Decision Act. 
Mr. Lipton stated that the legislative findings section of the 
preamble to the Natural Death Act, affirming the principle of 
autonomy in the face of fatal diseases, constitutes the Act's 
most significant portion. Thompson reported research on the 
understanding and use of the Natural Death Act, which 
demonstrated wide variability and substantial misunderstand- 
ing of the law among physicians. Sister Bayley testified that the 
Natural Death Act can be important in patient care when it 
leads to communication between patients and care givers but 
that it rarely changes preexisting decision patterns. Notwith- 
standing the broad statement of rights in the Act's preamble, 
she noted that the existence of legal liabilities has encouraged 
a perception among physicians and nurses that they are 
obligated to treat every patient with every possible beneficial 
modality of care not excluded by a valid "directive." She 
believes there ought to be little obligation to provide the 
intervention if it offers very little prospect of recovery. 
Besides reporting the results of the CMA's survey on the 
use of "living wills," Dr. Healy testified that he believes 
patients want (and physicians are comfortable with) oral and 
, joint decisionmaking, which is made awkward by written 
forms and technicalities. Dr. Healy also acknowledged that he 
usually talks with families about patients, but the content of 
the discussion is different than in conversations with patients. 
He stated that physicians do not and should not force explicit 
information upon patients. Miller reported on the model 
legislation that was proposed in Michigan for designating in 
advance a proxy decisionmaker and attributed the bill's failure 
to the opposition of the Right to Life Council and the Michigan 
Catholic Conference. 
Commissioner Renee C. Fox presided over the afternoon 
sessions. The first panel, on actions leading to death, consisted 
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- - -  -- 
of Leslie S. Rothenberg, an  attorney, and Dr. Robert Kaiser. 
who are Co-Chairmen of the Joint a d  h o c Committee on 
Biomedical Ethics of the Los Angeles County Medical Associa- 
tion and the Los Angles County Bar Association; Dr. Lawrence 
Pitts, Chief of Neurosurgery at San Francisco General Hospital; 
Dr. Joseph K. Indenbaum, Medical Director of the County 
Department of Health Services; and George Oakes, Deputy 
District Attorney for Los Angeles County. Rothenberg re- 
viewed the process that led to the a d  hoc committee's 
"Guidelines for Discontinuation of Life-Support," which apply 
to mechanical respirators or ventilators, and outlined the 
guidelines' accomplishments and shortcomings. Dr. Kaiser 
reported that the guidelines have had some impact on physi- 
cians and have been the subject of substantial discussion. 
Oakes stated that the guidelines had been helpful by making 
the community standard of medical practice clearer, by 
clarifying the legality of certain actions, and by focusing public 
education and discussion. 
Beginning with a description of "persistent vegetative 
state" (PVS), based on his studies of head injury, Dr. Pitts 
testified that he usually provides vigorous support for all 
potential PVS patients for the first month; before this time, he 
does not believe that the data are adequate to estimate 
prognosis reliably. If the patient remains vegetative thereafter, 
Dr. Pitts initiates no new therapy. 
Dr. Indenbaum reported the origin, composition, and 
activities of the Citizen's Committee on Life-Support Policies, 
which promulgated guidelines for nonresuscitation ("no-code") 
in county hospitals. 
The day's final panel discussed affirmative steps to end 
life in terminal situations. The first witness, Dr. Richard Scott, 
who is also a lawyer, spoke a s  General Counsel of Hemlock, a 
Los Angeles-based organization that supports legalization of 
active, voluntary euthanasia. Dr. Scott noted that although 
terminally ill patients who wish to die peacefully have the right 
to leave hospitals and die, doing so may entail substantial 
suffering and practical difficulties. He also argued that the 
distinction between voluntary and involuntary suicide is 
paramount; the voluntary request of the dying person should 
be a defense against charges of homicide -or assisting suicide. 
The final witness was  Edwin Shneidman, Professor of Thana- 
tology at UCLA, who talked about the difficulties in assessing 
rationality and  voluntariness. 
During the time set aside for public comment, the Commis- 
sion heard from Dr. Richard J. Lesco, of Torrance, California, 
who suggested that any policy with respect to consent regard- 
ing treatment of incompetent, dying patients should exonerate 
health care providers who make a "good-faith effort" to obtain 
consent from a relative or friend. 
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October 23, 1981 
During a Commission meeting that discussed common 
themes in the Commission's work, James M. Gustafson, 
Professor of Theological Ethics at the University of Chicago, 
presented a case study on decisions to forego treatment of a n  
infant in a neonatal intensive care unit. An extensive discus- 
sion ensued about the moral relevance of the effects on the 
family and involved health care personnel of a decision not to 
treat an  infant. The Commissioners agreed that it is sometimes 
appropriate to consider the effects that extending a person's 
life has on the quality of life of others, but that serious ethical 
problems can arise when such considerations play a large part 
in individual decisions or when the economic effects are 
treated differently for people dependent on public programs 
from those who are not. 
December 12,   1981 
At this meeting, the Commissioners considered the issues 
raised by cardiac resuscitation of hospitalized patients and by 
the decision against resuscitation, a s  set forth in a paper 
drafted for possible inclusion in the report. Dr. Sol Edelstein, 
director of the emergency room at  George Washington Univer- 
sity Hospital in Washington, D.C., served a s  a resource person 
for the discussion. It was  noted that the decision to write a "no- 
code" or "do not resuscitate" order assumes that death would 
be preferable to the life the patient would experience after 
resuscitation; moreover, since advance deliberation is possi- 
ble, institutional policies to guide decisionmaking may be 
ethically and legally desirable. 
The Commission also discussed treatment options   for 
permanently unconscious patients, for which neurologist David 
Levy of  Cornell University Medical Center in New York City 
served a s  a resource expert. Dr. Levy stated that the term 
"permanently unconscious patient" is a useful term to encom- 
pass subcategories of unconscious patients with different 
etiologies. Although prognosis studies for some subcategories 
are just beginning, Dr. Levy and his colleagues have found that 
the diagnosis can be made reliably for certain types of 
patients. In response to questions, Dr. Levy confirmed that 
from what is known of the nervous system it is highly unlikely 
that unconscious people feel pain. 
January 8 - 9,   1982 
During the first day of this hearing, the Commission 
continued the previous month's discussions of decisions to 
resuscitate hospital patients and of the care of those who are 
permanently unconscious. The thrust of the draft chapters was 
approved, and numerous suggestions were made for revisions 
in specific language and for the addition of further points. 
On January 9, Commissioner Fox presided over the 
morning's discussion of neonatal intensive care, which began
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with three witnesses from the Intensive Care Nursery at  
Children's Hospital in Washington, D.C. (Dr. Anne Fletcher, the 
Director; Carole Kennon, a social worker with major responsi- 
bility for the concerns of families; and Judy Brown, a nurse 
practitioner) and Jeanne Guillemin, a sociologist from Boston 
College who had spent over a year as  a participant-observer in 
neonatal intensive care units in the United States and six other 
countries. 
After Dr. Fletcher presented three case vignettes to 
illustrate the complexities of decisionmaking in neonatal 
intensive care, she and her colleagues described the team 
techniques used at Children's Hospital with parents who must 
suddenly face coping with decisions about their very ill 
newborn. The witnesses urged that nontreatment for babies 
with a very poor chance of recovery or of independent function 
should be possible and that the choice should rest principally 
with the parents. 
The relationships among professionals, between the com- 
munity and the hospital, and among hospitals were described 
by Guillemin, who pointed out that the setting is very complex 
from a sociological viewpoint. She listed some of the numerous 
decision points from delivery to resolution, noting that most of 
the serious conflict about treatment decisions comes from the 
inclusion of "marginal cases" within the sphere of treatment. 
She observed that, in other countries, clear guidelines exist to 
preclude referral of marginally viable newborns. Guillemin felt 
strongly that emphasis by public and private agencies on 
developing facilities and personnel for neonatal intensive care 
has not been balanced by appropriate concern for prevention 
of neonatal problems. 
A second panel on the obligation to sustain the life of the 
infant consisted of John Fletcher, assistant for bioethics 
working at the National Institutes of Health; Philip Devine, 
Professor of Philosophy at the University of Scranton in 
Pennsylvania; and Mary Anne Warren, a Professor of Philoso- 
phy at San Francisco State University. Warren initiated the 
discussion by conceptualizing the factors that would, in her 
view, justify foregoing life-sustaining treatment, such as the 
expected length of an infant's life, its quality, and the effects of 
the treatment on family members. Devine disagreed with the 
thrust of these remarks; he stated his belief that a newborn. 
must be considered to be as fully human and in the same 
situation as  an incompetent adult who has not left prior 
directives. Fletcher said that medical criteria regarding out- 
comes should be primary and that the physician bears an 
obligation to present the facts with a recommendation as  to the 
justifiable course of action; he was opposed, however, to 
allowing physicians to administer active euthanasia. Warren 
stated that in her view it is sometimes mandatory to kill in 
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order to prevent terrible suffering while dying. In regard to 
whether feeding an infant has a special moral claim, all 
panelists agreed that the claim to ordinary feeding is usually 
stronger than the claim for artificial feeding, and that there are 
reasons that justify foregoing artificial feeding that would not 
apply to ordinary feeding. 
Commissioner Donald W. Medearis presided over the 
afternoon session, during which the elements of responsible 
decisionmaking about very sick newborns were discussed. The 
participants were Dr. Raymond Duff, a pediatrician involved 
principally in primary care residency training at Yale-New 
Haven Medical Center, who in 1973 co-authored the first 
systematic description of nontreatment decisions for infants; 
Dr. Norman Fost, a pediatrician who directs the medical ethics 
program at  the University of Wisconsin Medical School at 
Madison; Dr. Peter Auld, a neonatologist who directs the 
neonatal intensive care unit at  New York Hospital; and Dr. 
John Freeman, a pediatric neurologist working especially with 
children with spina bifida at Johns Hopkins Hoqpital. 
Dr. Duff characterized the best for decisions 
about life-sustaining therapy a s  those that are made in private 
and that rest on collaboration between family and physicians 
acting on their own ideologies. While recognizing that such 
decisions usually have some self-serving elements, Dr. Duff 
argued that the "pro-life" ideology misuses the homicide laws 
when it makes prudent and responsible decisions seem to be 
malicious. Dr. Fost characterized a high-quality proxy decision- 
maker as a dispassionate person who has the full facts and has 
disinterested status, and stated that parents frequently fall 
seriously short of this ideal. Dr. Auld pointed out that there are 
three major groups for whom decisionmaking problems arise: 
obvious nonsurvivors, patients without family members capa- 
ble of participating effectively in decisions, and patients with 
chronically handicapping conditions compatible with a fairly 
long life. Dr. Freeman advocated that all babies should be 
intensively treated until the outcome is more clear even if this 
means having to (and being able to) actively kill some very 
handicapped survivors. Dr. Fost responded that active eutha- 
nasia could be moral and humane, but that there may be 
important social reasons to preclude active euthanasia. He 
emphasized the importance of avoiding the feeling of urgency 
in making decisions and the importance of a general preference 
to accept unwarranted suffering over unwarranted death. 
In order to limit abuses of various forms of foregoing 
therapy, Dr. Fost recommended establishing institutional re- 
view boards on the model of those established for research. Dr. 
Duff agreed that procedural guidance is needed, but empha- 
sized that such procedures should safeguard the integrity of the 
family. 
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February 13,  1982 
The second day of the Commission's February meeting 
was devoted entirely to the issues arising from neonatal 
intensive care. The session was chaired by Commissioner 
Albert R. Jonsen, who suggested a tripartite classification 
scheme for seriously ill newborns: those who will die despite 
therapy, those for whom prolonged therapy will sustain life but 
not cure the affliction, and those whose life-threatening 
condition can be corrected but who will still have other, severe 
handicaps. The possibility of and justification for Jonsen's 
scheme and alternative ones were the subjects of the Commis- 
sion's deliberations, with special emphasis on the diagnostic 
and prognostic uncertainties surrounding all categories. It was  
agreed that therapy may be foregone both in the first category 
and in the second category when it will be futile. The 
Commissioners rejected the notion that the decisions should be 
made according to a formula based on babies' weight, height, 
and so forth. The different meanings of "nonintervention" 
when no effective treatment exists and when medicine does 
possess the technical means of treatment were discussed; 
specific interventions were also discussed. The Commission 
concluded that these differences, a s  well a s  appropriate 
decisionmaking mechanisms, should be spelled out in the 
Report. 
June  10-11, 1982 
On the first day of this meeting, a panel of physicians 
focused on the potential import of the Commission's report for 
national health policy and clinical decisionmaking. The panel- 
ists included Dr. Ronald Cranford, a neurologist at  Hennepin 
County Medical Center in Minneapolis, Minnesota; Dr. Mitch- 
ell Rabkin, Medical Director of the Beth Israel Hospital in 
Boston; and Daniel Callahan, Director of the Institute of 
Society, Ethics and the Life Sciences (the Hastings Center). Dr. 
Cranford noted the role of hospital ethics committees in 
facilitating communication, fostering education, and providing 
public accountability. While cautioning against viewing these 
committees a s  a decisionmaking panacea, Dr. Cranford noted 
that only a small percent of hospitals have such bodies and 
suggested more institutions should be encouraged to establish 
and evaluate them. Both Dr. Cranford and Dr. Rabkin praised 
the Commission's Report a s  advocating a good, balanced 
policy. Callahan urged that particular attention be paid to the 
costs of care for the dying and the social context into which the 
report would fit. The Commissioners and witnesses also 
discussed the changing attitudes of patients and providers 
toward foregoing life-sustaining therapy. 
The morning's second panel, devoted to a conceptual 
analysis of the draft Report, included Dr. Callahan, from the 
first session; Joel Feinberg, Professor of Philosophy at the 
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University of Arizona in Tucson; and Richard A. McCormick,
S.J., S.T.D., of the Kennedy Institute's Center for Bioethics in 
Washington, D.C. Much of their discussion centered on Chap- 
ter Two, especially its treatment of the traditional philosophi- 
cal distinctions, such a s  acting versus refraining, intended 
outcomes versus merely foreseen consequences, and ordinary 
versus extraordinary treatment. 
Feinberg termed critical the distinction between general 
rules and actions in individual cases and pointed out the need 
for legislatures to err on the safe side in seeking a balance 
between justified killings and unjustified prolongations of life, 
noting that permissibility does not always equal justifiability. 
Father McCormick expressed grave reservations about the 
discussion of the traditional distinctions, beginning with that of 
allowing to die versus killing. He suggested replacing the 
hypothetical case then included in that discussion with a series 
of examples more germane to the medical setting that would 
highlight dangers of abuse and coercion. Callahan cautioned 
against mixing questions of fact and value, and called the issue 
of what ought legitimately to be a part of a public policy 
statement the biggest problem for the report. 
In a session devoted to comments from members of the 
public, Dr. James J. Smith, Director of the Nuclear Medicine 
Service at  the Veterans Administration Central Office, speak- 
ing on his own behalf, disagreed with Father McCormick's 
view of the value of life for those incapable of human 
interaction, stating that communication might be possible even 
with patients in persistent vegetative state. John Paris, S.J., of 
the University of Massachusetts Medical School and Holy 
Cross College, urged that Chapter Two be revised and rewrit- 
ten so that it could be of use in teaching medical students 
about ethical issues. Dr. Olga Fairfax, founder of United 
Methodists for Life, raised the recent case of Infant Doe in 
Indiana, calling the decision "not to treat" an  Orwellian 
euphemism for starvation. 
A panel on public policy and legal implications-Dr. 
Willard Gaylin, psychoanalyst and President of the Hastings
Center; John Robertson, Professor at the University of Wiscon- 
sin Law School; and Robert Burt, Professor at  the Yale Law 
School-made wide-ranging suggestions for improving the 
draft. Dr. Gaylin sounded a general call against lawyers' and 
philosophers' infatuation with hard cases and decried the 
popularity of framing issues in terms of "rights," with its 
tendency towards binary options and absolutes. He also urged 
a reevaluation of the Report's emphasis on the patient a s  an  
individual, in favor of a less isolated view of the patient a s  part 
of a network of family and friends. Robertson agreed with the 
tone of Chapters One and Two, but suggested they be more 
directly grounded in public policy questions. He also cautioned 
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that the establishment of ethics committees raises a number of 
legal issues, including composition, liability of members, legal 
effect of decisions, the source of authority, and the applicabili- 
ty of conspiracy and other criminal actions against ethics 
committee members who ratify decisions not to treat. 
Burt urged increased attention to the possibility of educa- 
tion and training for those who deal with the dying a s  
professionais, volunteers, or family members. Regarding in- 
competent patients, Burt urged a clearer identification of who 
is to be guardian, a s  well a s  a sharper delineation of the 
guardian's role, spelling out what training and capacities might 
be required. He suggested that the Report may encourage too 
ready resort to the courts, which might place too high a value 
on objectivity and leave no room for the moral ambiguity and 
anguish that should accompany decisions not to treat. 
Finally, the Department of Health and Human Services' 
letter to hospitals warning that decisions to withhold treatment 
for handicapped newborns violates Federal law and could 
jeopardize their receipt of Federal funds sparked critical 
comments by both witnesses and the Commissioners. 
On the second day of the June meeting the Commissioners 
continued deliberating on the draft Report, especially a s  it 
portrayed the standards and procedures for decisionmaking on 
behalf of patients who do not have the capacity to make their 
own health care decisions. It was  also decided that the 
criticism of the traditional distinctions in Chapter Two should 
be less severe, since these distinctions are of continuing 
value-if the label does not merely serve to substitute for 
appropriate analysis-to people who must decide actual cases. 
During the public comment session, Stephanie Ezrol of 
Lyndon Larouche's National Democratic Policy Committee 
read from the Nuremberg War  Crimes Trial and said that 
legalizing "euthanasia" is tantamount to murder. 
August 13,  1982 
The morning session of this meeting was devoted to a 
discussion of the sections of the draft Report on the effect of 
institutional arrangements on the decisions of patients and on 
decisionmaking about seriously ill newborns. During the 
morning's public comment session Barbara T. Syska of Silver 
Spring, Maryland, urged more attention to the prevention of 
central nervous system defects in newborns. 
October 8-9,  1982 
The Commission considered in detail a draft of the full 
Report, directing the staff to make various modifications and 
expansions. During the session scheduled for public comment, 
the Commission heard from Harris Coulter, a medical histori- 
an, who pointed out the important role of third-party payors 
and hospitals, which in his view encourage continued treat- 
ment of patients on life-support systems because of the profit 
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motive. Earl Appleby, a staff member of Senator Jesse Helms 
(R-N.C.), speaking in his capacity as a private citizen, defended 
the medical profession against any venal motives in offering 
life-prolonging therapy, based upon the experiences he and his 
mother have had in caring for his comatose father at  home for 
several years. Ronald Kokinda, representing the National 
Democratic Policy Committee, testified that decisions to forego 
life-sustaining therapy reflect a "cultural pessimism" and a 
giving-up on life. Dr. Dorothy Henneman, a practicing physi- 
cian, encouraged the Commission to present and evaluate the 
philosophical issues involved in the Report. 
November 12, 1982 
The Commission discussed the modifications made in the 
draft, especially as  they related to Chapter Two, and examined 
point-by-point the summary of conclusions in the introduction 
to the Report. 
December 15, 1982 
The Commission reviewed the changes' directed at the 
November meeting and adopted the Report unanimously, with 
directions on necessary editorial changes and completion of 
the references before publication. 
Mr. Fred Benjamin, a Department of Transportation em- 
ployee, spoke on his own behalf concerning the importance of 
educating people to make informed medical decisions. A letter 
from Dr. Joseph G. Zimring, F.A.A.F.P., on decisions to forego 
treatment and on the definition of death was read into the 
record. 
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In few areas of health care are people's evaluations of 
their experiences so varied and uniquely personal as in their 
assessments of the nature and value of the processes associ- 
ated with dying. For some, every moment of life is of 
inestimable value; for others, life without some desired level of 
mental or physical ability is worthless or burdensome. A 
moderate degree of suffering may be an important means of 
personal growth and religious experience to one person, but 
only frightening or despicable to another. Helping patients 
whose very definitions of what counts as health and disease 
are so different requires the utmost sensitivity and wisdom of 
health care professionals. 
Dying has many common symptoms and manifestations; 
their medical treatment is considered in this Appendix. How- 
ever, first it is important to remember that dying is not 
principally a "disease" calling for medical "remedies." Primari- 
ly, dying is the extinguishing of a human life, and those who 
provide medical care while patients are dying cannot effective- 
ly treat symptoms without caring for the patient as a person. 
Patients and their families will commonly be feeling great 
stress. The practitioner will have to be careful to accommodate 
the patient's priorities. Finding some meaning in death or 
saying farewell to family and friends may well be more 
important for a person than having a bowel obstruction treated 
or a dressing changed. 
The goals for those who provide care for a dying patient 
include: 
(1) Competent diagnosis, therapy, and prognosis. Medi- 
cal skill and clinical acumen are extremely valuable 
as the patient's medical condition deteriorates, and 
compassion and respect for the patient ought never 
to be allowed to substitute for competent care. 
(2) Symptom control to allow the patient to live as fully 
as possible. 
(3) Advancing the patient's life goals and making avail- 
able those experiences that the patient values. 
(4) Personal loyalty and reliability. Trust is very impor- 
tant to the patient's peace of mind, and is undercut 
by unreliability, dishonesty, evasiveness, hubris, or 
abandonment by significant others. 
(5) Help for family and friends during the patient's dying 
and during bereavement. 
(6) Comprehensive attention, involving an appropriate 
team of care givers and an appropriate institutional 
or home setting. With such support, people who 
prefer to do so can usually die at home. 
Supportive Care for Dying Patients 
General Management 
Skillful evaluation of a patient's history and physical 
examination and frequent review of the care plan will save 
dying patients more trouble than any drugs and tests could. 
Often, getting a definitive diagnosis of a complication would 
entail rehospitalization or distressing invasive procedures. 
However, knowledge of the natural history of a patient's 
diseases, the careful taking of an individual's history, and a 
skillful physical examination can in many cases make a 
presumptive diagnosis sufficiently certain to warrant the 
initiation of appropriate ameliorative therapy. Sometimes the 
diagnosis may be uncertain but all the remediable etiologies 
respond to fairly simple and acceptable therapies, so one or 
more treatment trials can be undertaken without a definitive 
diagnosis. 
Often people who are dying have multiple organ failures, 
making deleterious side effects of drugs and therapies even 
more common than in their general application. Drugs cleared 
through the kidney almost invariably require reduced dosage, 
either in amount per dose or frequency. 
The goals of medical practice should not be limited to 
improving a patient's health, but they must also include 
enhancing his or her self-respect and self-determination. For 
dying patients, who are in fact losing control over their lives in 
the most central way, control over the decisions that are still to 
be made is often very important. Some physicians deny this 
benefit through simple inattention or a rationalization that they 
are protecting the patient. Although patients expect tact and 
sympathy from their physicians, all available evidence indi- 
cates that they want to be included in decisionmaking about 
their care. Physicians and others who care for dying patients 
need to develop skills in communicating with patients and 
families so that most decisions about resuscitation, aggressive 
care, institutional arrangements, and symptom control remain 
the patient's. 
Symptom Control 
Nearly all dying patients have symptoms that can be 
relieved by judicious medical intervention. The symptom most 
feared in advance is pain, but mental function disturbances, 
nausea, diarrhea, constipation, infections, skin sores, and 
respiratory difficulty are also very distressing and often 
remediable as  well. In this section some of the most common 
symptoms and approaches to controlling them are delineated. 
Controlling symptoms sometimes requires relatively ag- 
gressive therapies.' The fact that a patient has only a few 
 
1 See e.g., D.S. Robbie, Addendum: Nerve Blocks and Other Proce-
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weeks or months left is relevant to the decision to use 
palliative radiotherapy or diverting colostomy-but a brief 
prognosis should not be taken to preclude these aggressive 
treatments. Rather, the individual's situation and likely course 
with each of various interventions should be considered 
carefully by the physician, other care providers, the patient, 
family, and friends. Sometimes, not only aggressive treatment 
of current symptoms but also aggressive treatment to forestall 
likely future symptoms is justified. Making the decision to 
undertake aggressive or risky treatments will often be unavoid- 
ably difficult, since it forces decisionmakers to confront the 
ambiguities of prognosis and the uncertainty of therapeutic 
effects. 
Pain. Only a minority of dying patients-fewer than half of 
those with malignancies, for example-have substantial prob- 
lems with pain,2  yet many people fear pain while dying more 
than death itself. Acute pain, a s  from an injury, is the healthy 
body's way of protecting the injured part and taking steps to 
repair it. On the other hand, chronic and progressive pain often 
serves no useful function; instead it wastes the patient's 
strength and resolve and destroys whatever value he or she 
could have found in living. Fortunately, the chronic pain of 
dying patients in almost always fairly easy to control. 
First, the care givers should seek a remediable cause: 
pathologic fractures, for example, usually deserve specific 
intervention rather than drugs.3 I n fact, pathologic fractures 
can often be averted by prophylactic nailing. Radiation therapy 
or chemotherapy of tumors can prevent or relieve symptoms, 
even when cure is not possible. 
Second, anxiety and fear must be mitigated. Pain is 
extremely subjective. A standard painful stimulus is perceived 
- -- 
dures, in Cicely M. Saunders, ed., THE MANAGEMENT OF TERMINAL 
DISEASE, Edward Arnold Publishers Ltd., London (1978) at 92; Thelma 
D. Bates, Radiotherapy in Terminal Care, id. at 119; Thelma D. Bates 
and Therese Vanier, Palliation b y  Cytotoxic Chemotherapy and 
Hormone Therapy, id. at 125; Michael R. Williams, The Place of 
Surgery in Terminal Care, id. at 134; B.A. Meyerson, The Role of 
Neurosurgery in the Treatment of Cancer Pain, 74 ACTA ANESTH. 
SCAND. (Supp.) 109 (1982); S. Arner, The Role of Nerve Blocks in the 
Treatment of Cancer, id. at 104; C. Bolund, Pain Relief through 
Radiotherapy and Chemotherapy, id. at 114. See also, a collection of 
general and specific articles in International Symposium on Pain of 
Advanced Cancer, in John J. Bonica et al., eds., 2 ADVANCES IN PAIN 
RESEARCH AND THERAPY, Raven Press, New York (1979) (hereinafter 
cited as  SYMPOSIUM ON PAIN); Robert G. Twycross and Vittorio
Ventafridda, eds., THE CONTINUING CARE OF TERMINAL CANCER 
PATIENTS, Pergamon Press, New York (1980). 
Robert G. Twycross, Relief of Pain, in Saunders, supra not 1,  at 66. 
Id. at 88-90. 
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as much worse if the patient is tired, afraid, isolated, or 
    d e p r e s s e d . 4 Although some psychological problems warrant 
specific therapy (as discussed in the next section), surprisingly 
effective results can be obtained with a calm, competent, and 
reassuring approach by care givers. A nurse or physician who 
can say with assurance that a patient need never (or never 
again) feel overwhelmed by pain, and who proceeds to 
demonstrate the truth of the assertion, greatly eases the 
patient's mind and reduces his or her attentiveness to the pain. 
Conversely, the most potent stimulus to fear of pain, and thus 
to increased pain, is inadequately treated pain. Patients who 
obtain short periods of relief with a narcotic followed by 
periods of pain while waiting for a next dose become trained to 
fear the expected onset of pain while pain-free and to actively 
seek the drug constantly.5  Such behavior commonly alienates 
hospital staff and leads to increased isolation. Adequate 
treatment for the pain can break this cycle. 
Narcotics. If a patient's pain is uncontrolled, the primary 
aim is to control it; risking a period of sedation is not usually a 
contraindication to fully effective doses. For rapid and flexible 
control initially, intramuscular or subcutaneous6 morphine is 
unsurpassed. In a patient who has not been on narcotics, 2-5 
mg. parenterally (using a higher dosage with younger and 
heavier patients in better general condition and a lower one in 
frail, thin, or elderly patients or those with reduced respiratory 
reserve) given every 15-30 minutes with constant observation 
is uniformly effective. For patients who have been taking 
narcotics without sufficient relief, giving 1.5 to 2 times the 
previous dose is usually an effective alternative initial dose. 
Once the patient is untroubled or asleep, the care giver can 
judge how sensitive the patient is and how severe the pain, and 
a regular regimen can be started. If control was achieved with 
one or two low doses, non-opioid analgesics (see p. 284 infra) 
with or without codeine (30-60 mg. orally every 3-6 hours) may 
be sufficient. If more was needed, initial use of oral hydromor-
phone or morphine is probably better. 
Control of pain with narcotics involves continual experi-
mention to keep the dose in the zone between oversedation on 
the one hand and recurrence of pain on the other, so that the 
uatient stays fairly alert but pain-free. Most patients have a 
Id. at 68; C. Richard Chapman, Psychologic and Behavorial Aspects 
of Cancer Pain,  in SYMPOSIUM ON PAIN, supra note 1,  at 45. 
 Twycross, supra note 2, at 71-72. 
The effectiveness and time course of narcotics is approximately 
equal for intramuscular and subcutaneous adminstration. Jerome H. 
Jaffe and William R. Martin, Opioid Analgesics and Antagonists, in 
Alfred Goodman Gilman, Louis S. Goodman, and Alfred Gilman, eds., 
GOODMAN AND Gilman's the PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS, 
Macmillan Pub. Co., New York (6th ed. 1980) at 494. 
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substantial "therapeutic window," though what doses achieve 
it and at what frequency do change over time.' For a few 
patients, especially when death is close, there is no such zone 
and the physician, with the patient's or family's concurrence, 
must be willing to accept sedation if pain is to be avoided. 
Oral medications are preferred to parenteral whenever 
 course, patients demonstrate substantial variabil- 
ity in their oral-parenteral ratio with each drug
g 
and similar 
variability in their individual ratio between drugs.1° However, 
all narcotics are less potent orally, sometimes dramatically son 
(see Table B1, p. 281 infra). Oral administration gives more 
constant blood and cerebrospinal fluid levels than intermittant 
parenteral dosing. Furthermore, parenteral administration to a 
dying patient so often becomes difficult as the muscle mass 
wastes and the superficial circulation is reduced. The patient 
also has more control over the oral route. Many patients find 
liquid preparations easier to take than tablets and capsules. A 
few patients benefit from the availability of narcotic supposito- 
ries12 (morphine, hydromorphone (Dilaudid 3 mg.), or oxymor- 
phone (Numorphan 5  mg.)) but bioavailability is variable. Yet 
suppositories can sometimes permit home care when a pa- 
tient's family cannot administer injectable medications. 
Physicians should become very familiar with a small 
number of narcotics, rather than using each of the numerous 
preparations only occasionally. Codeine for moderate pain, 
morphine or hydromorphone for moderate or severe pain, and 
methadone (Dolophine) or levorphanol (Levo-Diomoran) for 
fairly stable severe pain are sufficient for almost all narcotic 
needs. Codeine in usual doses has moderate efficacy, lasts 3-6 
hours when given orally, and has few side effects except 
constipation and occasional nausea. 
Morphine and hydromorphone are usually effective for 
about 3-4 hours and the dosage can be increased sufficiently to 
overcome almost any severe pain. At higher doses, morphine is 
thought to be more reliable than hydromorphone but it may 
cause nausea more often. However, hydromorphone is easily 
abused and is therefore sometimes difficult to obtain from 
 7 Twycross, supra note 2, at 71-72, 83-85; William T. Beaver, Manage- 
ment of Cancer Pain with Parenteral Medication, 244 J.A.M.A. 2653 
(1980); L.K. Paalzow, Pharmacokinetic Aspects of Optimal Pain 
Treatment, 74 ACTA ANESTH. SCAND. (Suppl.) 37 (1982). 
Beaver, supra note 7. 
Jaffe and Martin, supra note 6, at 507-09. 
Jack McKay Zimmerman, HOSPICE: COMPLETE CARE FOR THE 
TERMINALLY ILL, Urban & Schwarzenberg. Baltimore (1981) at 67. 
 
11 Jaffe and Martin, supra note 6, at 505-506; Charles E. Inturrisi, 
Narcotic Drugs, in Marcus Reidenberg, ed.. Clinical Pharmacology of 
Symptom Control, 66 THE  Medical           CLINICS OF NORTH America 1061 
(1982). 
 Twycross, supra note 2, a t  76. 
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Table B1: 
Approximate Equianalgesic Doses of Narcotics When Used 
for Chronic Pain* 
Drug 
Codeine 
Morphine 
Hydro- 
morphone
Methadone 
Levorphanol 
P.O. (mg.) I.M. or SQ. I Usual Effective dose (mg.) Interval (hrs.) 
10 mg. 
1.5 
3-4 t  i.m. and sq.,
4-6  p.o.
3-4  i.m. or sq., 
4-6  p.o.
3-4  i.m. or sq., 
4-6 p.o. 
Doses from Raymond W. Houde. Systemic Analgesics and Related Drugs: 
Narcotic Analgesics, in John J. Bonica and Vittorio Ventafridda, eds., 
INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON PAIN OF ADVANCED CANCER. 2 ADVANCES IN PAIN 
RESEARCH AND THERAPY, Raven Press, New York (1979) at 266; modified a s  
noted. Intervals from personal communication with Dr. Raymond Houde (Jan. 
1983),  modified a s  noted. 
t  Although these are the approximate doses of codeine to equal the analgesic 
effect of 10 mg. parenteral morphine, patients who need more than 100 mg. 
codeine orally or 60 mg. parenterally usually are switched to one of the more 
potent drugs. The ratio of oral codeine to oral morphine for equianalgesia is 
quite variable, having been reported to be a s  much as  13 :1 ;  R.W. Houde, S.L. 
Wallenstein, and W.T. Beaver, Clinical Measurement of Pain, in G. de Steuras,  
ed., ANALCETICS, Academic Press, New York (1965) a t  75.92. 
t The effective interval for codeine is often given a s  4-6 hours; see e.g. Alfred 
Goodman Gilman, Louis S. Goodman. and Alfred Gilman, eds., GOODMAN AND 
Gilman's ThE PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS. Macmillan Pub. Co.. 
New York (6th ed. 1980) at  507. Many clinicians are finding (and Houde has  
confirmed in cross-over studies) that the effective interval is actually close to 
that of morphine, about 3-4 hours, especially in parenteral administration; 
personal communication with Dr. Raymond Houde (Jan. 1983). 
** There is substantial uncertainty a s  to the correct oral-parenteral ratio for 
morphine. In single doses. the ratio is conventially given a s  6 :1
(o ra l :  pa ren te ra l ) ;   Gilman, Goodman, and Gilman, supra note t, at 507; Houde, 
supra note*, at  266. However, in chronic use, the ratio seems to be lower. 
Robert G. Twycross, The Brompton Cocktail, in Bonica and Ventafridda. supra 
note*. at  291, 293. postulates a ratio with morphine solution of  3:1 (oral to 
parenteral). Others feel it may well be a s  low as  2:1 Paul D. Henteleff and 
Elliot Fingerote. Clinical Study of Relative Effectiveness of Narcotics, at the 
5th Annual Meeting and 8th Symposium of the National Hospice Organization, 
Washington, Nov. 9, 1982. The value used here, 4:1 (oral to parenteral) was  
suggested by Dr. William Beaver (personal communication, Dec.1982) a s  a 
reasonable estimate for the usual progression from oral medications to 
parenteral, which, in potentially underestimating the correct dose, entails a 
readily remediable error. 
11 The best dosing interval for methadone is uncertain. Despite a long plasma 
half-life (15-30 hours: Charles E. Inturrisi. Narcotic Drugs, in Marcus Reiden- 
berg, ed., Clinical Pharmacology of Symptom Control, 66 THE MEDICAL CLINICS 
 of  NORTH AMERICA 1061, 1065 (1982)). the analgesic effect parenterally often is 
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only as long as morphine ( e.g., 3-5 hours; personal communication from 
Raymond Houde, Jan. 1983). Yet, using methadone at such frequent intervals 
often leads to confusion in the first few days. In chronic use, methadone might 
be given frequently (every 4 hours) for the first 24 hours, then the interval 
reduced to 1-3 times per day or the dosage reduced; L. Paalzow. L. Nelson, and 
P. Stenberg. Pharmacokinetic Basis for Optimal Methadone Treatment of Pain 
in Cancer Patients, 74 ACTA ANESTH. SCAND. (Suppl.) 55 (1982). See also, J. 
Sawe et al., Patient-controlled Dose Regimen of Methadone for Chronic 
Cancer Pain. 282 BRIT. MED. J. 771 (Mar. 1981); David S. Ettinger. Paul J. Vitale, 
and Donald Trump, Important Clinical Pharmacologic Considerations in the 
Use of Methadone in Cancer Patients. 63 CANCER TREATMENT REPORTS 457 
(1979). 
tt Robert G.  Twycross, Relief of Pain, in Cicely M. Saunders, ed., THE 
MANAGEMENT OF TERMINAL DISEASE, Edward Arnold Publishers Ltd.. London 
(1978) at 66, 77-78. gives this interval for levophanol. Its pharmacokinetics and 
existing research base parallel methadone, though its structure is different and 
its plasma half-life is shorter (12-16 hours, Inturrisi, supra note t, at  1065). It 
may be similar in having a relatively brief analgesic effect, especially in the 
first few days of use, and a tendency to accumulate with detrimental mental 
effects unless dosage is reduced. 
from outpatient pharmacies. The volume of narcotic for 
intramuscular use or the number of tablets for oral use can 
become unsettling to the physician or nurse and unacceptable 
to the patient. The professional should be reassured to know 
that some patients have required over 300 mg. of morphine 
orally every 3 hours and over 200 mg. intramuscularly every 2-3 
hours. As long as the patient is awake and in pain, the dose is 
not too high. However, such high doses may entail many 
tablets or unacceptably large or frequent parenteral injections. 
To reduce the volumes for parenteral administration over 
commercially available solutions, crushed hypodermic mor- 
phine sulfate tablets can be dissolved in warmed sterile water. 
At some point, intravenous morphine may be better. Morphine 
can be added to dextrose or electrolyte solution in whatever 
concentration is necessary, usually 1 mg./ml. initially. To 
prevent accidental overdose, either an automated rate control 
device or a 1-2  hour infusion volume (as in a Soluset) should be 
used. These high doses are the only time when diamorphine 
(heroin) offers an advantage, since its potency and solubility 
are so much higher that parenteral volumes remain low.13 
Hydromorphone is also very soluble, but concentrated solu- 
tions must be made up from the powdered drug and filtered by 
a pharmacist. 
For patients who seem to be stable for a period of weeks 
or months, a longer-acting narcotic is sometimes helpful. Either 
methadone or levorphanol can at times be given orally two or 
three times a day, thereby allowing the patient to sleep all 
night and to go about daily tasks without constantly attending 
to the next drug dose. Some patients use one of these most of 
 
13 Id. a t  76-77. Diamorphine is not legally available in the U n i t e d
States. 
Supportive Care for Dying Patients 
the time but take a shorter-acting agent as  a booster shortly 
before activities known to worsen pain, such a s  taking a bath 
or transferring from bed to chair. Methadone is reported to 
have a tendency to accumulate and induce oversedation or 
confusion.14 
The physician should know approximate equivalences of 
the most common narcotics preparations and delivery routes 
so that switching among regimens is a s  smooth a s  possible (see 
Table B1,  p. 281 supra). Cross-tolerance is fairly great, but not 
complete.15 Thus it is wise to use about one-quarter less than 
the predicted dose of a new narcotic for the first dose, possibly 
with a supplement in an  hour if needed. 
All narcotics should be given on a fairly regular schedule 
aimed to anticipate the recurrence of pain by having each dose 
take effect just a s  the last one is waning. Sometimes patients 
who are getting adequate pain relief for too short a period 
respond better to increased frequency than to increased 
dosage. In settings where the nurse or other person directly 
caring for the patient understands the pharmacology involved, 
writing orders "prn" is reasonable, a s  it is interpreted to mean 
"as needed to prevent recurrence of pain without undue 
sedation." In the usual hospital setting where "prn" might be 
interpreted to mean "when pain recurs," narcotics should be 
given on a regular schedule and adjustments made on the basis 
of frequent observation by the physician.16 When a previously 
adequate dosage schedule becomes inadequate and no  remedi- 
able cause is found, the patient will often need a potentiating 
drug or to have the total dose of the current narcotic nearly 
doubled to regain good effect. 
Whenever narcotics are used, certainly with dying pa- 
tients, flexibility and confidence are increased by  always 
having naloxone (Narcan, 0.4 mg./ml.) available. One milliliter 
(intravenous, intramuscular, or subcutaneous) will usually 
substantially reverse oversedation and respiratory depression, 
and that dosage may be repeated each 2-3 minutes until 3 ml. 
have been given.17  Usually, just letting the patient sleep until a 
14 Id. at  78; Kathleen M. Foley, The Practical Use of Narcotic 
Analgesics, in Marcus Reidenberg, ed., Clinical Pharmacology of 
Symptom Control, 66 THE MEDICAL CLINICS OF NORTH AMERICA 1091, 
1094-95 (1982). See also explanatory note tt, Table B1at  p. 281 supra. 
15 Raymond W .  Houde, The Use and Misuse of Narcotics in  the 
Treatment of Chronic Pain, in J.J. Bonica, ed., 4 ADVANCES IN 
NEUROLOGY, Raven Press, New York (1974) at 527. 
16 Marcia Angell, The Quality of Mercy (Editorial], 306 NEW ENG. J. 
Med. . 98 (1982); Beaver, supra note 7, at 2655-56;  for documentation of 
the current serious underutilization of narcotics, see Richard M. Marks 
and Edward Sachar, Undertreatment of Medical Inpatients with 
Narcotic Analgesics, 78 ANNALS INT. MED. 173 (1981). 
17 Jaffe and Martin, supra note 6, at 523-25. More tolerant and  
dependent patients are paradoxically sensitive to naloxone. There-
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mild overdose is metabolized is appropriate, but using nalox-
one allows for more diagnostic certainty and protection against 
drug-induced respiratory insufficiency. 
Narcotics commonly cause or worsen constipation and  
nausea, but these effects can be prevented and  t reated. 18
Pharmacologic agents to counteract constipation exacerbated 
by narcotics often are effective only at  2  to 3 times their usual 
dosage. 
Concerns about dying patients becoming addicted to 
narcotics are both mistaken and, in any case, irrelevant. Few 
patients develop problems because of physical dependence. 
Furthermore, if the cause of pain is relieved, narcotics can be  
discontinued over a few days without untoward effects.19 
Furthermore, physical and psychological addiction, when it 
occurs, is not particularly troubling to a patient who is dying, 
nor should it be to care givers. 
Other analgesics and potentiators. Acetaminophen, aspi- 
rin, and the group of nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory agents 
(including indomethacin and phenylbutazone) are often ade- 
quate for the control for pain. They act by different mecha- 
nisms than narcotics, with additive or supra-additive effects, 
thus allowing reduction in narcotic dosage in many cases.20
Also, their anti-inflammatory effects may directly relieve some 
sources of pain such a s  arthritis, contractures, or wounds. Of 
course, the risks of side effects such a s  gastritis or gastrointes- 
tinal bleeding must be considered. 
Agonist-antagonist drugs like pentazocine (Talwin), butor-
phanol (Stadol), and nalbuphine (Nubain) are potent analge- 
sics, though they do have ceiling effects and tend to cause 
psychotomimetic effects at high dose. But butorphanol and  
nalbuphine are only available for parenteral use and have not 
been well evaluated in chronic pain of dying patients. Pentazo-
fore, the standard naloxone preparation might best be diluted and 
administered in fractionated doses to reduce risk of inducing with- 
drawal and severe recurrent pain. For patients with tolerance, 
naloxone reversal is likely to have to be repeated over the ensuing few 
hours. Gilman, Goodman, and Gilman, supra note 6, at 523. 
See pp. 289-91 infra. 
19 Jane Porter and Hershel Jick, Addiction Rare in Patients Treated 
with Narcotics, 302 NEW ENG. J. MED. 123 (1980); Twycross, supra note 
2, a t  82-85. 
20 Thomas G. Kantor, Control of Pain by  Nonsteroidal Anti-Inflamma-
tory Drugs, in Marcus Reidenberg, ed., Clinical Pharmacology of 
Symptom Control, 66 THE MEDICAL CLINICS OF NORTH AMERICA 1053 
(1982); Charles G. Moertel, Relief of Pain in the Cancer Patient. in 
Stephen K.  Carter, Eli Glatstein, and Robert B. Livingston, eds., 
PRINCIPLES OF CANCER TREATMENT, McGraw-Hill Book Co.. New York 
(1982) at 199; Twycross, supra note 2, at 72-73; R.W. Houde, S.L. 
Wallenstein, and N. Rogers, 1 Clinical Pharmacology and 
THERAPEUTICS 163 (1960). 
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cine causes many adverse reactions, especially in the elderly, 
and is not especially flexible. A weaker tendency to cause 
addiction is not especially advantageous in dying patients; 
and, as  these drugs are narcotic antagonists, they cannot be 
used in an integrated program with narcotics-one that relies 
on increasing efficacy of drugs as  pain worsens or tolerance 
develops. Thus, pentazocine and other agonist-antagonist 
drugs have at this time little use in managing the pain of dying 
 patients.21 
Other drugs-such as  hydroxyzine (Vistaril, Atarax)22  and 
tricyclic antidepressants23-may potentiate narcotics. Usually 
patients with pain have reason for one or another of these, and 
the benefit of potentiation of narcotic effect is welcome. 
Theoretically, narcotic overdose could be induced in starting a 
potentiating drug, but this is rarely a problem. Benzodiazep- 
enes and phenothiazines probably do not potentiate narcot-
ics.24 
Steroids, most commonly prednisone or dexamethasone, 
help control pain that arising in osseous metastases or 
fractures. Usually, maximum effect is at  fairly low pharmaco-
logic doses, about 2-4 mg. per day of dexamethasone or 10-20 
mg. daily of  prednisone.25
Neurosurgical and anesthetic methods. Localized pain, 
especially from pain fibers low in the spinal cord or in a limb, 
are sometimes accessible to temporary or permanent pain tract 
disruption.26 Short-term blocks are useful for diagnosis but 
usually counterproductive for long-term pain control. Some 
initial testing of epidural morphine shows promise, however.27 
21 Twycross, supra note 2, at  74.
22 William T. Beaver and Grace Feise, Comparison of Analgesic 
Effects of Morphine Sulfate, Hydroxyzine, and Their Combination in 
Patients with Postoperative Pain, in J.J. Bonica and D. Albe-Fessard, 
eds., 1 ADVANCES I N  PAIN RESEARCH AND THERAPY, New York, Raven 
Press (1976) at  553. 
23 Robert G. Twycross, Overview of Analgesics, in SYMPOSIUM ON PAIN, 
supra note 1, at 617, 622; Lawrence M. Halpern, Psychotropics, 
Ataractics, and Related Drugs, in id. at  279. 
24 J.W. Dundee and J. Moore, The Myth of Phenothiazine Potentiation 
16 ANAESTHESIA 95 (1961); but see, Ross J.  Baldessarini, Drugs and the 
Treatment of Psychiatric Disorders, in Gilman, Goodman, and  Gil-  
man, supra note 6 at  391,414. 
25 Twycross, supra note 23, at  625; Twycross, supra note 2, at 88-90. 
26 Robbie, supra note 1;  Meyerson, supra note 1;  Arner, supra note 1;
Bolund, supra note 1.
27 L. Mandaus, R. Blomberg, and E. Hammars, Long-Term Epidural 
Morphine Analgesia, 74 ACTA ANESTH. SCAND. (Suppl.) 149 (1982); 
Lawrence Sherman, Robert Milch, and George Cohn, The Use of 
Epidural Morphine in a Hospice Setting, presented at  the Fifth Annual 
Meeting and Eighth Symposium of the National Hospice Organization, 
Washington, Nov. 9,1982. 
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Determining whether the destruction of a nerve, spinal cord 
tract, or brain center is warranted requires consultation with 
an experienced anesthesiologist and/or neurosurgeon. The 
patient considering an ablative procedure should be well 
aware of the likelihood and seriousness of the possible loss of 
additional neurologic functions. The patient should ordinarily 
have had a trial of vigorous nondestructive pain control. 
A mixture of 50% nitrous oxide and 50% oxygen may be 
useful for patients with short-lived severe pain, as in dressing 
changes or movement.28
Mental Function 
Preexisting disturbances. Patients who are dying are not 
all the same; severe depression, alcohol abuse, psychosis, 
dementia, and personality disorders are as  prevalent among 
these patients as among others. Treatment of the symptoms of 
these disorders as the patient is dying will usually entail the 
same sorts of methods used with healthier patients: drugs, 
behavioral modification, environmental control, and so forth. 
People giving care to dying patients must be'Gspecially careful, 
however, to set reasonable goals and limits and to focus more 
on accepting these patients than on changing them. 
Primary central nervous system disease. The changes in 
mental functions that patients dying of strokes, dementias, .or 
space-occupying intracranial lesions experience are often more 
disturbing to family members and care givers than to the 
patients themselves since they are often unaware of their 
situations. When these lesions cause distressing behavior, 
antispasmodic drugs or tranquilizers may be useful. When 
increased intracranial pressure could be a component, dexa-
methasone (2-32 mg. per day in 4-8 doses) may be tried,29 
though it has a number of potential side effects. If dexametha- 
sone is successful, the dosage can be reduced to lowest 
effective level. If the intracranial process is enlarging, symp- 
toms will recur and high doses might again be warranted. 
When dexamethasone no longer proves to be significantly 
beneficial, rapidly tapering it to baseline adrenal replacement 
(about 2 mg. per day) or lower is often warranted, as this 
allows the terminal phase to be mercifully brief. 
Drugs and metabolic abnormalities. Hypercalcemia is a 
particularly common concomitant of malignancies and can 
cause myriad symptoms, the most common being confusion, 
disorientation, and sedation. If this occurs as  the patient is 
Twycross, supra note 2,  at 98. 
29 Mary J. Baines, Control of Other Symptoms, in Saunders, supra note 
1, at 99, 102-103;  Plum recommends 16 mg. initially a n d  4  m g .  every 6 
hours, tapering if possible. Fred Plum. Headache, , in James B. 
Wyngaarden and Lloyd H. Smith, eds., Cecil Textbook of MEDICINE, 
W.B. Saunders Company, Philadelphia (16th ed. 1982) at 1948-49. 
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close to death anyway, it may be best to accept hypercalcemia 
without therapy, a s  few deaths are more gentle. However, if 
calcium rises when a patient might have a few weeks or more 
of valued life left, therapy may be warranted.30  Increased fluids 
and furosemide (Lasix)often suffice; adrenocortical 'steriods 
and oral phosphates are also often effective. Sometimes 
mithramycin (Mithracin), even a t  a s  low a dose a s  1-2 mg. 
intravenously once or twice a week, is effective. Calcitonin 
(Calcimar, 50-100 MRC daily or on alternate days) might also 
be used. 
Since dying patients are often cachectic, vitamin-deficient, 
acidotic, hypo-osmotic, uremic, hypoalbuminemic, or hypoxic 
they are likely to experience mental changes from drugs that 
do not usually have such effects. Sedatives and tranquilizers 
are obviously common culprits, but so are cimetidine, digoxin, 
tricyclic antidepressants, theophylline, steroids, and other 
"medical" drugs. Narcotics rarely cause confusion without 
concomitant severe sedation, though some patients find all 
narcotics to be dysphoric. When changes in a patient's mental 
status interfere with the patient and family living a s  fully a s  
possible, each drug that could be causing the mental change 
should be reduced a s  much a s  possible to test whether mental 
function is improved. 
Metabolic abnormalities like hypoxia, hepatic failure, 
renal failure, acidemia, hypokalemia, hypomagnesemia, and  
dehydration are not uncommon causes of mental disturbances 
and might be remediable. 
Anxiety and depression. Some anxiety and depression are  
normal in dying patients. Most of what  is truly troublesome to 
the individual is best relieved by simple psychological support, 
pain control, attention to legal, social, and financial problems, 
and so  for th. 31
Free-floating anxiety or persistent depression can have 
crippling effects on some patients. Fortunately, both commonly 
respond to fairly mild pharmacologic agents and supportive 
psychotherapy.32 Many patients benefit from fairly low doses 
of tricyclic antidepressants.33 A dose a s  low a s  20-30 mg. of 
doxepin (Sinequan] or nortriptyline at  bedtime often encour-
30 Baines, supra note 29, at 101; Zimmerman, supra note 10, at 68. 
31  Colin M. Parkes, Psychological Aspects, in Saunders, supra note 1, 
at 44. 
32 Id. at 56-57; Baines, supra note 29, at 114; Peter G. Wilson, Anxiety 
and Depression in Elderly and Dying Patients, in Marcus Reidenberg, 
ed., Clinical Pharmacology of Symptom Control, 66 THE MEDICAL 
CLINICS OF NORTH AMERICA 1011,1015 (1982). 
33 Alexander H. Glassman and Steven P. Roose, Tricyclic Drugs in the 
Treatment of Depression, in Marcus Reidenberg, ed., Clinical Pharma- 
cology of Symptom Control, 66 THE MEDICAL CLINICS OF North
AMERICA 1037,1040 (1982). 
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ages a good night's sleep, reduces anxiety, and improves 
appetite. 
Numerous other anxiolytic agents can be used: antihista- 
mines, benzodiazepines, phenothiazines, and so forth. Often, 
one or another is indicated for a separate reason; prochlorpera-
zine (Compazine), for example, is used to reduce both nausea 
and anxiety. Benzodiazepines are somewhat risky as  they have 
a long half-life and a fairly high incidence of causing confusion 
or sedation." Hydroxyzine (Vistaril or Atarax, 10-25 mg. every 
6-8 hours) has some advantages in that it potentiates narcotics, 
reduces nausea, can be given orally or parenterally, is fairly 
effective, and has few sedative or anticholinergic side effects 
even in elderly or debilitated patients. 
Gastrointestinal Symptoms 
Anorexia and dysphagia. For a patient to find himself or 
herself uninterested or averse to food can be quite disconcert- 
ing for the person, and often even more so to family members. 
However, substantial anorexia is almost the norm in the later 
stages of terminal illness. Sometimes counseling family and 
patient to accept a loss of appetite is extremely helpful. An 
altered sense of taste or smell is sometimes part of the cause of 
anorexia. Stronger flavors, careful menu selection, and good 
mouth care may help. 
Other interventions include a little of the patient's favorite 
alcoholic beverage (or Gevrabon,. which contains vitamins 
dissolved in sherry) 30 minutes before meals, small and 
attractive-looking meals on a flexible schedule, a vitamin and 
mineral supplement, high-calorie milk shakes or prepared 
dietary supplements, low-dose steriods (e.g., 1 mg. dexametha-
sone or 5 mg. prednisone three times daily), or tricyclic 
antidepressants.35 
Only rarely should a dying patient be fed by tube or 
intravenously. When neurologic or structural disease of the 
mouth or esophagus precludes the swallowing of food, tube 
feeding might be warranted if chosen by an individual on a 
well-informed basis.36 When initiating any sort of artificial 
feeding with a dying patient, the practitioner would do well to 
talk with the person and/or family about indications that 
would warrant its discontinuation. 
34 B. Robert Meyer, Benzodiazepines in the Elderly, in Marcus 
Reidenberg, ed., Clinical Pharmacology of Symptom Control, 66 THE 
MEDICAL CLINICS OF NORTH AMERICA 1017 (1982). 
35 Zimmerman, supra note 10, at 69-70. 
36 Michael R. Williams, The Place of Surgery in Terminal Care, in 
Saunders, supra note 1, at 134, 136; Zimmerman, supra note 10, at 70-
71. But see Joyce V .  Zerwekh, The Dehydration Question. Nursing83 
47 (1983), which argues that dehydration is normal and prevents 
distressing symptoms in the last few days of life. 
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In the unusual case where dysphagia is due to candidiasis 
or is avoidable by the justified use of a feeding tube, dysphagia 
is remediable. More commonly, a feeding tube is not warranted 
and the cause is not correctable; sedation and pain relief may 
then be all that is indicated. 
Problems with the mouth. Much avoidable distress arises 
from inattention to the Early in the course of a 
predictably fatal illness, patients should be encouraged to have 
dental care. Abcesses, exposed roots, and ill-fitting dentures 
are likely to be more of a problem as  the patient loses weight 
and fights infections less successfully. Dentures should be used 
as long as possible despite receding gums, especially since 
patients often feel ashamed to be seen without them. Regular 
brushing of the teeth and cleaning of the mouth can often 
improve the patient's self-image greatly. Candidiasis is usually 
easy to diagnose and treat, using nystatin (Mycostatin) either 
as a suspension or a s  oral tablets (5 ml. to swish, or one oral 
tablet to suck and swallow 3-4 times a day). 
Dehydration, head and neck surgery, radiation to the face 
and neck, mouth breathing, narcotics, and anticholinergics 
make dry mouth a common problem. Frequent tooth brushing 
and mouth rinsing help, a s  do sipping liquids, sucking on ice, or 
sucking on hard candies. Commercial artificial saliva (Moi- 
Stir) or a specially prepared mixture of methylcellulose and 
glycerin or lemon essence can also be helpful.38 
The inability to speak or to speak clearly is often very 
distressing to patients, families, and care givers. The usual 
methods of speech therapy-sign boards, typewriters, note 
pads, and lip reading-generally suffice to restore some 
communication. Often, however, care givers must be even 
more willing than normal to try to guess the patient's concerns 
and to initiate the relevant conversations. 
Nausea and vomiting. Many seriously ill patients have 
nausea and vomiting. Sometimes the cause can be corrected. If 
not, prochlorperazine (Compazine) or a related phenothiazine 
is usually the most effective therapy. Doses can be clustered 
(e.g., 5 mg. every 20 minutes up to 4 doses, to repeat every 6 
hours as  needed) in response to intermittent symptoms or can 
be scheduled (e.g., 10-20 mg. orally or intramuscularly every 8 
hours or 25 mg. per rectum every 6 hours) in response to more 
continuous symptoms.39
Delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) is a component of 
marijuana that is showing promise in early investigations 
37 
 Austin H. Kutscher, Bernard Schoenberg, and Arthur C. Carr, THE 
TERMINAL PATIENT: ORAL CARE, Columbia Univ. Press, New York (1973). 
Baines, supra note 29, at 99-100. 
39 Zimmerman, supra note 10, at 71. 
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concerning nausea and vomiting associated with chemothera- 
py.40 Oral metoclopramide (Reglan) may be useful to treat 
nausea and vomiting if gastric atony and reduced intestinal 
motility are contributing causes.41  Sometimes an antihistamine 
(e.g.,  dimenhydrinate (Dramamine)) can be helpful also. 
Intestinal obstruction. Some nausea and vomiting origi- 
nate with intestinal obstruction. If the obstruction is from fecal 
impaction, cathartics, enemas, manual disimpaction, and hyd- 
ration may solve the problem. With other causes, abdominal 
surgery will have to be considered. In addition to nausea and 
vomiting, intestinal obstruction can cause pain, infection, 
dehydration, and malnutrition. 
One need not always try to relieve the obstruction, 
however. When the obstruction is unifocal and low and the 
patient could otherwise live for some weeks or months, a 
diverting colostomy may be helpful palliation. But when the 
obstruction is multifocal or high or when a patient has at best 
only a few weeks to live, i t  may be best to treat the symptoms 
only.42  The pain and hyperperistalsis will   usually respond to 
adequate use of narcotics. Antiemetics and frequent small 
feedings allow for some absorption, and most patients remain 
quite comfortable until death, often without nasogastric suc-
tioning or intravenous fluids. 
Constipation and diarrhea. Decreased bulk in the diet, 
inactivity, abdominal disease, metabolic imbalance, dehydra- 
tion, anticholinergic 'drugs, and narcotics combine to make 
constipation the norm for dying patients. Untreated, constipa- 
tion can cause bowel obstruction, diarrhea, fever, pain, and 
confusion. Obviously, bowels should receive close attention. 
Stool softeners such as dioctyl sodium sulfosuccinate (Colace) 
or psyllium hydrophilic muciloid (Metamucil) should be given 
regularly. Stimulants such as  casanthranol (as in Peri-Colace), 
senna derivatives (Senokot), cascara sagrada, or bisacodyl 
(Dulcolax) should be added as needed. Mineral oil, milk of 
magnesia, or other agents may be preferred by some patients. 
If no stools are passed for three days, a rectal examination 
is in order. If stool is present but not impacted, the digital 
exam, glycerin suppositories, bisacodyl suppositories, and 
prepackaged enemas should be used, probably in about that 
sequence. No stool by the fourth day should elicit the same 
response, with the addition of vigorous enemas (soap suds, 
warm oil, or high volume). With assiduous attention and 
- - 
Id. 
 
41 Baines, supra note 29, at  103; Riyad Albibi and Richard McCallum, 
Metoclopramide: Pharmacology and Clinical Application, 98 ANN. 
Int. Med. 86 (1983). 
 
42 Zimmerman, supra note 10, at  71-72; Baines, supra note 29, at  101-02.
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vigorous efforts, nearly all patients can avoid the complica-
lions of  constipation.43 
Diarrhea is a less common problem, but it may be caused 
by diabetes, antibiotics, underlying malabsorption, and fecal 
impaction. If it is due to pancreatic insufficiency, diarrhea can 
be dramatically relieved by replacement enzymes.44 If the 
cause cannot be removed, the diarrhea can usually be stopped 
with diphenoxylate with atropine (Lomotil, 1 or 2 tablets after 
each stool, up to 8 per day) or loperamide (Imodium, 2-4 mg. 
after each stool up to 16 mg. per day). 
Ascites. Ascites is often asymptomatic despite being 
dramatic. When troubling, cirrhotic ascites may respond to the 
usual diuretics or the less usual shunting. Malignant ascites 
often is well controlled by instillation of chemotherapeutic 
agents or by frequent paracenteses, which are both well 
tolerated.45 
Skin Problems 
Decubitus ulcers. Cachectic, immobile, and bedbound
patients are at  great risk of developing skin sores. Few patients 
without them realize how distressing these lesions can be. 
Prevention, or at  least a delay in their onset, is much more 
satisfactory for patients than efforts to heal an established 
decubitus ulcer. Frequent turning, skin massage, padding 
around prominent bones and ears, and redoubled efforts if the 
skin starts to redden are the hallmarks of prevention. Immobile 
patients should have heel protectors and one of the various 
special mattresses (egg-crate, water bed, air mattresses, or the 
like). For some patients, an overhead trapeze is an invaluable 
encouragement to make frequent position changes. 
Few decubiti in dying patients heal. Once the skin breaks, 
usually all that can be done is to keep infection from being 
serious and to keep the lesion from enlarging. Usually about 
once a month, cellular debris needs to be cleared with a week 
of wet-to-dry dressings or sharp dissection. Various local 
therapies are promoted, though none has been shown to be 
distinctly superior in controlled trials.46 
43 Baines, supra note 29, at  104-05;  Harvey Klein, Constipation and 
Fecal Impaction, in Marcus Reidenberg, ed., Clinical Pharmacology of 
Symptom Control, 66 THE MEDICAL CLINICS OF NORTH AMERICA 1135 
(1982). 
44 Baines, supra note 29, at 105. 
45 Charles G. Moertel, The Peritoneum, in James F. Holland and Emil 
Frei, III, eds., CANCER MEDICINE, Lea & Febiger, Philadelphia (1973) at 
1631,1632. 
46 James B. Reuler and Thomas G. Cooney, The Pressure Sore: 
Pathophysiology and Principles of Management, 94 ANNALS I N T .  MED. 
661; Joseph Agris and Melvin Spira, Pressure Ulcers: Prevention and 
Treatment, 31 CLINICAL SYMPOSIA  5, 7 (1979). 
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Other open lesions. Some patients have fistulas or sinuses 
whose care presents a problem. Sometimes excision, amputa- 
tion, or diversion of the contents of the originating viscera are 
beneficial. Otherwise, local care of the affected skin will often 
require creative efforts. Sometimes a de facto stoma can be 
created. 
Extensive malignant ulcerations pose another dramatic 
nursing challenge. The goals should be to reduce cosmetic 
distress, to keep the lesion clean and odor-free, and to avoid 
serious infection or hemorrhage. There is no substitute for 
gentle, thorough cleansing and dressing, usually twice a day. 
Half-strength hydrogen peroxide or Dakin's solution seem to be 
well tolerated and mildly bactericidal. If odor is a problem, 
powdered tetracycline (from a capsule) is quite effective when 
sprinkled over the lesions before dressing. If minor bleeding 
occurs, pressure, gelfoam, or powdered thrombin may help. 
Suture material should be available for efforts to tie major 
middle-size arteries that bleed, though rupture of a major 
artery is often best managed with an abundance of  towels,47 
since repair or ligature is so likely doomed and the patient is so 
rapidly unconscious. If the patient is frightened, parenteral 
morphine, hyoscine, or diazepam (Valium) will provide rapid 
tranquilization and also fairly reliable amnesia if the patient 
survives.48 Some attention should be given to making all 
dressings cosmetically acceptable, especially on the neck, face, 
and hands. Creative application of dressings can mask the 
absence or distortion of cheek, jaw, or eye, and thereby keep it 
easier for visitors to see the patient, and for the patient to see a 
mirror. 
Pruritus. The itching associated with malignancy usually 
has no definite treatable origin. Pruritus of biliary obstruction 
sometimes responds to cholestyramine (Questran). Some pruri- 
tus is caused by drugs, soaps and lotions, or other allergens. If 
no specific cause can be remedied, antihistamines such as  
hydroxyzine (Vistaril), phenothiazines such as  trimeprazine 
(Temaril), or topical or systemic steriods may be of some 
help.49  Relief is reported to last a day or two after intravenous 
 47  "[The patient at risk of     hemorrage] should  be encouraged to pursue 
his normal activities. It is, however, kind to arrange for the traditional 
red blanket to be draped about him to lessen the distress of any 
onlookers if a large bleed ensues:" Williams,  supra note 36, at 137. 
48  Cicely Saunders, Principles of Symptom Control in Terminal Care, 
in Marcus Reidenberg, ed., Clinical Pharmacology of Symptom 
Control, 66 THE MEDICAL CLINICS OF NORTH AMERICA 1169,1178 (1982). 
 49 Id. at 1177; Richard K. Winkelmann, Pharmncologic Control of 
Pruritus, in Marcus Reidenberg, in Clinical Pharmacology of 
Symptom Control, 66 THE MEDICAL CLINICS  OF NORTH AMERICA 1119 
(1982).
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use of local anesthetics.50
Fever. History and physical exam are especially helpful in 
distinguishing among the very different possible etiologies of 
fever-especially dehydration, constipation, central nervous 
system lesions, urinary infection, or pneumonia. The causative 
etiology can generally be treated. Furthermore, usually the 
patient benefits from antipyretics, increased fluid intake (if 
possible), and alcohol sponge baths. If the fever probably 
results from an overwhelming bacterial infection, with falling 
blood pressure and obtundation, treatment may appropriately 
be withheld, including not giving antibiotics, intravenous 
volume expansion, or pressors. Symptomatic urinary tract 
infection rarely is overwhelming but can be quite distressing, 
thus nearly always warranting antibiotic therapy.51 
Weakness. Most dying people feel weak; oddly, many 
people need to be reassured that weakness is acceptable. 
Appropriate use of antidepressants and pain control drugs 
sometimes helps to ameliorate weakness. Transfusions for 
profound anemia are sometimes dramatically beneficial. Ste- 
roid effects, uremia, hepatic encephalopathy, hypercarbia, and 
hypoxia are often partially treatable. Anabolic hormones like 
nandrolone decanoate (Deca-Durabolin) or fluoxymesterone 
(Halotestin) or adrenocortical steriods like . prednisone or 
dexamethasone (Decadron) are sometimes beneficial. Central 
nervous system stimulants like methylphenidate (Ritalin) have 
been reported to benefit a few patients, but the incidence of 
confusion is fairly high.52
Respiratory Symptoms. Few symptom groups are so 
frustrating as  hiccups, cough, and dyspnea. Patients with 
serious disease rarely respond to the "first-aid" measures to 
stop hiccups. Amphetamines, phenothiazines, haloperidol, or 
metoclopramide sometimes Phrenic nerve block is 
usually effective but sometimes fails and always compromises 
respiratory reserve. 
Coughing might arise from treatable causes-pleural effu- 
sion, pulmonary embolus, dehydration of the bronchi, pneumo- 
nia, or thick sputum. Often, however, humidifiers, potassium 
iodide, chest physical therapy, and other remedial measures do 
not help. Cough might be suppressed by terpin hydrate with 
codeine, hycodan, or with stronger narcotics. Using viscous 
H.U. Gerbershagen, in SYMPOSIUM ON PAIN, supra note 1, at 301-02; 
Luis Tapia et al., Pruritus in Dialysis Patients Treated with Parenteral 
Lidocaine, 296 NEW ENG. J. MED.  261 (1977). 
51 Zimmerman, supra note 10, at 73. 
52 Id. at 67-68; Twycross, supra note 2,  at 80-81. 
53 Baines, supra note 29, at 106; Zimmerman, supra note 10,  at 73. 
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lidocaine (Xylocaine) and other local anesthetics as a gargle or 
sucking on hard candies may help for a short time." 
Whether or not to treat pneumonia with antibiotics 
depends upon the patient's situation.55  Pneumonia may some- 
times be the "old man's friend," as it is often called, and could 
well be acceptable, with cough and dyspnea controlled by 
morphine. Sometimes, though, even in a patient expected to die 
soon, antibiotics, chest physical therapy, and oxygen are 
better. 
No symptom is so terrifying a s  dyspnea. Usually any 
remediable cause-pleural fluid, congestive heart failure, ane- 
mia, and bronchospasm, for example-should be 
Positioning the patient in a semirecumbent position, blowing 
cool air over his or her face, and judicious use of oxygen often 
help. Radiation to the mediastinurn and dexamethasone (4 mg. 
every 6 hours) may help if the etiology is mediastinal tumor. 
Even if pain is not a problem, low-dose narcotics help, either 
by reducing anxiety, by reducing pulmonary vasocongestion, or 
by dulling the medullary reflexes.57 A few milligrams of 
morphine every 3-4   hours or about 5 mg. at bedtime can greatly 
add to the patient's comfort without causing any deleterious 
effect on respiratory effort. Dyspnea as a terminal event is 
discussed in the next section. When a dying patient is on a 
respirator, rather rapid and controlled weaning is sometimes 
indicated; such weaning should proceed with symptom control 
but without trying to maintain respiratory function.58 
Agonal symptoms. The symptoms discussed thus far 
generally apply to patients who are within a few months of 
death. Sometimes the last few hours and minutes present some 
additional symptoms that can be treated. 
Agonal respiratory insufficiency. No death is more ago- 
nizing for the aware patient and all around him or her than one 
from respiratory insufficiency. Untreated, the patient will 
struggle for air until exhausted, when carbon dioxide narcosis 
and progressive hypoxia finally bring death fairly quickly. The 
patient must sit, can barely speak, and can continue in this 
way for hours or even a few days. In this situation, the care 
giver must be certain that no specific remedy-diuretics, 
54 Zimmerman,  supra note 10, at 72-73. 
55 Baines,  supra note 29, at 108-09. 
56 However, in discussing bronchial carcinomtt, some advocate not 
using thoracentesis or intrapleural cytotoxic agents but instead 
relying upon morphine for dyspnea. See Bates and Vanier, supra note 
1, at 132.
Twycross,  supra note 2, at  79.
58 Ake Grenvik, Terminal Weaning: Discontinuance of Life-Support- 
ing Therapy in the Terminally Ill Patient (Editorial), 11 CRIT.   CARE 
MED. (forthcoming,  May  1983) .
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oxygen, thoracentesis, and so on-is warranted to relieve the 
respiratory insufficiency.59 Then, with the appropriate consent 
by the patient and family, morphine can be given intramuscu- 
larly in small doses (for a patient who has not developed any 
tolerance,  3-5 mg. in each dose] every 15-20 minutes until some 
relief is obtained. Usually, the patient's breathing will slow 
slightly and become a little deeper and his or her terror will 
subside. No more morphine may be needed. If the patient is 
already quite exhausted, the slowed respirations will induce 
hypercapnia, which will perpetuate the sedation and the 
patient will die in the ensuing sleep. If the patient has more 
reserve, the severe dyspnea will probably recur, and can again 
be treated with morphine. Although this approach is far from 
perfect, it does allow the physician to improve upon what is 
otherwise a singularly terrifying and agonizing final few hours. 
Aesthetic considerations. Even when a patient is beyond 
caring about how others remember his or her last hours, this 
period can have serious effects on family, friends, and care 
givers. Usually it is important to keep the "death bed" a s  
aesthetic a s  possible. This entails considering the sensory 
impressions presented by the patient and surroundings. 
The visual impression should, a s  far a s  possible, be one of 
peace and privacy. Attentive nursing can minimize disruption 
caused by emesis or bleeding. Agonal seizures or muscle 
twitches a re  usually minor and brief, but respond to intramus- 
cular diazepam (Valium) if needed. Emaciation, artificial tubes, 
and various wounds can be disguised with skillful use of sheets 
and bedspreads. 
Masking unpleasant odors by putting extra sheets over 
wounds and incontinence, ensuring good air circulation, and 
using pleasant odors helps family members to stay with the 
patient. 
Some patients develop a noisy bronchial congestion or 
relaxation of the soft tissues shortly before death-the well- 
known "death rattle." If this is distressing to the family (it 
never seems to be present in patients awake  enough to be 
distressed by it), scopolamine or atropine (0.4 mg. of either by 
injection), added to a narcotic, is usually sufficient to make the 
patient sound better.60 
Patients, care givers, and family members seem to benefit 
from maintaining physical contact a s  the end of life nears. 
Family members may need to be asked if they would like to 
hold the patient's hand or wipe the forehead, a s  they are 
commonly uncertain about what they can or should do. 
59 Baines, supra note 29, at 109-10;  Saunders, supra note 48, at  1175-76.  
60 Baines supra note 29, at 110. 
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Bereavement 
The responsibilities of those who cared for the patient who 
died do not end with that person's death. It is well known that 
the death of a loved one is a stressful event that can lead to 
premature death, increased morbidity, and psychological diffi- 
culties for survivors.61 Health care professionals who cared for 
the patient will often have come to know that person's family 
during the patient's illness. They are therefore well situated to 
observe behavior patterns, emotional reactions, and social 
circumstances that may signal difficulty during bereavement. 
Although the majority of people grieve "normally" and 
return to adequate levels of functioning within a reasonable 
period, many people need support during bereavement and 
some people (variously estimated at 10-20%) will be unable to 
resolve their grief on their own and will benefit from profes- 
sional help. Research has shown that people who lack social 
supports, whose relationships with the deceased involved 
ambivalent feelings, who suffered a completely unexpected 
loss, or who have preexisting physical or psychological disor- 
ders are at  high risk for pathological grief.62  Furthermore, the 
circumstances surrounding the death itself and the particular 
person who dies may render the survivors especially vulnera- 
ble. The death of a child, for example, is generally extremely 
stressful for parents and siblings and is likely to require special 
attention. Health professionals are likely to learn of these 
circumstances while they are caring for the patient, which 
should trigger the professionals' attention later to signs that the 
survivors are encountering difficulties that may warrant help. 
Although the health care professionals who cared for the 
patient need not also assume full responsibility for the care of 
survivors, it is their responsibility to be aware of signs of 
See e.g., T.H. Holmes and R.H. Rake, The Social Readjustment 
Rating Scale, 11 J.  PSYCHOSOMATIC RES. 213 (1967);  K.J. Helsing and M. 
Szklo,  Mortality After Bereavement, 114 AM. J.  EPIDEMIOLOGY 41 (1981); 
C.M. Parkes and R. Brown, Health After Bereavement: A Controlled 
Study of Young Boston Widows and Widowers, 34 PSYCHOSOMATIC 
MED. 449 (1972); G.L. Klerman and J.E. Izen, The Effects of Bereave- 
ment and Grief on Physical Health and General Well-Being, 9 
ADVANCES IN PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 1, 41 (1977). 
Beverly Raphael, Preventive Intervention with the Recently Ber- 
eaved, 34 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1450 (1977); Robert S. Weiss, 
Recovery from Bereavement: Findings and Issues, presented at NIH 
Professional Conference, Nov. 1982, a t  6 (summary of findings in Colin 
Murray Parkes and Robert S. Weiss, RECOVERY FROM BEREAVEMENT, 
Basic Books, New York (in press)); Mary L.S. Vachon et al., Predictors 
and Correlates of Adoption to Conjugal Bereavement, 139 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 998 (1982); Paula J. Clayton, Bereavement and its Manage- 
ment, in E.S. Paykel, ed., HANDBOOK OF AFFECTIVE DISORDERS, Churchill 
Livingstone, Edinburgh (1982) at Chapter 31. 
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pathologic grief, to have enough contact with survivors to 
detect the need for further help, and to be knowledgeable 
about community resources and professional services, so they 
can refer survivors to these resources if needed. In addition, 
part of the role of health care professionals and institutions is 
to respect, insofar a s  possible, the needs of a culturally and 
religiously diverse population. This means seeking out and 
respecting the family's wishes with regard to autopsy, disposi- 
tion of the body, and possible funeral arrangements. 
This Appendix was  prepared by the Commission's Assistant 
Director for Medical Studies, Joanne Lynn, M.D., who wishes to 
acknowledge the helpful reviews and advice of several com- 
missioners, of Drs. William T. Beaver, Paul Beeson, Raymond 
Houde, Fred Plum, Cicely Saunders, Thomas Walsh and Jack 
M. Zimmerman, and of the nursing staff of the Washington 
Home Hospice.     .  Similar material is to be published in John R. 
Walsh and Christine K. Cassel, eds., GERIATRIC MEDICINE: 
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES, Springer-Verlag, New York (1983). 
 
Statements 
by the AMA and 
the Catholic Church 
Judicial Council, American Medical 
Association* 
S 2.10 Quality of Life. 
In the making of decisions for the treatment of seriously 
deformed newborns or persons who are severely deteriorated 
victims of injury, illness or advanced age, the primary consid- 
eration should be what is best for the individual patient and 
not the avoidance of a burden to the family or to society. 
Quality of life is a factor to be considered in determining what 
is best for the individual. Life should be cherished despite 
disabilities and handicaps, except when prolongation would be 
inhumane and unconscionable. Under these circumstances, 
withholding or removing life supporting means is ethical 
provided that the normal care given an individual who is ill is 
not discontinued. 
In desperate situations involving newborns, the advice 
and judgment of the physician should be readily available, but 
the decision whether to exert maximal efforts to sustain life 
should be the choice of the parents. The parents should be told 
the options, expected benefits, risks and limits of any proposed 
care; how the potential for human relationships is affected by 
the infant's condition; and relevant information and answers to 
their questions. The presumption is that the love which parents 
usually have for their children will be dominant in the 
decisions which they make in determining what is in the best 
interest of their children. It is to be expected that parents will 
* Selections from OPINIONS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAN 
MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, Dr. John H. Burkhart, Chairman, American 
Medical Association, Chicago (1982) at 9-10. 
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act unselfishly, particularly where life itself is at stake. Unless 
there is convincing evidence to the contrary, parental authority 
should be respected. 
S 2.11 Terminal Illness. 
The social commitment of the physician is to prolong life 
and relieve suffering. Where the observance of one conflicts 
with the other, the physician, patient, and/or family of the 
patient have discretion to resolve the conflict. 
For humane reasons, with informed consent a physician 
may do what is medically necessary to alleviate severe pain, or 
cease or omit treatment to let a terminally ill patient die, but he 
should not intentionally cause death. In determining whether 
the administration of potentially life-prolonging medical treat- 
ment is in the best interest of the patient, the physician should 
consider what the possibility is for extending life under 
humane and comfortable conditions and what are the wishes 
and attitudes of the family or those who have responsibility for 
the custody of the patient. 
Where a terminally ill patient's coma is beyond doubt 
irreversible and there are adequate safeguards to confirm the 
accuracy of the diagnosis, all means of life support may be 
discontinued. If death does not occur when life support 
systems are discontinued, the comfort and dignity of the 
patient should be maintained. 
Declaration on Euthanasia, the Sacred 
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith* 
Introduction 
The rights and values pertaining to the human person 
occupy an important place among the questions discussed 
today. In this regard, the Second Vatican Ecumenical Council 
solemnly reaffirmed the lofty dignity of the human person, and 
in a special way his or her right to life. The Council therefore 
condemned crimes against life "such as  any type of murder, 
genocide, abortion, euthanasia, or wilful suicide" (Pastoral 
Constitution Gaudium  et Spes, 27). 
More recently, the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of 
the Faith has reminded all the faithful of Catholic'teaching on 
procured abortion.' The Congregation now considers it oppor- 
tune to set forth the Church's teaching on euthanasia. 
Vatican City (May 5,1980). 1 Declaration on Procured Abortion, 18 November 1974: AAS 66 
(1974),  pp. 730-747. 
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It is indeed true that, in this sphere of teaching, the recent 
Popes have explained the principles, and these retain their full 
force;2  but the progress of medical science in recent years has 
brought to the fore new aspects of the question of euthanasia, 
and these aspects call for further elucidation on the ethical 
level. 
In modern society, in which even the fundamental values 
of human life are often called into question, cultural change 
exercises an influence upon the way of looking at  suffering and 
death; moreover, medicine has increased its capacity to cure 
and to prolong life in particular circumstances, which some- 
times give rise to moral problems. Thus people living in this 
situation experience no little anxiety about the meaning of 
advanced old age and death. They also begin to wonder 
whether they have the right to obtain for themselves or their 
fellowmen an "easy death", which would shorten suffering and 
which seems to them more in harmony with human dignity. 
A number of Episcopal Conferences have raised questions 
on this subject with the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine 
of the Faith. The Congregation, having sought the opinion of 
experts on the various aspects of euthanasia, now wishes to 
respond to the Bishops' questions with the present Declaration, 
in order to help them to give correct teaching to the faithful 
entrusted to their care, and to offer them elements for 
reflection that they can present to the civil authorities with 
regard to this very serious matter. 
The considerations set forth in the present document 
concern in the first place all those who place their faith and 
hope in Christ, who, through his life, death and Resurrection, 
has given a new meaning to existence and especially to the 
death of the Christian, as Saint Paul says: "If we live, we live to 
the Lord, and if we die, we die to the Lord" (Rom 14:8; cf. Phil 
1:20). 
As for those who profess other religions, many will agree 
with us that faith in God the Creator, Provider and Lord of 
Pius XII, Address to those attending the Congress of the Internation- 
al Union of Catholic Women's Leagues, 11 September 1947: AAS 39 
(1947), p. 483: Address to the Italian Catholic Union of Midwives, 29 
October 1951: AAS 43 (1951), pp. 835-354; Speech to the members of 
the International Office of military medicine documentation, 19 
October 1953: AAS 45 (1953), pp. 744-754; Address to those taking part 
in the IXth Congress of the Italian Anaesthesiological Society, 24 
February 1957: AAS 49 (1957), p. 146; cf. also Address on "reanima- 
tion," 24 November 1957: AAS 49 (1957), pp. 1027-1033; Paul VI, 
Address to the members of the United Nations Special Committee on 
Apartheid, 22 May 1974: AAS 66 (1974), p. 346; John Paul II: Address to 
the Bishops of the United States of America, 5  October 1979: AAS 71 
(1979),  p. 1225. 
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life-if they share this belief-confers a lofty dignity upon 
every human person and guarantees respect for him or her. 
It is hoped that this Declaration will meet with the 
approval of many people of good will, who, philosophical or 
ideological differences notwithstanding, have nevertheless a 
lively awareness of the rights of the human person. These 
rights have often in fact been proclaimed in recent years 
through declarations issued by International Congresses;3     and 
since it is a question here of fundamental rights inherent in 
every human person, it is obviously wrong to have recourse to 
arguments from political pluralism or religious freedom in 
order to deny the universal value of those rights. 
The Value Of Human Life 
Human life is the basis of all goods, and is the necessary 
source and condition of every human activity and of all 
society. Most people regard life as  something sacred and hold 
that no one may dispose of it at  will, but believers see in life 
something greater, namely a gift of God's love, which they are 
called upon to preserve and make fruitfu1,:And it is this latter 
consideration that gives rise to the following consequences: 
1. No one can make an attempt on the life of an  innocent 
person without opposing God's love for that person, without 
violating a fundamental right, and therefore without commit- 
ting a crime of the utmost gravity.4
2. Everyone has the duty to lead his or her life in 
accordance with God's plan. That life is entrusted to the 
individual as  a good that must bear fruit already here on earth, 
but that finds its full perfection only in eternal life. 
3. Intentionally causing one's own death, or suicide, is 
therefore equally as wrong as  murder; such an action on the 
part of a person is to be considered as  a rejection of God's 
sovereignty and loving plan. Furthermore, suicide is also often 
a refusal of love for self, the denial of the natural instinct to 
live, a flight from the duties of justice and charity owed to 
one's neighbour, to various communities or to the whole of 
society-although, as  is generally recognized, at  times there 
are psychological factors present that can diminish responsibil- 
ity or even completely remove it. 
However, one must clearly distinguish suicide from that 
sacrifice of one's life whereby for a higher cause, such a s  God's 
glory, the salvation of souls or the service of one's brethren, a 
One thinks especially of Recommendation 779 (1976) on the rights of 
the sick and dying, of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe a t  its XXVIIth Ordinary Session, cf. Sipeca, No. 1, March 1977, 
pp. 14-15. 
We leave aside completely the problems of the death penalty and of 
war, which involve specific considerations that do not concern the 
present subject. 
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person offers his or her own life or puts it in danger (cf. Jn 
15: 14).
Euthanasia 
In order that the question of euthanasia can be properly 
dealt with, it is first necessary to define the words used. 
Etymologically speaking, in ancient times euthanasia 
meant an easy death without severe suffering. Today one no 
longer thinks of this original meaning of the word, but rather of 
some intervention of medicine whereby the sufferings of 
sickness or of the final agony are reduced, sometimes also with 
the danger of suppressing life prematurely. Ultimately, the 
word euthanasia is used in a more particular sense to mean 
"mercy killing", for the purpose of putting an end to extreme 
suffering, or saving abnormal babies, the mentally ill or the 
incurably sick from the prolongation, perhaps for many years, 
of a miserable life, which could impose too heavy a burden on 
their families or on society. 
It is therefore necessary to state clearly in what sense the 
word is used in the present document. 
By euthanasia is understood an action or an omission 
which of itself or by intention causes death, in order that all 
suffering may in this way be eliminated. Euthanasia's terms of 
reference, therefore, are to be found in the intention of the will 
and in the methods used. 
It is necessary to state firmly once more that nothing and 
no one can in any way permit the killing of an innocent human 
being, whether a foetus or an embryo, an  infant or an  adult, an  
old person, or one suffering from an incurable disease, or a 
person who is dying. Furthermore, no one is permitted to ask 
for this act of killing, either for himself or herself or for another 
person entrusted to his or her care, nor can he or she consent to 
it, either explicitly or implicitly. Nor can any authority legiti- 
mately recommend or permit such an action. For it is a 
question of the violation of the divine law, an offence against 
the dignity of the human person, a crime against life, and an 
attack on humanity. 
It may happen that, by reason of prolonged and barely 
tolerable pain, for deeply personal or other reasons, people 
may be led to believe that they can legitimately ask for death 
or obtain it for others. Although  in these cases the guilt of the 
  
individual may be reduced or completely absent, nevertheless 
the error of judgment into which the conscience falls, perhaps 
in good faith, does not change the nature of this act of killing, 
which will alwavs be in itself something to be reiected. The 
 
pleas of gravely ill people who sometimes ask for death are not 
to be understood as implying a true desire for euthanasia; in 
fact it is almost always a case of an  anguished plea for help 
and love. What a sick person needs, besides medical care, is 
love, the human and supernatural warmth with which the sick 
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person can and ought to be surrounded by all those close to 
him or her, parents and children, doctors and nurses. 
The Meaning of Suffering for Christians nnd the Use of 
Painkillers 
Death does not always come in dramatic circumstances 
after barely tolerable sufferings. Nor do we have to think only 
of extreme cases. Numerous testimonies which confirm one 
another lead one to the conclusion that nature itself has made 
provision to render more bearable at the moment of death 
separations that would be terribly painful to a person in full 
health. Hence it is that a prolonged illness, advanced old age, 
or a state of loneliness or neglect can bring about psychologi- 
cal conditions that facilitate the acceptance of death. 
Nevertheless the fact remains that death, often preceded 
or accompanied by severe and prolonged suffering, is some- 
thing which naturally causes people anguish. 
Physical suffering is certainly an unavoidable element of 
the human condition; on the biological level, it constitutes a 
warning of which no one denies the usefulness; but, since it 
affects the human psychological makeup, it often exceeds its 
own biological usefulness and so can become so severe a s  to 
cause the desire to remove it at  any cost. 
According to Christian teaching, however, suffering, espe- 
cially suffering during the last moments of life, has a special 
place in God's saving plan; it is in fact a sharing in Christ's 
Passion and a union with the redeeming sacrifice which he 
offered in obedience to the Father's will. Therefore one must 
not be surprised if some Christians prefer to moderate their use 
of painkillers, in order to accept voluntarily at least a part of 
their sufferings and thus associate themselves in a conscious 
way with the sufferings of Christ crucified (cf. Mt 27:34).
Nevertheless it would be imprudent to impose a heroic way of 
acting as a general rule. On the contrary, human and Christian 
prudence suggest for the majority of sick people the use of 
medicines capable of alleviating or suppressing pain, even 
though these may cause as  a secondary effect semicon- 
sciousness and reduced lucidity. As for those who are not in a 
state to express themselves, one can reasonably presume that 
they wish to take these painkillers, and have them adminis- 
tered according to the doctor's advice. 
But the intensive use of painkillers is not without difficul- 
ties, because the phenomenon of habituation generally makes 
it necessary to increase their dosage in order to maintain their 
efficacy. At this point it is fitting to recall a declaration by Pius
XII, which retains its full force; in answer to a group of doctors 
who had put the question: "Is the suppression of pain and 
consciousness by the use of narcotics ...permitted by religion 
and morality to the doctor and the patient (even at the 
approach of death and if one foresees that the use of   narcotics
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will shorten life)?", the Pope said: "If no other means exist, and 
if, in the given circumstances, this does not prevent the 
carrying out of other religious and moral duties: Yes".5 In this 
case, of course, death is in no way intended or sought, even if 
the risk of it is reasonably taken; the intention is simply to 
relieve pain effectively, using for this purpose painkillers 
available to medicine. 
However, painkillers that cause unconsciousness need 
special consideration. For a person not only has to be able to 
satisfy his or her moral duties and family obligations; he or she 
also has to prepare himself or herself with full consciousness 
for meeting Christ. Thus Pius XII warns: "It is not right to 
deprive the dying person of consciousness without a serious 
r e a s o n " . 6
Due Proportion. in the Use of Remedies 
Today it is very important to protect, at  the moment of 
death, both the dignity of the human person and the Christian 
concept of life, against a technological attitude that threatens 
to become an abuse. Thus, some people speak of a "right to 
die", which is an expression that does not mean the right to. 
procure death either by one's own hand or by means of 
someone else, as  one pleases, but rather the right to die 
peacefully with human and Christian dignity. From this point 
of view, the use of thereapeutic means can sometimes pose 
problems. 
In numerous cases, the complexity of the situation can be 
such as  to cause doubts about the way ethical principles 
should be applied. In the final analysis, it pertains to the 
conscience either of the sick person, or of those qualified to 
speak in the sick person's name, or of the doctors, to decide, in 
the light of moral obligations and of the various aspects of the 
case. 
Everyone has the duty to care for his or her own health or 
to seek such care from others. Those whose task it is to care for 
the sick must do so conscientiously and administer the 
remedies that seem necessary or useful. 
However, is it necessary in all circumstnaces to have 
recourse to all possible remedies? 
In the past, moralists replied that one is never obliged to 
use "extraordinary" means. This reply which as  a principle still 
holds good, is perhaps less clear today, by reason of the 
imprecision of the term and the rapid progress made in the 
treatment of sickness. Thus some people prefer to speak of 
"proportionate" and "disproportionate" means. In any case, it 
will be possible to make a correct judgment as  to the means by 
Pius XII, Address of 24 February 1957; AAS  49 (1957), , p. 147. 
6 
 Pius XII, ibid., p. 145; cf. Address of 9 September 1958: AAS 50 (1958), 
p. 694. 
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studying the type of treatment to be used, its degree of 
complexity or risk, its cost and the possibilities of using it, and 
comparing these elements with the result that can be expected, 
taking into account the state of the sick person and his or her 
physical and moral resources. 
In order to facilitate the application of these general 
principles, the following clarifications can be added: 
If there are no other sufficient remedies, it is permitted, 
with the patient's consent, to have recourse to the means 
provided by the most advanced medical techniques, even if 
these means are still at the experimental stage and are not 
without a certain risk. By accepting them, the patient can even 
show generosity in the service of humanity. 
It is also permitted, with the patient's consent, to interrupt 
these means, where the results fall short of expectations. But 
for such a decision to be made, account will have to be taken 
of the reasonable wishes of the patient and the patient's 
family, a s  also of the advice of the doctors who are specially 
competent in the matter. The latter may in particular judge that 
the investment in instruments and personnel is disproportion- 
ate the the results foreseen; they may also judge that the 
techniques applied impose on the patient strain or suffering out 
of proportion with the benefits which he or she may gain from 
such techniques. 
It is also permissible to make do with the normal means 
that medicine can offer. Therefore one cannot impose on 
anyone the obligation to have recourse to a technique which is 
already in use but which carries a risk or is burdensome. Such 
a refusal is not the equivalent of suicide; on the contrary, it 
should be considered as  an acceptance of the human condition, 
or a wish to avoid the application of a medical procedure 
disproportionate to the results that can be expected, or a desire 
not to impose excessive expense on the family or the communi- 
ty. 
When inevitable death is imminent in spite of the means 
used, it is permitted in conscience to take the decision to refuse 
forms of treatment that would only secure a precarious and 
burdensome prolongation of life, so long as the normal care 
due to the sick person in similar cases is not interrupted. In 
such circumstances the doctor has no reason to reproach 
himself with failing to help the person in danger. 
Conclusion 
The norms contained in the present Declaration are 
inspired by a profound desire to serve people in accordance 
with the plan of the Creator. Life is a gift of God, and on the 
other hand death is unavoidable; it is necessary therefore that 
we, without in any way hastening the hour of death, should be 
able to accept it with full responsibility and dignity. It is true 
that death marks the end of our earthly existence, but at  the 
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same time it opens the door to immortal life. Therefore all must 
prepare themselves for this event in the light of human values, 
and Christians even more so in the light of faith. 
As for those who work in the medical profession, they 
ought to neglect no means of making ail their skill available to 
the sick and the dying; but they should also remember how 
much more necessary i t  is to provide them with the comfort of 
boundless kindness and heartfelt charity. Such service to 
people is also service to Christ the Lord, who said: "As you did 
it to one of the least of these my brethren, you did it to me" (Mt
25:40).
A t  the audience granted to the undersigned Prefect, His 
Holiness Pope John Paul II approved this Declaration, adopted 
at the ordinary meeting of the Sacred Congregation for the 
Doctrine of the Faith, and ordered its publication. 
Rome, the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the 
Faith, 5 May 1980. 
Franjo Card. Seper 
Prefect 
Jerome Hamer, O.P. 
Tit. Archbishop of Lorium 
Secretary 
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Table D1: 
Comparison of Existing Natural Death Statutes* 
Is directivet limited to 
patients who will die 
very soon even with 
treatment? 
May form of directive 
be varied? 
May proxy be named 
in directive? 
May directive be written 
for a child or an 
incompetent adult? 
Is directive said to be 
nullified by pregnancy? 
Are penalties specified 
for physicians who 
refuse to follow a 
directive? 
Does the statute specify 
that the physician must 
inform the patient (if 
competent) of the 
terminal prognosis before 
the directive is binding? 
s directive binding only 
f patient knows of 
erminal condition? 
s a waiting period 
mposed after patient is 
nformed before 
lirective is binding? 
dust a directive be 
periodically reaffirmed? 
dust terminal conditions 
be confirmed by consulta- 
ion and certified 
n writing? 
Ala. Ark. Calif. Del. D.C. Id. 
yes no              yes
yes yes no 
possibly possibly no 
no yes no 
yes no           yes 
yes yes 
yes no 
possibly no 
no no 
no no 
yes no 
no yes no          yes(2)    yes
no yes no           (3) no 
yes    no(1) yes yes no 
for footnotes, see p. 312. 
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Ks. Nev. N.M. N.C. Ore. Tx. Vt.             Va.(10) Wash. 
yes uncertain yes no         yes 
ves 
yes yes no 
possibly possibly no 
for child  yes(6) 
no no 
yes          no(11)    yes  
yes         yes(12 yes 
possibly possibly possibly 
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* A natural death statute is one that establishes a way for 
patients while competent to direct that treatment at the end of 
their lives, if they are not then able to make decisions, shall not 
include artificial interventions that prolong dying. The individ- 
ual state statutes are given infra at pp. 318-87. 
t "Directive" means the written instrument implementing a 
natural death statute for a particular patient. 
(1)  Except, a directive may be made by legally appointed 
guardian on behalf of an incompetent adult. 
(2) The physician probably is given an affirmative duty to 
inform all patients whose directives thereby become binding. 
(3) If patient is able to comprehend, then directive is binding 
only if patient is informed. If patient is unable to comprehend, 
directive is binding when terminal condition is certified. 
(4) Except that the desires of a qualified patient at the time are 
always governing, and the patient probably must be informed 
if the desires are to have this force. 
(5) Must be "substantially" the form given in the statute. 
(6) Procedures are specified for comatose incompetent pa- 
tients. 
(7) Does not specify written certification. 
(8) Directive is binding only if patient is "qualified" at the time 
it is executed. The statute does not state that informing a 
competent patient is essential to qualifying, but it would be 
reasonable to interpret the statute as entailing this require- 
ment. 
(9) Statute specified that physician has a duty to inform the 
patient or actively assist in selecting another physician but 
does not specify penalties for failure to do so. 
(10) The Virginia statute was passed by both houses and 
awaiting the governor's signature as of March 17,1983. 
(11) The definition of terminal condition requires that death be 
imminent, but does not specify whether it must be imminent 
even with the proposed treatment. 
(12) Directive may be made orally if done after diagnosis of 
terminal condition. 
(13) A procedure is given for foregoing life-sustaining proce- 
dures on behalf of adult incompetent patients. 
(14) Where patient is competent, certification need only be 
made by the attending physician. 
(15) If patient is competent, the statute's requirement that the 
decision be reaffirmed would seem to entail assuring that the 
patient knows the terminal prognosis. 
Natural Death Statutes and Proposals 313 
Medical Treatment Decision Act* (Model 
Bill) 
The following Model Bill was drafted at Yale Law School 
in a Legislative Services Project sponsored by the Society for 
the Right to Die. The use of * and * *  is to indicate alternatives. 
1. Purpose 
The Legislature finds that adult persons have the funda- 
mental right to control the decisions relating to the rendering of 
their own medical care, including the decision to have life- 
sustaining procedures withheld or withdrawn in instances of a 
terminal condition. 
In order that the rights of patients may be respected even 
after they are no longer able to participate actively in decisions 
about themselves, the Legislature hereby declares that the 
laws of the State of shall recognize the right of an 
adult person to make a written declaration instructing his 
physician to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining procedures 
in the event of a terminal condition. 
2. Definitions 
The following definitions shall govern the construction of 
this act: 
(a) "Attending physician" means the physician selected 
by, or assigned to, the patient who has primary responsibility 
for the treatment and care of the patient. 
(b) "Declaration" means a witnessed document in writing, 
voluntarily executed by the declarant in accordance with the 
requirements of Section 3 of this act. 
(c) "Life-sustaining procedure" means any medical proce- 
dure or intervention which, when applied to a qualified patient, 
would serve only to prolong the dying process and where, in 
the judgment of the attending physician, death will occur 
whether or not such procedures are utilized. "Life-sustaining 
procedure" shall not include the administration of medication 
or the performance of any medical procedure deemed neces- 
sary to provide comfort care. 
(d) "Qualified patient" means a patient who has executed 
a declaration in accordance with this act and who has been 
diagnosed and certified in writing to be afflicted with a 
terminal condition by two physicians who have personally 
examined the patient, one of whom shall be the attending 
physician. 
* From Handbook of Enacted Laws, published by  the Society for the 
Right to Die, 250 West  57th Street, N e w  Y o r k ,  N.Y. 10107. Reprinted by  
permission. 
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3. Execution of Declaration 
Any adult person may execute a declaration directing the 
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures in a 
terminal condition. The declaration shall be signed by the 
declarant in the presence of two subscribing witnesses *(who 
are not) **(no more than one of whom may be) (a) related to 
the declarant by blood or marriage, (b) entitled to any portion 
of the estate of the declarant under any will of declarant or 
codicil thereto then existing or, at the time of the declaration, 
by operation of law then existing, (c) a claimant against any 
portion of the estate of the declarant, or (d) directly financially 
responsible for the declarant's medical care. 
It shall be the responsibility of declarant to provide for 
notification to his attending physician of the existence of the 
declaration. An attending physician who is so notified shall 
make the declaration, or a copy of the declaration, a part of the 
declarant's medical records. 
The declaration shall be substantially in the following 
form, but in addition may include other specific directions. 
Should any of the other specific directions be held to be 
invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other directions of the 
declaration which can be given effect without the invalid 
direction, and to this end the directions in the declaration are 
severable. 
DECLARATION 
Declaration made this day of 
(month, year). I, , being of sound mind, willfully and 
voluntarily make known my desire that my dying shall not be 
artificially prolonged under the circumstances set forth below, 
do hereby declare: 
If at any time I should have an incurable injury, disease, or 
illness certified to be a terminal condition by two physicians 
who have personally examined me, one of whom shall be my 
attending physician, and the physicians have determined that 
my death will occur whether or not life-sustaining procedures 
are utilized and where the application of life-sustaining 
procedures would serve only to artificially prolong the dying 
process, I direct that such procedures be withheld or with- 
drawn, and that I be permitted to die naturally with only the 
administration of medication or the performance of any 
medical procedure deemed necessary to provide me with 
comfort care. 
In the absence of my ability to give directions regarding 
the use of such life-sustaining procedures, it is my intention 
that this declaration shall be honored by my family and 
physician(s) as the final expression of my legal right to refuse 
medical or surgical treatment and accept the consequences 
from such refusal. 
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I understand the full import of this declaration and I am 
emotionally and mentally competent to make this declaration. 
Signed 
City, County and State of Residence 
The declarant has been personally known to me and I 
believe him or her to be of sound mind. 
Witness 
Witness 
4. Revocation 
A declaration may be revoked at  any time by the 
declarant, without regard to his or her mental state or  
competency, by any of the following methods: 
(a) By being canceled. defaced, obliterated, or burnt, torn, 
or otherwise destroyed by the declarant or by some person in 
his or her  presence and by his or her direction. 
(b) By a written revocation of the declarant expressing his 
or her intent to revoke, signed and dated by the declarant. The 
attending physician shall record in the patient's medical record 
the time and date when he or she received notification of the 
written revocation. 
(c) By a verbal expression by the declarant of his or her 
intent to revoke the declaration. Such revocation shall become 
effective upon communication to the attending physician by 
the declarant or by a person who is reasonably believed to be 
acting on behalf of the declarant. The attending physician shall 
record in the patient's medical record the time, date and place 
of the revocation and the time, date and place, if different, of 
when he or  she received notification of the revocation. 
5. Physician's Responsibility: Written Certification 
An attending physician who has been notified of the 
existence of a declaration executed under this act shall, 
without delay after the diagnosis of a terminal condition of the 
declarant, take the necessary steps to provide for written 
certification and confirmation of the declarant's terminal 
condition, so that declarant may be deemed to be a qualified 
patient, a s  defined in Section 1(d)  of this act. 
An attending physician who fails to comply with this 
section shall be deemed to have refused to comply with the 
declaration and shall be liable a s  specified in Section 7(a). 
6. Physician's Responsibility and Immunities 
The desires of a qualified patient who is competent shall 
a t  all times supersede the effect of the declaration. 
If the qualified patient is incompetent at  the time of'the 
decision to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining procedures, a 
declaration executed in accordance with Section 3 of this act is 
presumed to be valid. For the purpose of this act, a physician or 
health care facility may presume in the absence of actual 
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notice to the contrary that an individual who executed a 
declaration was of sound mind when it was executed. The fact 
of an individual's having executed a declaration shall not be 
considered as an indication of a declarant's mental incompe- 
tency. *(Age of itself shall not be a bar to a determination of 
competency.) 
In the absence of actual notice of the revocation of the 
declaration, none of the following, when acting in accordance 
with the requirements of this act, shall be subject to civil 
liability therefrom, unless negligent, or shall be guilty of any 
criminal act or of unprofessional conduct: 
(a) A physician or health facility which causes the with- 
holding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures from a 
qualified patient. 
(b) A licensed health professional, acting under the direc- 
tion of a physician, who participates in the withholding or 
withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures. 
7. Penalties 
(a) An attending physician who refuses to comply with the 
declaration of a qualified patient pursuant to this act shall 
make the necessary arrangements to effect the transfer of the 
qualified patient to another physician who will effectuate the 
declaration of the qualified patient. An attending physician 
who fails to comply with the declaration of a qualified patient 
or to make the necessary arrangements to effect the transfer 
shall be civilly liable. 
(b) Any person who willfully conceals, cancels, defaces, 
obliterates, or damages the declaration of another without such 
declarant's consent or who falsifies or forges a revocation of 
the declaration of another shall be civilly liable. 
(c) Any person who falsifies or forges the declaration of 
another, or willfully conceals or withholds personal knowledge 
of a revocation as  provided in Section 4, with the intent to 
cause a withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining proce- 
dures contrary to the wishes of the declarant, and thereby, 
because of such act, directly causes life-sustaining procedures 
to be withheld or withdrawn and death to thereby be hastened, 
shall be subject to prosecution for unlawful homicide. 
8. General Provisions 
(a) The withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining pro- 
cedures from a qualified patient in accordance with the 
provisions of this act. shall not, for any purpose, constitute a 
suicide. 
(b) The making of a declaration pursuant to Section 3 shall 
not affect in any manner the sale, procurement, or issuance of 
any policy of life insurance, nor shall it be deemed to modify 
the terms of an existing policy of life insurance. No policy of 
life insurance shall be legally impaired or invalidated in any 
manner by the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining 
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procedures from an insured qualified patient, notwithstanding 
any term of the policy to the contrary. 
(c) No physician, health facility, or other health provider, 
and no health care service plan, insurer issuing disability 
insurance, self-insured employee welfare benefit plan, or non- 
profit hospital plan, shall require any person to execute a 
declaration as a condition for being insured for, or receiving, 
health care services. 
(d) Nothing in this act shall impair or supersede any legal 
right or legal responsibility which any person may have to 
effect the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining proce- 
dures in any lawful manner. In such respect the provisions of 
this act are cumulative. 
(e) This act shall create no presumption concerning the 
intention of an individual who has not executed a declaration 
to consent to the use or withholding of life-sustaining proce- 
dures in the event of a terminal condition. 
(f) If any provision of this act or the application thereof to 
any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity 
shall not affect other provisions or applications of the act 
which can be given effect without the invalid provision or 
application, and to this end the provisions of this act are 
severable. 
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Natural Death Statutes, by State* 
Alabama 
SS 22-8A-1. Short title. 
This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the 
"Natural Death Act." S
 22-8A-2. Legislative intent. 
The legislature finds that adult persons have the funda- 
mental right to control the decisions relating to the rendering of 
their own medical care, including the decision to have life- 
sustaining procedures withheld or withdrawn in instances of a 
terminal condition. 
In order that the rights of patients may be respected even 
after they are no longer able to participate actively in decisions 
about themselves, the legislature hereby declares that the laws 
of this state shall recognize the right of an adult person to make 
a written declaration instructing his or her physician to 
withhold or withdraw life-sustaining procedures in the event of 
a terminal condition. 
S 22-8A-3. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter, the following terms shall have the 
following meanings, respectively, unless the context clearly 
indicates otherwise: 
(1) Attending physician. The physician selected by, or 
assigned to, the pafient who has primary responsibility for the 
treatment and care of the patient. 
(2) Declaration. A witnessed document in writing, volun- 
tarily executed by the declarant in accordance with the 
requirements of section 22-8A-4. 
(3) Life-sustaining procedure. Any medical procedure or 
intervention which, when applied to a qualified patient, would 
serve only to prolong the dying process and where, in the 
judgment of the attending physician, death will occur whether 
or not such procedure or intervention is utilized. Life-sustaining 
procedure shall not include the administration of medication or 
the performance of any medical procedure deemed necessary 
to provide comfort or care or to alleviate pain. 
(4) Physician. A person licensed to practice medicine and 
osteopathy in the state of Alabama. 
(5) Qualified patient. A patient, who has executed a 
declaration in accordance with this chapter and who has been 
diagnosed and certified in writing to be afflicted with a 
terminal condition by two physicians who have personally 
Statutes have been edited only where necessary to correct spelling 
and to standardize printing format. 
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examined the patient, one of whom shall be the attending 
physician. 
(6) Terminally ill or injured patient. A patient whose death 
is imminent or whose condition is hopeless unless he or she is 
artificially supported through the use of life-sustaining proce- 
dures. 
S 22-8A-4. Written declaration; requirements; form. 
(a) Any adult person may execute a declaration directing 
the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures in 
a terminal condition. The declaration made pursuant to this 
chapter shall be: (1) In writing; (2) signed by the person making 
the declaration, or by another person in the declarant's 
presence and by the declarant's expressed direction; (3) dated; 
and (4) signed in the presence of two or more witnesses at least 
19 years of age neither of whom shall be the person who signed 
the declaration on behalf of and at the direction of the person 
making the declaration, related to the declarant by blood or 
marriage, entitled to any portion of the estate of the declarant 
according to the laws of in-testate succession of this state or 
under any will of the declarant or codicil thereto, or directly 
financially responsible for declarant's medical care. The 
declaration of a qualified patient diagnosed as  pregnant by the 
attending physician shall have no effect during the course of 
the qualified patient's pregnancy. 
(b) It shall be the responsibility of declarant to provide for 
notification to his or her attending physician of the existence of 
the declaration. An attending physician who is so notified shall 
make the declaration, or a copy of the declaration, a part of the 
declarant's medical records. 
(c) The declaration shall be substantially in the following 
form, but in addition may include other specific directions. 
Should any of the other specific directions be held to be 
invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other directions of the 
declaration which can be given effect without the invalid 
direction, and to this end the directions in the declaration are 
severable. 
DECLARATION 
Declaration made this day of 
(Month, year). I, , being of sound mind, willfully and 
voluntarily make known my desires that my dying shall not be 
artificially prolonged under the circumstances set forth below, 
do hereby declare: 
If at any time I should have an incurable injury, disease, or 
illness certified to be a terminal condition by two physicians 
who have personally examined me, one of whom shall be my 
attending physician, and the physicians have determined that 
my death will occur whether or not life-sustaining procedures 
are utilized and where the application of life-sustaining 
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procedures would serve only to artificially prolong the dying 
process, I direct that such procedures be withheld or with- 
drawn, and that I be permitted to die naturally with only the 
administration of medication or the performance of any 
medical procedure deemed necessary to provide me with 
comfort care. 
In the absence of my ability to give directions regarding 
the use of such life-sustaining procedures, it is my intention 
that this declaration shall be honored by my family and 
physician(s) as the final expression of my legal right to refuse 
medical or surgical treatment and accept the consequences 
from such refusal. 
I understand the full import of this declaration and I am 
emotionally and mentally competent to make this declaration. 
Signed 
City, County and State of Residence 
Date 
The declarant has been personally known to me and I 
believe him or her to be of sound mind. I did not sign the 
declarant's signature above for or at  the direction of the 
declarant. I am not related to the declarant by blood or 
marriage, entitled to any portion of the estate of the declarant 
according to the laws of intestate succession or under any will 
of declarant or codicil thereto, or directly financially responsi- 
ble for declarant's medical care. 
Witness 
Witness 
Date 
S 22-8A-5. Revocation of written declaration. 
(a) A declaration may be revoked at  any time by the 
declarant by any of the following methods: 
(1) By being obliterated, burnt, torn, or otherwise de- 
stroyed or defaced in a manner indicating intention to cancel; 
(2) By a written revocation of the declaration signed 
and dated by the declarant or person acting at the direction of 
the declarant; or 
(3) By a verbal expression of the intent to revoke the 
declaration, in the presence of a witness 19 years of age or 
older who signs and dates a writing confirming that such 
expression of intent was made. Any verbal revocation shall 
become effective upon receipt by the attending physician of the 
above mentioned writing. The attending physician shall record 
in the patient's medical record the time, date and place of 
when he or she received notification of the revocation. 
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(b) There shall be no criminal or civil liability on the part 
of any person for failure to act upon a revocation made 
pursuant to this section unless that person has actual knowl- 
edge of the revocation. 
S 22-8A-3. Certification and confirmation of terminal condition. 
An attending physician who has been notified of the 
existence of a declaration executed under this chapter, without 
delay after the diagnosis of a terminal condition of the 
declarant, shall take the necessary steps to provide for written 
certification and confirmation of the declarant's terminal 
condition, so that declarant may be deemed to be a qualified 
patient under this chapter. 
§ 22-8A-7. Competency of declarant; liability of participating 
physician, facility, etc. 
The desires of a qualified patient shall at all times 
supersede the effect of the declaration. 
If the qualified patient is incompetent at the time of the 
decision to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining procedures, a 
declaration executed in accordance with section 22-8A-4 is 
presumed to be valid. For the purpose of this chapter, a 
physician or medical care facility may presume in the absence 
of actual notice to the contrary that an individual who 
executed a declaration was of sound mind when it was 
executed. The fact of an individual's having executed a 
declaration shall not be considered as  an indication of a 
declarant's mental incompetency. Age of itself shall not be a 
bar to a determination of competency. 
No physician, licensed health care professional, medical 
care facility or employee thereof who in good faith and 
pursuant to reasonable medical standards causes or partici- 
pates in the withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining 
procedures from a qualified patient pursuant to a declaration 
made in accordance with this chapter shall, as  a result thereof, 
be subject to criminal or civil liability, or be found to have 
committed an act of unprofessional conduct. 
S 22-8A-8. Refusal of attending physician to comply with 
declaration; penalties for willful concealment, etc. of declara- 
tion or revocation. 
(a) An attending physician who refuses to comply with the 
declaration of a qualified patient pursuant to this chapter shall 
not be liable for his refusal, but shall permit the qualified 
patient to be transferred to another physician. 
(b) Any person who willfully conceals, cancels, defaces, 
obliterates or damages the declaration of another without such 
declarant's consent or who falsifies or forges a revocation of 
the declaration of another shall be guilty of a Class A 
misdemeanor. 
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(c) Any person who falsifies or forges the declaration of 
another, or willfully conceals or withholds personal knowledge 
of the revocation of a declaration, with the intent to cause a 
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures con- 
trary to the wishes of the declarant, and thereby, because of 
such act, directly causes life-sustaining procedures to be 
withheld or withdrawn and death to be hastened, shall be 
guilty of a Class C felony. 
S 22-8A-9. Withholding or withdrawal of procedures not 
suicide; execution of declaration not to affect sale, etc. of life 
insurance nor be condition for receipt of health care services; 
provisions of chapter cumulative. 
(a) The withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining pro- 
cedures from a qualified patient in accordance with the 
provisions of this chapter shall not, for any purpose, constitute 
a suicide and shall not constitute assisting suicide. 
(b) The making of a declaration pursuant to section 22-8A- 
4 shall not affect in any manner the sale, procurement, or 
issuance of any policy of life insurance, nor shall it be deemed 
to modify the terms of an existing policy of life insurance. No 
policy of life insurance shall be legally impaired or invalidated 
in any manner by the withholding or withdrawal of life- 
sustaining procedures from an insured qualified patient, not- 
withstanding any term of the policy to the contrary. 
(c) No physician, medical care facility, or other health 
care provider, and no health care service plan, health mainte- 
nance organization, insurer issuing disability insurance, self- 
insured employee welfare benefit plan, nonprofit medical 
service corporation or mutual nonprofit hospital or hospital 
service corporation shall require any person to execute a 
declaration as  a condition for being insured for, or receiving, 
health care services. 
(d) Nothing in this chapter shall impair or supersede any 
legal right or legal responsibility which any person may have to 
effect the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining proce- 
dures in any lawful manner. In such respect the provisions of 
this chapter are cumulative. 
(e) This chapter shall create no presumption concerning 
the intention of an individual who has not executed a 
declaration to consent to the use or withholding of life- 
sustaining procedures in the event of a terminal condition. 
 S 22-8A-10.  Provisions of chapter not an approval of mercy 
killing, etc. 
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to condone, 
authorize or approve mercy killing or to permit any affirmative 
or deliberate act or omission to end life other than to permit the 
natural process of dying as provided in this chapter. 
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Ala. Code SS 22-8A-1 through 22-8A-10 (May 27,1981) 
(Acts  1981, NO. 81-772, SS 1-10). 
Arkansas 
S 82-3801 Right to die with dignity or to have life prolonged. 
Every person shall have the right to die with dignity and to 
refuse and deny the use or application by any person of 
artificial, extraordinary, extreme or radical medical and surgi- 
cal means or procedures calculated to prolong his life. Alterna- 
tively, every person shall have the right to request that such 
extraordinary means be utilized to prolong life to the extent 
possible. 
S 82-3802. Written request. 
Any person, with the same formalities as  are required by 
the laws of this State for the execution of a will, may execute a 
document exercising such right and refusing and denying the 
use or application by any person of artificial, extraordinary, 
extreme or radical medical or surgical means or procedures 
calculated to prolong his life. In the alternative, any person 
may request in writing that all means be utilized to prolong life. 
S 82-3803. Who may execute written request for another. 
If any  person is a minor or an adult who is physically or 
mentally unable to execute or is otherwise incapacitated from 
executing either document, it may be executed in the same 
form on his behalf: 
(a) By either parent of the minor; 
(b) By his spouse; 
(c) If his spouse is unwilling or unable to act, by his child 
aged eighteen [18] or over; 
(d) If he has more than one [1] child aged eighteen [18] or 
over, by a majority of such children; 
(e) If he has no spouse or child aged eighteen [18] or over, 
by either of his parents; 
(f)  If he has no parent living, by his nearest living relative; 
or 
(g) If he is mentally incompetent, by his legally appointed 
guardian. 
Provided, that a form executed in compliance with this 
Section must contain a signed statement by two [2] physicians 
that extraordinary means would have to be utilized to prolong 
life. 
§ 82-3803. No liability for actions in accordance with request. 
Any person, hospital or other medical institution which 
acts or refrains from acting in reliance on and in compliance 
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with such document shall be immune from liability otherwise 
arising out of such failure to use or apply artificial, extraordi- 
nary, extreme or radical medical or surgical means or proce- 
dures calculated to prolong such person's life. 
Ark. Stat. Ann. SS 82-3801 through 82-3804  (March 30,1977) 
(Acts  1977, NO. 879, SS 1-4). 
California 
S 7185. Citation. 
This act shall be known and may be cited a s  the Natural 
Death Act. 
S 7186. Legislative findings and declarations 
The Legislature finds that adult persons have the funda- 
mental right to control the decisions relating to the- rendering of 
their own medical care, including the decision to have life-
sustaining procedures withheld or withdrawn in instances  of a 
terminal condition. 
The Legislature further finds that modern medical technol- 
ogy has made possible the artificial prolongation of human life 
beyond natural limits. 
The Legislature further finds that, in the interest of 
protecting individual autonomy, such prolongation of life for 
persons with a terminal condition may cause loss of patient 
dignity and unnecessary pain and suffering, while providing 
nothing medically necessary or beneficial to the patient. 
The Legislature further finds that there exists considerable 
uncertainty in the medical and legal professions a s  to the 
legality of terminating the use or application of life-sustaining 
procedures where the patient has voluntarily and in sound 
mind evidenced a desire that such procedures be withheld or 
withdrawn. 
In recognition of the dignity and privacy which patients 
have a right to expect, the Legislature hereby declares that the 
laws of the State of California shall recognize the right of an  
adult person to make a written directive instructing his 
physician to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining procedures 
in the event of a terminal condition. 
 S 7187. Definitions. 
The following definitions shall govern the construction of 
this chapter. 
( a )  "Attending physician" means the physician selected 
by, or assigned to, the patient who has primary                 responsibility 
for the treatment and care of the patient.
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(b) "Directive" means a written document voluntarily 
 by the declarant in accordance with the requirements 
of Section 7188. The directive, or a copy of the directive, shall 
be made part of the patient's medical records. 
(c) "Life-sustaining procedure" means any medical proce- 
dure or intervention which utilizes mechanical or other artifi- 
cial means to sustain, restore, or supplant a vital function, 
which, when applied to a qualified patient, would serve only to 
 artificially prolong the moment of death and where, in the 
judgement of the attending physician, death is imminent wheth- 
er or not such procedures are utilized. "Life-sustaining proce- 
dure" shall not include the administration of medication or the 
performance of any medical procedure deemed necessary to 
alleviate pain. 
(d) "Physician" means a physician and surgeon licensed 
by the Board of Medical Quality Assurance or the Board of 
Osteopathic Examiners. 
(e) "Qualified patient" means a patient diagnosed and 
certified in writing to be afflicted with a terminal condition by 
two physicians, one of whom shall be the attending physician, 
who have personally examined the patient. 
( f )  "Terminal condition" means an  incurable condition 
      c a u s e d  by injury, disease, or illness, which, regardless of the 
application of life-sustaining procedures, would, within reason- 
able medical judgment, produce death, and where the applica- 
tion of life-sustaining procedures serve only to postpone the 
moment of death of the patient. 
 S 7188. Directive to physicians. 
Any adult person may execute a directive directing the 
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures in a 
terminal condition. The directive shall be signed by the 
declarant in the presence of two witnesses not related to the 
declarant blood or marriage and who would not be entitled 
to any portion of the estate of the declarant upon his decease 
under any will of the declarant or codicil thereto then existing 
or, a t  the time of the directive, by operation of law then 
existing. In addition, a witness to a directive shall not be the 
attending physician, an employee of the-attending physician or 
a health facility in which the declarant is a patient, or any 
person who has a claim against any portion of the estate of the 
declarant upon his decease at the time of the execution of the 
        directive. The directive shall be in the following form: 
DIRECTIVE TO PHYSICIANS 
Directive made this                 day of                  (month, year). 
I , . , being of sound mind, willfully, and voluntarily 
make known my desire that my life shall not be  artificially 
     prolonged under the circumstances set forth below, do hereby 
declare: 
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If at any time I should have an incurable injury, disease, or 
illness certified to be a terminal condition by two physicians, 
and where the application of life-sustaining procedures would 
serve only to artificially prolong the moment of my death and 
where my physician determines that my death is imminent 
whether or not life-sustaining procedures are utilized, I direct 
that such procedures be withheld or withdrawn, and that I be 
permitted to die naturally. 
2. In the absence of my ability to give directions regarding the 
use of such life-sustaining procedures, it is my intention that 
this directive shall be honored by my family and physician(s)
as  the final expression of my legal right to refuse medical or 
surgical treatment and accept the consequences from such 
refusal. 
3. If I have been diagnosed as pregnant and that diagnosis is 
known to my physician, this directive shall have no force or 
effect during the course of my pregnancy. 
4. I have been diagnosed and notified at least 14  days ago as  
having a terminal condition by , M.D., whose 
address is _________, and whose telephone number is 
_________. I understand that if I have not filled in the 
physician's name and address, it shall be presumed that I did 
not have a terminal condition when I made out this directive. 
5. This directive shall have no force or effect five years from 
the date filled in above. 
6. I understand the full import of this directive and I am 
emotionally and mentally competent to make this directive. 
Signed 
City, County and State of Residence 
The declarant has been personally known to me and I believe 
him or her to be of sound mind. 
Witness 
Witness 
S 188.5. Directive to physicians: Patient in skilled nursing 
facility. 
A directive shall have no force or effect if the declarant is 
a patient in a skilled nursing facility as defined in subdivision 
(c) of Section 1250 at the time the directive is executed unless 
one of the two witnesses to the directive is a patient advocate 
or ombudsman as may be designated by the State Department 
of Aging for this purpose pursuant to any other applicable 
provision of law. The patient advocate or ombudsman shall 
have the same qualifications as  a witness under Section 7188. 
The intent of this section is to recognize that some patients 
in skilled nursing facilities may be so insulated from a 
voluntary decisionmaking role, by virtue of the custodial 
nature of their care, as to require special assurance that they 
are capable of willfully and voluntarily executing a directive. 
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S 7189.  Revocation of directive. 
(a) A directive may be revoked at any time by the 
declarant, without regard to his mental state or competency, by 
any of the following methods: 
(1) By being canceled, defaced, obliterated, or burnt, torn, 
or otherwise destroyed by the declarant or by some person in 
his presence and by his direction. 
(2) By a written revocation of the declarant expressing his 
intent to revoke, signed and dated by the declarant. Such 
revocation shall become effective only upon communication to 
the attending physician by the declarant or by a person acting 
on behalf of the declarant. The attending physician shall 
record in the patient's medical record the time and date when 
he received notification of the written revocation. 
(3) By a verbal expression by the declarant of his intent to 
revoke the directive. Such revocation shall become effective 
only upon communication to the attending physician by the 
declarant or by a person acting on behalf of the declarant. The 
attending physician shall record in the patient's medical record 
the time, date, and place of the revocation and the time, date, 
and place, if different, of when he received notification of the 
revocation. 
(b) There shall be no criminal or civil liability on the part 
of any person for failure to act upon a revocation made 
pursuant to this section unless that person has actual knowl- 
edge of the revocation. 
S7189.5.   Term of directive. 
A directive shall be effective for five years from the date of 
execution thereof unless sooner revoked in a manner pre- 
scribed in Section 7189. Nothing in this chapter shall be 
construed to prevent a declarant from reexecuting a directive 
at  any time in accordance with the formalities of Section 7188, 
including reexecution subsequent to a diagnosis of a terminal 
condition. If the declarant has executed more than one 
directive, such time shall be determined from the date of 
execution of the last directive known to the attending physi- 
cian. If the declarant becomes comatose or is rendered 
incapable of communicating with the attending physician, the 
directive shall remain in effect for the duration of the comatose 
condition or until such time a s  the declarant's condition 
renders him or her able to communicate with the attending 
physician. 
S 7190  . Immunity from civil or criminal liability. 
No physician or health facility which, acting in accordance 
with the requirements of this chapter, causes the withholding 
or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures from a qualified 
patient, shall be subject to civil liability therefrom. No licensed 
health professional, acting under the direction of a physician, 
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who participates in the withholding or withdrawal of life- 
sustaining procedures in accordance with the provisions of this 
chapter shall be subject to any civil liability. No physician, or 
licensed health professional acting under the direction of a 
physician, who participates in the withholding or withdrawal 
of life-sustaining procedures in accordance with the provisions 
of this chapter shall be guilty of any criminal act or of 
unprofessional conduct. 
S 7191.  Duties  of physician. 
(a) Prior to effecting a withholding or withdrawal of life- 
sustaining procedures from a qualified patient pursuant to the 
directive, the attending physician shall determine that the 
directive complies with Section 7188, and, if the patient is 
mentally competent, that the directive and all steps proposed 
by the attending physician to be undertaken are in accord with 
the desires of the qualified patient. 
(b) If the declarant was a qualified patient at least 14 days 
prior to executing or reexecuting the directive, the directive 
shall be conclusively presumed, unless revoked, to be the 
directions of the patient regarding the withholding or with- 
drawal of life-sustaining procedures. No physician, and no 
licensed health professional acting under the direction of a 
physician, shall be criminally or civilly liable for failing to 
effectuate the directive of the qualified patient pursuant to this 
subdivision. A failure by a physician to effectuate the directive 
of a qualified patient pursuant to this division shall constitute 
unprofessional conduct if the physician refuses to make the 
necessary arrangements, or fails to take the necessary steps, to 
effect the transfer of the qualified patient to another physician 
who will effectuate the directive of the qualified patient. 
(c) If the declarant becomes a qualified patient subse- 
quent to executing the directive, and has not subsequently 
reexecuted the directive, the attending physician may give 
weight to the directive as evidence of the patient's directions 
regarding the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining 
procedures and may consider other factors, such as informa- 
tion from the affected family or the nature of the patient's 
illness, injury, or disease, in determining whether the totality of 
circumstances known to the attending physician justify effectu- 
ating the directive. No physician, and no licensed health 
professional acting under the direction of a physician, shall be 
criminally or civilly liable for failing to effectuate the directive 
of the qualified patient pursuant to this subdivision. 
S 7192.  Suicide: Insurance. 
(a) The withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining pro- 
cedures from a qualified patient in accordance with the 
provisions of this chapter shall not, for any purpose, constitute 
a suicide. 
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(b) The making of a directive pursuant to Section 7188 
shall not restrict, inhibit, or impair in any manner the sale, 
procurement, or issuance of any policy of life insurance, nor 
shall it be deemed to modify the terms of an existing policy of 
life insurance. No policy of life insurance shall be legally 
mpaired or invalidated in any manner by the withholding or 
 w i t h d r a w a l  of life-sustaining procedures from an insured 
qualified patient, notwithstanding any term of the policy to the 
contrary. 
(c) No physician, health facility, or other health provider, 
a n d  no health care service plan, insurer issuing disability 
insurance, self-insured employee welfare benefit plan, or 
nonprofit hospital service plan, shall require any person to 
execute a directive a s  a condition for being insured for, or 
receiving , health care services. 
S 7193.  Rights as cumulative. 
Nothing in this chapter shall impair or supersede any legal 
right or legal responsibility which any person may have to 
effect the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining proce-
dures in any lawful manner. In such respect the provisions of 
this chapter are cumulative. 
S 7194.  Criminal penalties. 
Any person who willfully conceals, cancels, defaces, 
 obliterates, or damages the directive of another without such 
declarant's consent shall be guility of a misdemeanor. Any 
person who, except where justified or excused by law, falsifies 
or forges the directive of another, or willfully conceals or 
withholds personal knowledge of a revocation a s  provided in 
Section 7189, with the intent to cause a withholding or 
withdrawal  of life-sustaining procedures contrary to the 
   wishes of the declarant, and thereby, because of any such act, 
directly causes life-sustaining procedures to be withheld or 
  withdrawn and death to thereby be hastened, shall be subject 
to prosecution for unlawful homicide a s  provided in Chapter 1 
commencing with Section 187) of Title 8 of Part 1 of the Penal 
Code.
S 7195.   Construction of chapter. 
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to condone, 
authorize, or approve mercy killing, or to permit any affirma-
ive or deliberate act or omission to end life other than to 
permit the natural process of dying a s  provided in this chapter. 
1976 Cal. Stat., Chapter 1439, Code S Health and Safety, SS 7185 
hrough 7195 (Sept. 30,1976). 
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Delaware 
S 2501.  Definitions. 
(a) 'Artificial means' shall mean manufactured or techni- 
cal contrivances which may be attached to or integrated into 
the human body, but which are not normally a part of the 
human body. 
(b) 'Attending physician' shall mean the physician select- 
ed by the patient or someone on his behalf, or assigned by a 
health care facility to the patient, which physician has primary 
responsibility for the treatment and care of the patient. 
(c) 'Declarant' shall mean the person on whose behalf a 
declaration, in accordance with this chapter, is made. 
(d) 'Declaration' shall mean a written statement voluntari- 
ly executed by the declarant or his agent directing the 
withholding or withdrawal of certain medical treatment, even 
if such treatment is the sole means of sustaining life, during a 
future state of incompetency. 
(e) 'Maintenance medical treatment' shall mean any medi- 
cal or surgical procedure or intervention which utilizes me- 
chanical or  other artifical means to sustain, restore, or supplant 
a vital function; and which would serve only to artifically 
prolong the dying process and delay the moment of death 
where death is imminent, whether or not such procedures are 
utilized. The words 'maintenance medical treatment' shall not 
include the administration of medication, nor the performance 
of any medical procedure necessary to provide comfort care or 
to alleviate pain. 
( f )  'Terminal condition' shall mean any disease, illness, 
injury or condition sustained by any human being from which 
there is no reasonable medical expectation of recovery and 
which, a s  a medical probability, will result in the death of such 
human being regardless of the use or discontinuance of 
medical treatment implemented for the purpose of sustaining 
life, or the life processes. 
S 2502.  Right of self-determination. 
(a) An individual, legally adult, who is competent and of 
sound mind, has the right to refuse medical or surgical 
treatment if such refusal is not contrary to existing public 
health laws. Such individual has  the right to make a written, 
dated declaration instructing any physician, including without 
limitation the treating physican, to cease or refrain from 
medical or surgical treatment during a possible pre-stated 
future incompetency of such person. The declaration shall take 
effect whenever the circumstances described in the declaration 
take place, and the fact they have taken place is confirmed in 
writing by two physicians. 
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(b) An adult person by written declaration may appoint 
an agent who will act on behalf of such appointor if, due to a 
condition resulting from illness or injury and, in the judgment 
of the attending physician, the appointor becomes incapable of 
making a decision in the exercise of the right to accept or 
refuse medical treatment. 
(c) An agent appointed in accordance with this section 
may accept or refuse medical treatment proposed for the 
appointor if, in the judgment of the attending physician, the 
appointor is incapable of making that decision. This authority 
shall include the right to refuse medical treatment which would 
extend the appointor's life. An agent authorized to make 
decisions under this chapter has a duty to act in good faith, and 
with due regard for the benefit and interests of the appointor. 
S 2503. Written declaration. 
(a) Any adult person may execute a declaration directing 
the withholding or withdrawal of maintenance medical treat- 
ment, where the person is in a terminal condition and under 
such circumstances a s  may be set forth in the declaration. The 
declaration made pursuant to this chapter shall be: 
(1)  in writing; 
(2) signed by the person making the declaration, or by 
another person in the declarant's presence at the declarant's 
expressed direction; 
(3) dated; and 
(4) signed in the presence of two or more adult wit- 
nesses, a s  set forth in subsection (bj. 
(b) The declaration shall be signed by the declarant in the 
presence of two subscribing witnesses, neither of whom: 
(1)    is related to the declarant by blood or marriage; 
(2) is entitled to any portion of the estate of the 
declarant under any will of the declarant or codicil thereto 
then existing nor, at  the time of the declaration, is so entitled 
by operation of law then existing; 
(3) has, at  the time of the execution of the declaration, a 
present or inchoate claim against any portion of the estate of 
the declarant; 
(4) has a direct financial responsibility for the declar- 
ant's medical care; or 
(5) is an  employee of the hospital or other health care 
facility in which the declarant is a patient. 
(c) Each witness to the declaration shall verify that he is 
not prohibited, under subsection (b) of this section, from being 
a witness under the provision of this chapter. 
(d) The declaration of a patient diagnosed a s  pregnant by 
the attending physician shall be of no effect during the course 
of the patient's pregnancy. Where a declaration is lacking any 
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requirement under this subsection and such defect is later 
corrected by amendment or codicil, whether formally or 
informally prepared, such declaration shall be valid ab initio, 
notwithstanding the earlier defect. 
S 2504.  Revocation. 
[a) The desires of a declarant who is competent shall at  
all times supercede the effect of the declaration. A declarant 
may revoke his declaration at any time, without regard to his 
mental state or competency. Any of the following methods is 
sufficient for revocation: 
(1) Destruction, cancellation, obliteration, or mutilation 
of the declaration with an intent to revoke it. If physical 
disability has rendered the declarant unable to destroy, cancel, 
obliterate, or mutilate the declaration, he may direct another 
individual to do so in his presence; 
(2) An oral statement made in the presence of two 
persons, each eighteen years of age or older, which expresses 
an intent contrary to that expressed in the declaration; 
 (3) Either a new declaration, made in the same manner 
with the same formality as the former declaration, which 
expresses an intent contrary to that expressed in the prior 
declaration; or a written revocation signed and dated by the 
declarant. 
(b) There shall be no criminal nor civil liability on the part 
of any person for failure to act in accordance with a revoca- 
tion, unless such person has actual or constructive knowledge 
of the revocation. 
(c) If the declarant becomes comatose or is rendered 
incapable of communicating, the declaration shall remain in 
effect for the termination of the comatose condition, or until 
such time as  the declarant's condition renders him able to 
communicate. 
S 2505.  Health care personnel; legal immunity. 
Physicians or nurses who act in reliance on a document 
executed in accordance with this chapter, where such health 
care personnel have no actual notice of revocation or contrary 
indication, by withholding medical procedures from an individ- 
ual who executed such document shall be presumed to be 
acting in good faith, and unless negligent shall be immune from 
civil or criminal liability. 
For purposes of this chapter a physician or nurse may 
presume, in the absence of actual notice to the contrary, that 
an individual who executed a document under this chapter 
was of sound mind when it was executed. 
S  2506.  Safeguard provisions. 
(a) Anyone who has good reason to believe that the 
withdrawal or withholding of a maintenance medical treat- 
ment in a particular case: 
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(1) is contrary to the most recent expressed wishes of a 
declarant;  
(2) is being proposed pursuant to a Declaration that has 
been falsified, forged, or coerced; or 
(3) is being considered without the benefit of a revoca- 
tion which has been unlawfully concealed, destroyed, altered 
or cancelled; may petition the Court of Chancery for appoint- 
ment of a guardian for such declarant. 
(b) Upon receipt of a declaration, the hospital or the 
attending physician shall acknowledge receipt of same, and 
shall include the declaration a s  part of the declarant's medical 
records. 
(c) A declaration shall be effective for ten years from the 
date it was declared or executed, unless sooner revoked in a 
manner permitted under this chapter. Nothing in this chapter 
shall be construed to prevent any person from re-executing a 
Declaration at any time. 
(d) The Division of Aging and the Public Guardian shall 
have oversight over any declaration executed by a resident of 
a sanatorium, rest home, nursing home, boarding home, or 
related institution a s  the same is defined in § 1101, Title of 
the Delaware Code. Such declaration shall have no force nor 
effect if the declarant is a resident of a sanatorium, rest home, 
nursing home, boarding home or related institution at  the time 
the declaration is executed unless one of the witnesses is a 
person designated a s  a patient advocate or ombudsman by 
either the Division of Aging or the Public Guardian. The patient 
advocate or ombudsman must have the qualifications required 
of other witnesses under this Chapter.
S 2507. Assumptions and presumptions. 
(a) Neither the execution of a declaration under this 
Chapter nor the fact that maintenance medical treatment is 
withheld from a patient in accordance therewith shall, for any 
purpose, constitute a suicide. 
(b) The making of a declaration pursuant to this Chapter 
shall not restrict, inhibit, nor impair in any manner the sale, 
procurement, or issuance of any policy of life insurance, nor 
shall it be deemed or presumed to modify the terms of an  
existing policy of life insurance. No policy of life insurance 
shall be legally impaired or invalidated in any manner by the 
withholding or withdrawal of maintenance medical treatment 
from an  insured patient, notwithstanding any term of the policy 
to the contrary. 
(c) No physician, health facility, or other health care 
provider, nor any health care service plan, insurer issuing 
disability insurance, self-insured employee welfare benefit 
plan, or non-profit hospital service plan, shall require any 
person to execute a Declaration a s  a condition to being 
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insured, or for receiving health care services, nor shall the 
signing of a Declaration be a bar. 
(d) This chapter shall create no presumption concerning 
the intentions of an individual, who has not executed a 
declaration, to consent to the use or withholding of life- 
sustaining procedures in the event of a terminal condition. 
S 2508. Penalties. 
(a) Whoever threatens directly or indirectly, coerces, or 
intimidates any person to execute a declaration directing the 
withholding or withdrawal of maintenance medical treatment 
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be 
fined not less than $500 nor more than $1,000; be imprisoned 
not less than 30 days nor more than 90 days; or both. The 
Superior Court shall have jurisdiction over such offenses. 
(b) Whoever knowingly conceals, destroys, falsifies or 
forges a document with intent to create the false impression 
that another person has directed that maintenance medical 
treatment be utilized for the prolongation of his life is guilty of 
a Class C felony. 
(c) The Superior Court shall have jurisdiction over all 
offenses under this Chapter. 
§ 2509. Exemption from liability; defense. 
(a) No physician or other individual, nor any health care 
facility which, acting in accordance with the requirement of 
this Chapter, causes the withholding or withdrawal of life- 
sustaining procedures from a patient, shall be subject to civil 
liability therefrom. No physician or other person acting under 
the direction of a physician who participates in the withholding 
or withdrawal of a life-sustaining procedure in accordance 
with the provisions of this Chapter shall be guilty of any 
criminal act or of unprofessional conduct, other determinations 
to the contrary notwithstanding. 
(b] In any action for malpractice governed by Chapter 68 
of Title 18, brought against any attending physician or any 
health care facility, arising out of the observance of the 
provisions of this Chapter, it shall be a defense to such action 
that the attending physician or health care facility acted in 
accordance with a written declaration meeting all of the 
procedural requirements of this Chapter. 
Section 2. This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 
Delaware Death with Dignity Act. 
Section 3. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to 
condone, authorize, or approve of mercy killing; be construed 
to permit any affirmative or deliberate act or omission to end 
, life other than to permit the natural process of dying; nor be 
construed to be a method of defining or determining a technical 
state of death. 
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Section 4. If any provision of this Act or the application 
thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, such 
invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of 
this Act which can be given effect without the invalid provision 
or application, and to that end the provisions of this Act are 
declared to be severable. 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, SS 2501 through 2509 (July 12, 1982). 
District of Columbia 
S 6-2421. Definitions. 
For the purposes of this subchapter, the term: 
(1) "Attending physician" means the physician selected 
by, or assigned to, the patient who has  primary responsibility 
for the treatment and care of the patient. 
(2) "Declaration' means a witnessed document in writing, 
voluntarily executed by the declarant in accordance with the 
requirements of S 6-2422. 
(3) "Life-sustaining procedure' means any medical proce- 
dure or intervention, which, when applied to a qualified 
patient, would serve only to artificially prolong the dying 
process and where, in the judgment of the attending physician 
and a second physician, death will occur whether or not such 
procedure or intervention is utilized. The term "life-sustaining
procedure" shall not include the administration of medication 
or the performance of any medical procedure deemed neces- 
sary to provide comfort care or to alleviate pain. 
(4) "Physician' means a person authorized to practice 
medicine in the District of Columbia. 
(5) "Qualified patient' means a patient who has executed 
a declaration in accordance with this subchapter and who has 
been diagnosed and certified in writing to be afflicted with a 
terminal condition by 2 physicians who have personally 
examined the patient, one of whom shall be the attending 
physician. 
(6) "Terminal condition' means an  incurable condition 
caused by injury, disease, or illness, which, regardless of the 
application of life-sustaining procedures, would, within reason- 
able medical judgment, produce death, and where the applica- 
tion of life-sustaining procedures serve only to postpone the 
moment of death of the patient. 
§ 6-2422. Declaration-Execution; form. 
(a) Any persons 18 years of age or older may execute a 
declaration directing the withholding or withdrawal of  life- 
sustaining procedures from themselves should they be in a
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terminal condition. The declaration made pursuant to this 
subchapter shall be: 
(1)  In writing; 
(2) Signed by the person making the declaration or by 
another person in the declarant's presence at the declarant's 
express direction; 
(3) Dated; and 
(4) Signed in the presence of  2 or more witnesses at least 
18 years of age. In addition, a witness shall not be: 
(A) The person who signed the declaration on behalf of 
and at the direction of the declarant; 
(B) Related to the declarant by blood or marriage; 
(C) Entitled to any portion of the estate of the declarant 
according to the laws of intestate succession of the District of 
Columbia or under any will of the declarant or codicil thereto; 
(D) Directly financially responsible for declarant's med- 
ical care; or 
(E) The attending physician, an employee of the attend- 
ing physician, or an employee of the health facility in which the 
declarant is a patient. 
(b) It shall be the responsibility of the declarant to provide 
for notification to his or her attending physician of the 
existence of the declaration. An attending physician, when 
presented with the declaration, shall make the declaration or a 
copy of the declaration a part of the declarant's medical 
records. 
(c) The declaration shall be substantially in the following 
form, but in addition may include other specific directions not 
inconsistent with other provisions of this subchapter. Should 
any of the other specific directions be held to be invalid, such 
invalidity shall not affect other directions of the declaration 
which can be given effect without the invalid direction, and to 
this end the directions in the declaration are severable. 
Declaration 
Declaration made this day of 
(month/year). 
I, , being of sound mind, willfully and voluntari- 
ly make known my desires that my dying shall not be 
artificially prolonged under the circumstances set forth below, 
do declare: 
If at any time I should have an incurable injury, disease, or 
illness certified to be a terminal condition by 2 physicians who 
have personally examined me, one of whom shall be my 
attending physician, and the physicians have determined that 
my death will occur whether or not life-sustaining procedures 
are utilized and where the application of    life-sustaining 
procedures would serve only to artificially prolong the dying 
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process, I direct that such procedures be withheld or with- 
drawn, and that I be permitted to die naturally with only the 
administration of medication or the performance of any 
medical procedure deemed necessary to provide me with 
comfort care or to alleviate pain. 
In the absence of my ability to give directions regarding 
the use of such life-sustaining procedures, it is my intention 
that this declaration shall be honored by my family and 
physician(s)  a s  the final expression of my legal right to refuse 
medical or surgical treatment and accept the consequences 
from such refusal. 
I understand the full import of this declaration and I am 
emotionally and mentally competent to make this declaration. 
Signed 
Address 
I believe the declarant to be of sound mind. I did not sign 
the declarant's signature above for or at  the direction of the 
declarant. I am at least 18 years of age and am not related to 
the declarant by blood or marriage, entitled to any portion of 
the estate of the declarant according to the laws of intestate 
succession of the District of Columbia or under any will of the 
declarant or codicil thereto, or directly financially responsible 
for declarant's medical care. I am not the declarant's attending 
physician, an  employee of the attending physician, or a n  
employee of the health facility in which the declarant is a 
patient. 
Witness 
Witness 
 S  6-2423..    Same-Restrictions. 
A declaration shall have no effect if the declarant is a 
patient in an  intermediate care or skilled care facility a s  
defined in the Health Care Facilities Regulation, enacted June 
14,1974 (Reg. 74-15; 20 DCR 1423) at  the time the declaration is 
executed unless 1  of the 2 witnesses to the directive is a patient 
advocate or ombudsman. The patient advocate or ombudsman 
shall have the same qualifications a s  a witness under S 6-2422. 
S 6-2424.   Same-Revocation. 
(a) A declaration may be revoked at  any time only by the 
declarant or at  the express direction of the declarant, without 
regard to the declarant's mental state by any of the following 
methods: 
(1) By being obliterated, burnt, torn, or otherwise de- 
stroyed or defaced by the declarant or by some person in the 
declarant's presence and at  his or her direction; 
(2) By a written revocation of the declaration signed 
and dated by the declarant or person acting at the direction of 
the declarant. Such revocation shall become effective only 
upon communication of the revocation to the attending physi- 
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cian by the declarant or by a person acting on behalf of the 
declarant. The attending physician shall record in the patient's 
medical record the time and date when he or she receives 
notification of the written revocation; or 
(3) By a verbal expression of the intent to revoke the 
declaration, in the presence of a witness 18 years or older who 
signs and dates a writing confirming that such expression of 
intent was made. Any verbal revocation shall become effective 
only upon communication of the revocation to the attending 
physician by the declarant or by a person acting on behalf of 
the declarant. The attending physician shall record, in the 
patient's medical record, the time, date, and place of when he 
or she receives notification of the revocation. 
(b) There shall be no criminal or civil liability on the part 
of any person for failure to act upon a revocation made 
pursuant to this section unless that person has actual knowl- 
edge of the revocation. 
 S 6-2425.    Physician's duty to confirm terminal condition. 
(a) An attending physician who has been notified of the 
existence of a declaration executed under this subchapter, 
without delay after the diagnosis of a terminal condition of the 
declarant, shall take the necessary steps to provide for written 
certification and confirmation of the declarant's terminal 
condition, so that the declarant may be deemed to be a 
qualified patient under this subchapter. 
(b) Once written certification and confirmation of the 
declarant's terminal condition is made a person becomes a 
qualified patient under this subchapter only if the attending 
physician verbally or in writing informs the patient of his or 
her terminal condition and documents such communication in 
the patient's medical record. If the patient is diagnosed as  
unable to comprehend verbal or written communications, such 
patient shall become a qualified patient as  defined in S 6-2421, 
immediately upon written certification and confirmation of his 
or her terminal condition by the attending physician. 
(c) An attending physician who does not comply with this 
section shall be considered to have committed an act of 
unprofessional conduct under S 2-1326. 
S 6-2426.   Competency and intent of declarant. 
( a )  T h e desires of a qualified patient shall at all times 
supersede the effect of the declaration. 
(b) If  the qualified patient is incompetent at the time of the 
decision to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining procedures, a 
decliircllion executed in accordance with S 6-2422 is presumed 
to be valid. For the purpose of this subchapter, a physician or 
health facility may presume in the absence of actual notice to 
the contrary that an individual who executed a declaration 
was of sound  m ind  when  i t was executed. The fact of an 
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individual's having executed a declaration shall not be consid- 
ered as an indication of a declarant's mental incompetency. 
S 6-2427. Extent of medical liability; transfer of patient; criminal 
offenses. 
(a) No physician, licensed health care professional, health 
facility, or employee thereof who in good faith and pursuant to 
reasonable medical standards causes or participates in the 
withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining procedures from 
a qualifed patient pursuant to a declaration made in accor- 
dance with this subchapter shall, as  a result thereof, be subject 
to criminal or civil liability, or be found to have committed an 
act of unprofessional conduct. 
(b) An attending physician who cannot comply with the 
declaration of a qualified patient pursuant to this subchapter 
shall, in conjunction with the next of kin of the patient or other 
responsible individual, effect the transfer of the qualified 
patient to another physician who will honor the declaration of 
the qualified patient. Transfer under these circumstances shall 
not constitute abandonment. Failure of an attending physician 
to effect the transfer of the qualified patient according to this 
section, in the event he or she cannot comply with the 
directive, shall constitute unprofessional conduct as defined in 
S 2-1326. 
(c) Any person who willfully conceals, cancels, defaces, 
obliterates, or damages the declaration of another without the 
declarant's consent or who falsifies or forges a revocation of 
the declaration of another shall commit an offense, and upon 
conviction shall be fined an amount not to exceed $5,000 or be 
imprisoned for a period not to exceed 3 years, or both. 
(d) Any person who falsifies or forges the declaration of 
another, or willfully conceals or withholds personal knowledge 
of the revocation of a declaration, with the intent to cause a 
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures, con- 
trary to the wishes of the declarant, and thereby, because of 
such act, directly causes life-sustaining procedures to be 
withheld or withdrawn and death to be hastened, shall be 
subject to prosecution for unlawful homicide pursuant to S 22-
2401.
S 6-2428 Exclusion of suicide; effect of declaration upon 
issuance. 
(a) The withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining pro- 
cedures from a qualified patient in accordance with the 
provisions of this subchapter shall not, for any purpose, 
constitute a suicide and shall not constitute the crime of 
assisting suicide. 
(b) The making of a declaration pursuant to S 6-2422 shall 
not affect in any manner the sale, procurement, or issuance of 
any policy of life insurance, nor shall it be deemed to modify 
the terms of an existing policy of life insurance. No policy of 
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life insurance shall be legally impaired or invalidated in any 
manner by the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining 
procedures from an insured qualified patient, notwithstanding 
any term of the policy to the contrary. 
(c) No physician, health facility, or other health care 
provider, and no health care service plan, health maintenance 
organization, insurer issuing disability insurance, self-insured 
employee welfare benefit plan, nonprofit medical service 
corporation, or mutual nonprofit hospital service corporation 
shall require any person to execute a declaration as a 
condition for being insured for, or receiving, -health care 
services. 
S   6-2429. Preservation of existing rights. 
(a) Nothing in this subchapter shall impair or supersede 
any legal right or legal responsibility which any person may 
have to effect the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining 
procedures in any lawful manner. In such respect the provi- 
sions of this subchapter are cumulative. 
(b) This subchapter shall create no presumption concern- 
ing the intention of an individual who has not executed a 
declaration to consent to the use or withholding of   life- 
sustaining procedures in the event of a terminal condition. 
S   6-2430. Effect of subchapter. 
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to condone, 
authorize, or approve mercy-killing or to permit any affirmative 
or deliberate act or omission to end a human life other than to 
permit the natural process of dying as provided in this 
subchapter. 
D.C. Code Ann. 16, SS 6-2401 through 6-2430 (February 25,1982). 
Idaho 
 S 39-4501. Short title. 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Natural 
Death Act." 
§ 39-4502. Statement of policy. 
The legislature finds that adult persons have the funda- 
mental right to control the decisions relating to the rendering of 
their medical care, including the decision to have life sustain-  
ing procedures withheld or withdrawn in instances of a 
terminal condition. 
The legislature further finds that modern medical technol- 
ogy has made possible the artificial prolongation of human life 
beyond natural limits. 
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The legislature further finds that patients suffering from 
terminal conditions are sometimes unable to express their 
desire to withhold or withdraw such artificial life prolongation 
procedures which provide nothing medically necessary or 
beneficial to the patient because of the progress of the disease 
process which renders the patient comatose or unable to 
communicate with the physician. 
In recognition of the dignity and privacy which patients 
have a right to expect, the legislature hereby declares that the 
laws of this state shall recognize the right of an adult person to 
make a written directive instructing his physician to withhold 
or withdraw life sustaining procedures when such person is 
suffering from a terminal condition and unable to instruct his 
physician regarding such procedures because of the terminal 
condition. 
S 39-4503. Definitions. 
The following definitions shall govern the construction of 
this chapter: 
(1) "Attending physician" means the physician licensed 
by the state board of medicine, selected by, or assigned to, the 
patient who has primary responsibility [responsibility] for the 
treatment and care of the patient. 
(2) "Terminal condition" means an incurable physical 
condition caused by disease or illness which reasonable 
medical judgment determines shortens the  lifespan of the 
patient. 
(3) "Qualified patient" means a person of sound mind at 
least eighteen (18) years of age diagnosed by the attending 
physician to be afflicted with a terminal condition. 
(4) "Artificial life-sustaining procedure" means any medi- 
cal procedure or intervention which utilizes mechanical means 
to sustain or supplant a vital function which when applied to a 
qualified patient, would serve only to artificially prolong the 
moment of death and where, in the judgment of the attending 
physician, death is imminent whether or not such procedures 
are utilized. Artificial life-sustaining procedures shall not 
include the administration of medication or the performance of 
any medical procedure deemed necessary to alleviate pain. 
S 39-4504. Directive for withholding procedures. 
Any qualified patient may execute a directive directing the 
withholding or withdrawal of artificial life-sustaining proce- 
dures when such patient becomes unconscious or unable to 
communicate with his attending physician because of the 
progress of the terminal condition resulting in his inability to 
voluntarily determine whether such procedures should be 
utilized and if such procedures would serve only to prolong the 
moment of his death and where his attending physician 
determines that his death is imminent whether or not such 
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procedures are utilized. The directive shall be signed by the 
qualified patient in the presence of two (2) witnesses who shall 
verify in such directive that they are not related to the qualified 
patient by blood or marriage, that they would not be entitled to 
any portion of the estate of the qualified patient upon his 
demise under any will of the qualified patient or codicil thereto 
then existing, at the time of the directive, or by operation of 
law then existing. In addition, the witnesses shall verify that 
they are not the attending physician, an employee of the 
attending physician or a health facility in which the qualified 
patient is a patient or any person who has a claim against any 
portion of the estate of the qualified patient upon his demise at 
the time of the execution of the directive. The directive shall be 
in the following form: 
DIRECTIVE TO PHYSICIAN 
Directive made this day of 
(month/year). 
I, , being of sound mind, willfully and voluntari- 
ly make known my desire that my life shall not be artificially 
prolonged under the circumstances below: 
1. In the absence of my ability to give directions regarding 
the use of artificial life-sustaining procedures as a result of the 
disease process of my terminal condition, it is my intention 
that such artificial life-sustaining procedures should not be 
used when they would serve only to artificially prolong the 
moment of my death and where my attending physician 
determines that my death is imminent whether or not the 
artificial life-sustaining procedures are utilized. 
2. I have been diagnosed and notified that I have a 
terminal condition known as by  , M.D., 
whose address is and whose telephone number is 
3. This directive shall have no force or effect after five 
years from the date filled in above. 
4. I understand the full impact of this directive and I am 
emotionally and mentally competent to make this directive. 
(Name) 
(City, County and State) 
Witness 
Witness 
STATE OF IDAHO 
County of Ada 
We, , and , the qualified 
patient and the witnesses respectively, whose names are 
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signed to the attached and foregoing instrument, being first 
duly sworn, do hereby declare to the undersigned authority 
that the qualified patient signed and executed the directive and 
that he signed willingly and he executed it as his free and 
voluntary act for the purposes therein expressed; and that each 
of the witnesses, in the presence and hearing of the qualified 
patient signed the directive as  witness and that to the best of 
his knowledge the qualified patient was at the time 18 or more 
years of age, of sound mind and under no constraint or undue 
influence. We the undersigned witnesses further declare that 
we are not related to the qualified patient by blood or 
marriage; that we are not entitled to any portion of the estate of 
the qualified patient upon his decease under any will or codicil 
thereto presently existing or by operation of law then existing; 
that we are not the attending physician, an employee of the 
attending physician or a health facility in which the qualified 
patient is a patient, and that we are not a person who has a 
claim against any portion of the estate of the qualified patient 
upon his decease at the present time. 
Qualified Patient 
Witness 
Witness 
SUBSCRIBED, sworn to and acknowledged before me by 
, the qualified patient, and subscribed and sworn to 
before me by and , witnesses, this 
day of ,19 
Notary Public for the State 
of Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
(SEAL) 
S 39-4505. Revocation. 
(1) A directive may be revoked at  any time by the 
qualified patient, without regard to his mental state or compe- 
tence, by any of the following methods: 
(a) By being cancelled, defaced, obliterated or burned, 
torn or otherwise destroyed by the qualified patient or by some 
person in his presence and by his direction. 
(b) By a written revocation of the qualified patient 
expressing his intent to revoke, signed by the qualified patient. 
(c) By a verbal expression by the qualified patient of his 
intent to revoke the directive. 
(2) There shall be no criminal or civil liability on the part 
of any person for failure to act upon a revocation of a directive 
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made pursuant to this section unless that person has actual 
knowledge of the revocation. 
S 39-4506. Expiration of directive. 
A directive shall be effective for five (5) years from the 
date of execution unless sooner revoked in a manner described 
in section 39-4505, Idaho Code. Nothing in this chapter shall be 
construed to prevent a qualified patient from reexecuting a 
directive at any time. If the qualified patient becomes coma- 
tose or is rendered incapable of communicating with the 
attending physician, the directive shall remain in effect for the 
duration of the comatose condition or until such time as the 
qualified patient's condition renders him able to communicate 
with the attending physician. 
S   39-4507. Immunity. 
No physician or health facility, which, acting in accordance 
with a directive meeting the requirements of this chapter, 
causes the withholding or withdrawal of artificial life-sustain-
ing procedures from a qualified patient, shall be subject to civil 
liability or criminal liability therefrom. 
S 39-4508. General provisions. 
(1) This chapter shall have no effect or be in any manner 
construed to apply to persons not executing a directive 
pursuant to this chapter nor shall it in any manner affect the 
rights of any such persons or of others acting for or on behalf of 
such persons to give or refuse to give consent or withhold 
consent for any medical care, neither shall this chapter be 
construed to affect chapter 43, title 39, Idaho Code, in any 
manner. 
(2) The making of a directive pursuant to this chapter shall 
not restrict, inhibit or impair in any manner the sale, procure- 
ment, or issuance of any policy of life insurance, nor shall it be 
deemed to modify the terms of existing policy of life insurance. 
No policy of life insurance shall be legally impaired or 
invalidated in any manner by the withholding or withdrawal of 
artificial life-sustaining procedures from an insured qualified 
patient, notwithstanding any term of the policy to the contrary. 
(3) No physician, health facility or other health provider 
and no health care service plan, insurer issuing disability 
insurance, self-insured employee, welfare benefit plan, or 
nonprofit hospital service plan, shall require any person to 
execute a directive as a condition for being insured for, or 
receiving, health care services. 
Idaho Code SS 39-4501 through 39-4508 (March 1977). 
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Kansas 
S 65-28, 101    . Withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining proce- 
dures; legislative finding and declaration. 
The legislature finds that adult persons have the funda- 
mental right to control the decisions relating to the rendering of 
their own medical care, including the decision to have life-
sustaining procedures withheld or withdrawn in instances of a 
terminal condition. 
In order that the rights of patients may be respected even 
after they are no longer able to participate actively in decisions 
about themselves, the legislature hereby declares that the laws 
of this state shall recognize the right of an adult person to make 
a written declaration instructing his or her physician to 
withhold or withdraw life-sustaining procedures in the event of 
a terminal condition. 
S 65-28, 102    . Same; definitions. 
As used in this act: 
(a) "Attending physician" means the physician selected 
by, or assigned to, the patient who has primary responsibility 
for the treatment and care of the patient. 
(b) "Declaration" means a witnessed document in writing, 
voluntarily executed by the declarant in accordance with the 
requirements of K.S.A. 65-28,103. 
(c) "Life-sustaining procedure" means any medical proce- 
dure or intervention which, when applied to a qualified patient, 
would serve only to prolong the dying process and where, in 
the judgment of the attending physician, death will occur 
whether or not such procedure or intervention is utilized. "Life-
sustaining procedure" shall not include the administration of 
medication or the performance of any medical procedure 
deemed necessary to provide comfort care or to alleviate pain. 
(d) "Physician" means a person licensed to practice 
medicine and surgery by the state board of healing arts. 
(e) "Qualified patient" means a patient who has executed 
a declaration in accordnce with this act and who has been 
diagnosed and certified in writing to be afflicted with a 
terminal condition by two physicians who have personally 
examined the patient, one of whom shall be the attending 
physician. 
S 65-28, 103.    Same; declaration authorizing; effect during preg- 
nancy of qualifed patient; duty to notify attending physician; 
form of declaration; severability of directions. 
(a) Any adult person may execute a declaration directing 
the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures in 
a terminal condition. The declaration made pursuant to this act 
shall be: (1) In writing; (2) signed by the person making the 
declaration, or by another person in the declarant's presence 
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and by the declarant's expressed direction; (3) dated; and (4) 
signed in the presence of two or more witnesses at least 
eighteen (18)  years of age neither of whom shall be the person 
who signed the declaration on behalf of and at the direction of 
the person making the declaration, related to the declarant by 
blood or marriage, entitled to any portion of the estate of the 
declarant according to the laws of intestate succession of this 
state or under any will of the declarant or codicil thereto, or 
directly financially responsible for declarant's medical care. 
The declaration of a qualified patient diagnosed as pregnant by 
the attending physician shall have no effect during the course 
of the qualified patient's pregnancy. 
(b) It shall be the responsibility of declarant to provide for 
notification to his or her attending physician of the existence of 
the declaration. An attending physician who is so notified shall 
make the declaration, or a copy of the declaration, a part of the 
declarant's medical records. 
(c) The declaration shall be substantially in the following 
form, but in addition may include other specific directions. 
Should any of the other specific directions be held to be 
invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other directions of the 
declaration which can be given effect without the invalid 
direction, and to this end the directions in the declaration are 
severable. 
DECLARATION 
Declaration made this day of 
(month, year). I,               , being of sound mind, willful-
ly and voluntarily make known my desire that my dying 
shall not be artificially prolonged under the circum- 
stances set forth below, do hereby declare: 
If at any time I should have an incurable injury, disease, 
or illness certified to be a terminal condition by two 
physicians who have personally examined me, one of 
whom shall be my attending physician, and the physi- 
cians have determined that my death will occur whether 
or not life-sustaining procedures are utilized and where 
the application of life-sustaining procedures would serve 
only to artifically prolong the dying process, I direct that 
such procedures be withheld or withdrawn, and that I be 
permitted to die naturally with only the administration 
of medication or the performance of any medical 
procedure deemed necessary to provide me with com- 
fort care. 
In the absence of my ability to give directions regarding 
the use of such life-sustaining procedures, it is my 
intention that this declaration shall be honored by my 
family and physician(s) as the final expression of my 
legal right to refuse medical or surgical treatment and 
accept the consequences from such refusal. 
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I understand the full import of this declaration and I am 
emotionally and mentally competent to make this decla- 
ration. 
Signed 
City, County and State 
of Residence 
The declarant has been personally known to me and I 
believe him or her to be of sound mind. I did not sign the 
declarant's signature above for or at the direction of the 
declarant. I am not related to the declarant by blood or 
marriage, entitled to any portion of the estate of the 
declarant according to the laws of intestate succession 
or under any will of declarant or codicil thereto, or 
directly financially responsible for declarant's medical 
care. 
Witness 
Witness 
§ 65-28,104.  Same; revocation of declaration. 
(a) A declaration may be revoked at any time by the 
declarant by any of the following methods: 
(1) By being obliterated, burnt, torn, or otherwise de- 
stroyed or defaced in a manner indicating intention to cancel; 
(2) by a written revocation of the declaration signed and 
dated by the declarant or person acting at the direction of the 
declarant; or 
(3) by a verbal expression of the intent to revoke the 
declaration, in the presence of a witness eighteen (18)  years of 
age or older who signs and dates a writing confirming that such 
expression of intent was made. Any verbal revocation shall 
become effective upon receipt by the attending physician of the 
above mentioned writing. The attending physician shall record 
in the patient's medical record the time, date and place of 
when he or she received notification of the revocation. 
(b) There shall be no criminal or civil liability on the part 
of any person for failure to act upon a revocation made 
pursuant to this section unless that person has actual knowl- 
edge of the revocation. 
S 65-28,105. Same; written certification and confirmation of 
declarant's terminal condition; effect of failure to comply. 
An attending physician who has been notified of the 
existence of a declaration executed under this act, without 
delay after the diagnosis of a terminal condition of the 
declarant, shall take the necessary steps to provide for written 
certification and confirmation of the declarant's terminal 
condition, so that declarant may be deemed to be a qualified 
patient under this act. 
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An attending physician who fails to comply with this 
section shall be deemed to have refused to comply with the 
declaration and shall be subject to subsection (a) of K.S.A. 65-
28,107. 
§ 65-28,106. Same; desires of qualified patient supersede 
declaration; presumptions relating to declaration; immunity 
from civil or criminal liability for persons acting pursuant to 
declaration. 
The desires of a qualified patient shall at  all times 
supersede the effect of the declaration. 
If the qualified patient is incompetent at the time of the 
decision to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining procedures, a 
declaration executed in accordance with K.S.A. 65-28,103 is 
presumed to be valid. For the purpose of this act, a physician or 
medical care facility may presume in the absence of actual 
notice to the contrary that an individual who executed a 
declaration was of sound mind when it was executed. The fact 
of an individual's having executed a declaration shall not be 
considered as an indication of a declarant's mental incompe- 
tency. Age of itself shall not be a bar to a determination of 
competency. 
No physician, licensed health care professional, medical 
care facility or employee thereof who in good faith and 
pursuant to reasonable medical standards causes or partici- 
pates in the withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining 
procedures from a qualified patient pursuant to a declaration 
made in accordance with this act shall, as  a result thereof, be 
subject to criminal or civil liability, or be found to have 
committed an act of unprofessional conduct. 
S 6548,107. Same; attending physician's refusal to comply with 
declaration of qualified patient; transfer of patient; unprofes- 
sional conduct; unlawful act. 
(a) An attending physician who refuses to comply with the 
declaration of a qualified patient pursuant to this act shall 
effect the transfer of the qualified patient to another physician. 
Failure of an attending physician to comply with the declara- 
tion of a qualified patient and to effect the transfer of the 
qualified patient shall constitute unprofessional conduct as  
defined in K.S.A. 65-2837. 
(b) Any person who willfully conceals, cancels, defaces, 
obliterates or damages the declaration of another without such 
declarant's consent or who falsifies or forges a revocation of 
the declaration of another shall be guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor. 
(c) Any person who falsifies or forges the declaration of 
another, or willfully conceals or withholds personal knowledge 
of the revocation of a declaration. with the intent to cause a 
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures con- 
trary to the wishes of the declarant, and thereby, because of 
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such.  act, directly causes life-sustaining procedures to be 
withheld or withdrawn and death to be hastened, shall be 
guilty of a class E felony. 
S 65-28,108.    Same; construction and effect of act. 
(a) The withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining pro- 
cedures from a qualified patient in accordance with the 
provisions of this act shall not, for any purpose, constitute a 
suicide and shall not constitute the crime of assisting suicide as  
defined by K.S.A. 21-3406. 
(b) The making a declaration pursuant to K.S.A. 65-28,103 
shall not affect in any manner the sale, procurement, or 
issuance of any policy of life insurance, nor shall it be deemed 
to modify the terms of an existing policy of life insurance. No 
policy of life insurance shall be legally impaired or invalidated 
in any manner by the withholding or withdrawal of life- 
sustaining procedures from an insured qualified patient, not- 
withstanding any term of the policy to the contrary. 
(c) No physician, medical care facility, or other health 
care provider, and no health care service plan, health mainte- 
nance organization, insurer issuing disability insurance, self-
insured employee welfare benefit plan, nonprofit medical 
service corporation or mutual nonprofit hospital service corpo- 
ration shall require any person to execute a declaration as a 
condition for being insured for, or receiving, health care 
services. 
(d) Nothing in this act shall impair or supersede any legal 
right or legal responsibility which any person may have to 
effect the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining proce- 
dures in any lawful manner. In such respect the provisions of 
this act are cumulative. 
(e) This act shall create no presumption concerning the 
intention of an  individual who has not executed a declaration 
to consent to the use or withholding of life-sustaining proce- 
dures in the event of a terminal condition. 
S 65-28,109. Same; act not to be construed to condone or 
approve mercy killing or to permit other than natural process of 
dying. 
Nothing in this act shall be construed to condone, autho- 
rize or approve mercy killing or to permit any affirmative or 
deliberate act or omission to end life other than to permit the 
natural process of dying as  provided in this act. 
Kan. Stat. Ann. 65-28,101 through 65-28,109 (July 1, 1979). 
Nevada 
S 449.540  Definitions. 
As used in NRS 449.540 to 449.680, inclusive, unless the 
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context otherwise requires, the words and terms defined in 
NRS 449.550 to 449.590, inclusive, have the meanings ascribed 
to them in those sections. 
S 449.550 "Attending physician" defined. 
"Attending physician" means the physician, selected by or 
assigned to a patient, who has primary responsibility for the 
treatment and care of the patient. 
S 449.560 "Declaration" defined. 
"Declaration" means a written document executed by an 
adult person directing that when he is in a terminal condition 
and becomes comatose or is otherwise rendered incapable of 
communicating with his attending physician, life-sustaining 
procedures shall not be applied. 
S 449.570 "Life-sustaining procedure" defined. 
"Life-sustaining procedure" means a medical procedure 
which utilizes mechanical or other artificial methods to sus- 
tain, restore or supplant a vital function. The term does not 
include medication or procedures necessary to alleviate pain. 
S 449.580 "Physician" defined. 
"Physician" means any person licensed to practice medi- 
cine or osteopathy. 
S 449.590 "Terminal condition" defined. 
"Terminal condition" means an incurable condition which 
is such that the application of life-sustaining procedures serves 
only to postpone the moment of death. 
S 449.600 Execution of declaration. 
Any adult person may execute a declaration directing that 
when he is in a terminal condition and becomes comatose or is 
otherwise rendered incapable of communicating with his 
attending physician, life-sustaining procedures be withheld or 
withdrawn from him. The person shall execute the declaration 
in the same manner in which a will is executed, except that a 
witness may not be: 
1. Related to the declarant by blood or marriage. 
2. The attending physician. 
3. An employee of the attending physician or of the 
hospital or other health and care facility in which the declarant 
is a patient. 
4. A person who has a claim against any portion of the 
estate of the declarant. 
S 449.610 Form of declaration; entry and removal of declaration 
from medical records. 
The declaration shall be in substantially the following 
form: 
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- - -  - -  
DIRECTIVE TO PHYSICIANS 
Date 
I, , being of sound mind, intentionally and 
voluntarily declare: 
1. If at any time I am in a terminal condition and become 
comatose or am otherwise rendered incapable of communicat- 
ing with my attending physician, and my death is imminent 
because of an incurable disease, illness or injury, I direct that 
life-sustaining procedures be withheld or withdrawn, and that I 
be permitted to die naturally. 
2. It is my intention that this directive be honored by my 
family and attending physician as the final expression of my 
legal right to refuse medical or surgical treatment and to accept 
the consequences of my refusal. 
3. If I have been found to be pregnant, and that fact is 
known to my physician, this directive is void during the course 
of my pregnancy. I understand the full import of this directive, 
and I am emotionally and mentally competent to execute it. 
Signed 
City, County and State of Residence 
The declarant has been personally known to me and I believe 
to be of sound mind. 
Witness 
Witness 
Section 3 of the declaration form should be omitted for 
male declarants. 
The executed declaration, or a copy thereof signed by the 
declarant and the witnesses, shall be placed in the medical 
record of the declarant and a notation made of its presence and 
the date of its execution. A notation of the circumstances and 
date of removal of a declaration shall be entered in the medical 
record if the declaration is removed for any reason. 
S 449.620 Revocation of declaration; immunity in case of failure 
to act upon revocation. 
(1) A declaration may be revoked at any time by the 
declarant in the same way in which a will may be revoked, or 
by a verbal expression of intent to revoke. A verbal revocation 
is effective upon communication to the attending physician by 
the declarant or another person communicating it on behalf of 
the declarant. The attending physician shall record the verbal 
revocation and the date on which he received it in the medical 
record of the declarant. 
(2) No person is liable in a civil or criminal action for 
failure to act upon a revocation of a declaration unless the 
person had actual knowledge of the revocation. 
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S 449.630 Immunity for withholding or withdrawing life-sustain-
ing procedures. 
No hospital or other health and care facility, physician or 
person working under the direction of a physician who causes 
the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures 
from a patient in a terminal condition who has a declaration in 
effect and has become comatose or has otherwise been 
rendered incapable of communicating with his attending 
physician is subject to criminal or civil liability or to a charge 
of unprofessional conduct or malpractice as a result of an  
action taken in accordance with NRS 449.600 to 449.660, 
inclusive. 
S 449.640 Immunity in case of failure to follow directions of 
patient. 
(1) If a patient in a terminal condition has a declaration in 
effect and becomes comatose or is otherwise rendered incapa- 
ble of communicating with his attending physician, the physi- 
cian shall give weight to the declaration as  evidence of the 
patient's directions regarding the application of life-sustaining 
procedures, but the attending physician may also consider 
other factors in determining whether the circumstances war- 
rant following the directions. 
(2) No hospital or other health care facility, physician or 
person working under the direction of a physician is subject to 
criminal or civil liability for failure to follow the directions of 
the patient to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining procedures. 
S 449.650 Effect of declaration respecting suicide, insurance 
policies; execution of declaration may not be required as 
condition for insurance, health care services. 
(1) A person does not commit suicide by executing a 
declaration. 
(2) The execution of a declaration does not restrict, inhibit 
or impair the sale, procurement or issuance of any policy of 
insurance, nor shall it be deemed to modify any term of an 
existing policy of insurance. No policy of life insurance is 
impaired or invalidated in whole or in part by the withholding 
or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures from an insured 
person, regardless of any term of the policy. 
(3) No person may require another to execute a declara- 
tion as  a condition for being insured for or receiving health 
care services. 
S 449.660 Penalties. 
(1) Any person who willfully conceals, cancels, defaces,
obliterates or damages the declaration of another without the 
consent of the declarant is guilty of misdemeanor. 
(2) Any person who falsifies or  forges a document purport-
ing to be the declaration of another, or who willfully conceals
or withholds personal knowledge    of a revocation, with the
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intent to cause a withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining 
procedures contrary to the wishes of the declarant and thereby 
directly causes life-sustaining procedures to be withheld or 
withdrawn and death to be hastened is guilty of murder. 
S 449.670 Termination of life. 
Nothing in NRS 449.600 to 449.620, inclusive, permits any 
affirmative or deliberate act or omission which ends life other 
than to permit the natural process of dying. 
S 449.680 Other right or responsibility to withhold or withdraw 
life-sustaining procedures not limited. 
Nothing in NRS 449.610 to 449.660, inclusive, limits the 
right or responsibility which a person may otherwise have to 
withhold or withdraw life-sustaining procedures. 
 S 449.690 Effect of instrument executed before July 1, 1977. 
An instrument executed before July 1,  1977, which clearly 
expresses the intent of the declarant to direct the withholding 
or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures from him when he 
is in a terminal condition and becomes comatose or is 
otherwise rendered incapable of communicating with his 
attending physician shall, if executed in a manner which 
attests voluntary execution and not subsequently revoked, be 
given the same effect as a declaration prepared and executed 
in accordance with NRS 449.540 to 449.680, inclusive. 
Nev. Rev. Stat. SS 449.550 through 449.590 (May 6, 1977). 
New Mexico 
S 24-7-1. Short title. 
This act [24-7-1 to 24-7-11 NMSA 1978] may be cited as the 
"Right to Die Act.". 
 S  24-7-2. Definitions. 
As used in the Right to Die Act: 
- 
(A] "maintenance medical treatment" means medical 
treatment designed solely to sustain the life processes; 
(B) "minor" means a person who has not reached the age 
of majority; 
(C) "physician" means an individual licensed to practice 
medicine in New Mexico; and 
(D) "terminal illness" means an illness that will result in 
death as defined in Section 12-2-4 NMSA 1978, regardless of 
the use or discontinuance of maintenance medical treatment. 
S 24-7-3. Execution of a document. 
(A) An individual of sound mind and having reached the 
age of majority may execute a document directing that if he is 
ever certified under the Right to Die Act as suffering from a 
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terminal illness then maintenance medical treatment shall not 
be utilized for the prolongation of his life. 
(B) A document described in Subsection A of this section 
is not valid unless it has been executed with the same 
formalities as  required of a valid will pursuant to the provi- 
sions of the Probate Code [45-1-101 to 45-7-401 NMSA 1978]. 
S 24-7-4. Execution of a document for the benefit of a terminally 
ill minor. 
(A) If a minor has been certified under the Right to Die 
Act a s  suffering a terminal illness, the following individual 
may execute the document on his behalf: 
(1) the spouse, if he has reached the age of majority; or 
(2) if there is no spouse, or if the spouse is not available 
at the time of the certification or is otherwise unable to act, 
then either the parent or guardian of the minor. 
(B) An individual named in Subsection A of this section 
may not execute a document: 
(1) if he has actual notice of contrary indications by the 
minor who is terminally ill; or 
(2) when executing as  a parent or guardian, if he has 
actual notice of opposition by either another .parent or guard- 
ian or a spouse who has attained the age of majority. 
(C) A document described in Subsection A of this section 
is not valid unless it has been executed with the same 
formalities as  required of a valid will under the Probate Code, 
and has been certified upon its face by a district court judge 
pursuant to Subsection D of this section. 
(D) Any person executing a document pursuant to the 
provisions of this section shall petition the district court for the 
county in which the minor is domiciled, or the county in which 
the minor is being maintained, for certification upon the face of 
the document. The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem to 
represent the minor and may hold an  evidentiary hearing 
before certification. All costs shall be charged to the petitioner. 
If the district court judge is satisfied that all requirements of 
the Right to Die Act have been satisfied, that the document 
was executed in good faith and that the certification of the 
terminal illness was in good faith, then he shall certify the 
document. 
S 24-7-5. Certification of a terminal illness. 
(A) For purposes of the Right to Die Act, certification of a 
terminal illness may be rendered only in writing by two 
physicians, one of whom is the physician in charge of the 
individual who is terminally ill. A copy of any such certifica- 
tion shall be kept in the records of the medical facility where 
the patient is being maintained. If the patient is not being 
maintained in a medical facility, a copy shall be retained by 
the physician in charge in his own case records. 
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(B) A physician who certifies a terminal illness under this 
section is presumed to be acting in good faith. Unless it is 
alleged and proved that his action violated the standard of 
reasonable professional care and judgment under the circum- 
stances, he is immune from civil or criminal liability that 
otherwise might be incurred. 
§ 24-7-6. Revocation of a document. 
(A) An individual who has executed a document under 
the Right to Die Act may, at any time thereafter, revoke the 
document. Revocation may be accomplished by destroying the 
document, or by contrary indication expressed in the presence 
of one witness who has reached the age of majority. 
(B) A minor may revoke the document in the manner 
provided under Subsection A of this section. During the 
remainder of his terminal illness, any such revocation may 
constitute actual notice of his contrary indication. 
 S 24-7-7. Physician's immunity from liability. 
(A) After certification of a terminal illness under the Right 
to Die Act, a physician who relies on a document executed 
under that act, of which he has no actual notice of revocation 
or contrary indication, and who withholds maintenance medi- 
cal treatment from the terminally ill individual who executed 
the document, is presumed to be acting in good faith. Unless it 
is alleged and proved that the physician's actions violated the 
standard of reasonable professional care and judgment under 
the circumstances, he is immune from civil or criminal liability 
that otherwise might be incurred. 
(B) A physician who relies on a document executed on 
behalf of a terminally ill minor under the Right to Die Act and 
certified on its face by a district court judge pursuant to 
Section 4 of that act, and who withholds maintenance medical 
treatment from the terminally ill minor on whose behalf the 
document was executed, is presumed to be acting in good faith, 
if he has no actual notice of revocation or contrary indication. 
Unless it is alleged and proved that the physician's actions 
violated the standard of reasonable professional care and 
judgment under the circumstances, he is immune from civil or 
criminal liability that otherwise might be incurred. 
(C) In the absence of actual notice to the contrary, a 
physician may presume that an individual who executed a 
document under the Right to Die Act was of sound mind when 
the document was executed. 
(D) Any hospital or medical institution or its employees 
which act or refrain from acting in reasonable reliance on and 
in compliance with a document executed under the Right to Die 
Act shall be immune from civil or criminal liability that 
otherwise might be incurred. 
 S 24-7-8. Insurance. 
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(A) The withholding of maintenance medical treatment 
from any individual pursuant to the provisions of the Right to 
Die Act shall not, for any purpose, constitute a suicide. 
(B) The execution of a document pursuant to the Right to 
Die Act shall not restrict, inhibit or impair in any manner the 
sale, procurement or issuance of any policy of life insurance, 
nor shall it be deemed to modify the terms of an existing policy 
of life insurance. No policy of life insurance shall be legally 
impaired or invalidated in any manner by the withholding of 
maintenance medical treatment under the Right to Die Act 
from an insured individual, notwithstanding any term of the 
policy to the contrary. 
(C) No physician, health facility or other health care 
provider, and no health care service plan, insurer issuing 
disability insurance, self-insured employee welfare benefit 
plan or nonprofit hospital service plan shall require any person 
to execute a document pursuant to the Right to Die Act as a 
condition for being insured for, or receiving, health care 
service. 
 S  24-7-9. Cumulative provisions. 
Nothing in the Right to Die Act shall impair or supersede 
any existing legal right or legal responsibility which any person 
may have to effect the withholding or nonutilization of any 
maintenance medical treatment in any lawful manner. In such 
respect the provisions of the Right to Die Act are cumulative. 
S 24-7-10. Penalties. 
(A) Whoever knowingly and willfully conceals, destroys, 
falsifies or forges a document with intent to create the false 
impression that another person has directed that no mainte- 
nance medical treatment be utilized for the prolongation of his 
life or the life of a minor, or whoever knowingly and willfully 
conceals evidence of revocation of a document executed 
pursuant to the Right to Die Act, is guilty of a second degree 
felony, punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for a 
period of not less than ten years nor more than fifty years or a 
fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) or both. 
(B) Whoever knowingly and willfully conceals, destroys, 
falsifies or forges a document with intent to create the false 
impression that another person has not directed that mainte- 
nance medical treatment not be utilized for the prolongation of 
his life is guilty of a third degree felony, punishable by 
imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of not less than two 
years nor more than ten years or a fine of not more than five 
thousand dollars ($5,000) or both. 
(C) Whoever executes a document under the Right to Die 
Act for the benefit of a terminally ill minor and who either has 
actual notice of contrary indications by the minor who is 
terminally ill, or, when executing as a parent or guardian, has 
actual notice of opposition by either another parent or guard-
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ian or a spouse, is guilty of a second degree felony, punishable 
by imprisonment in the penitentiary for a period of not less 
than ten years nor more than fifty years, or by a fine of not 
more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) or both. 
 S 24-7-11.    Application. 
The Right to Die Act applies to all persons executing 
documents in conformity with that act on or after the effective 
date of the Right to Die Act. 
N.M. Stat. Ann. S§ 24-7-1 through 24-7-10 (April 7, 1977). 
North Carolina 
S  90-320.     General purpose of article. 
(a) The General Assembly hereby recognizes that an 
individual's rights as a citizen of this State include the right to
a peaceful and natural death. This Article is to establish a 
procedure for the exercise of that right and to state expressly 
the extent of a physician's obligation to preserve the life of his 
patient in situations where artificial means may be used to
sustain the circulatory and respiratory functions for an indefi- 
nite period. 
(b) Nothing in this Article shall be construed to authorize 
any affirmative or deliberate act or omission to end life other 
than to permit the natural process of dying. Nothing in this 
Article shall impair or supersede any legal right or legal 
responsibility which any person may have to effect the 
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures in any 
lawful manner. In such respect the provisions of this Article 
are cumulative. 
S 90-321.   Right to a natural death. 
(a) As used in this Article the term: 
(1) "Declarant" means a person who has signed a 
declaration in accordance with subsection (c); 
(2) "Extraordinary means" is defined as  any medical 
procedure or intervention which in the judgment of 
the attending physician would serve only to post- 
pone artificially the moment of death by sustaining, 
restoring, or supplanting a vital function; 
(3) "Physician" means any person licensed to practice 
medicine under Article 1 of Chapter 90 of the laws of 
the State of North Carolina. 
(b) If a person has declared, in accordance with subsec- 
tion (c) below, a desire that his life not be prolonged by 
extraordinary means; and the declaration has not been re- 
voked in accordance with subsection (e); and (1) It is deter-
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mined by the attending physician that the declarant's present 
condition is 
a. Terminal; and 
b. Incurable; and 
(2) There is confirmation of the declarant's present condition 
as set out above in subdivision (b)(1)  by a physician other than 
the attending physician; then extraordinary means may be 
withheld or discontinued upon the direction and under the 
supervision of the attending physician. 
(c) The attending physician may rely upon a signed, 
witnessed, dated and proved declaration: 
Which expresses a desire of the declarant that no 
extraordinary means be used to prolong his life if his 
condition is determined to be terminal and incura- 
ble; and 
Which states that the declarant is aware that the 
declaration authorizes a physician to withhold or 
discontinue the extraordinary means; and 
Which has been signed by the declarant in the 
presence of two witnesses who believe the declarant 
to be of sound mind and who state that they (i) are 
not related within the third degree to the declarant 
or to the declarant's spouse, (ii) do not know or have 
a reasonable expectation that they would be entitled 
to any portion of the estate of the declarant upon his 
death under any will of the declarant or codicil 
thereto then existing or under the Intestate Succes- 
sion Act as it then provides, (iii) are not the 
attending physician, or an employee of the attending 
physician, or an  employee of a health facility in 
which the declarant is a patient, or an employee of a 
nursing home or any group-care home in which the 
declarant resides, and (iv) do not have a claim 
against any portion of the estate of the declarant at 
the time of the declaration; and 
Which has been proved before a clerk or assistant 
clerk of superior court, or a notary public who 
certifies substantially as set out in subsection (d) 
below. 
(d) The following form is specifically determined to meet 
the requirements above:  
"Declaration of A Desire For A Natural Death 
"I, , being of sound mind, desire that my life not 
be prolonged by extraordinary means if my condition is 
determined to be terminal and incurable. I am aware and 
understand that this writing authorizes a physician to withhold 
or discontinue extraordinary means. 
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"This the day of 
Signature 
"I hereby state that the declarant, , being of 
sound mind signed the above declaration in my presence and 
that I am not related to the declarant by blood or marriage and 
that I do not know or have a reasonable expectation that I 
would be entitled to any portion of the estate of the declarant, 
under any existing will or codicil of the declarant, or as an heir 
under the Intestate Succession Act if the declarant died on this 
date without a will. I also state that I am not the declarant's 
attending physician or an employee of the declarant's attend- 
ing physician, or an employee of a health facility in which the 
declarant is a patient or an employee of a nursing home or any 
group-care home where the declarant resides. I further state 
that I do not now have any claim against the declarant. 
Witness 
Witness 
The clerk or the assistant clerk, or a notary public may, 
upon proper proof, certify the declaration as  follows: 
"Certificate 
"I, , Clerk (Assistant Clerk) of Superior Court or 
Notary Public (circle one as appropriate) for County 
hereby certify that , the declarant, appeared before 
me and swore to me and to the witnesses in my presence that 
this instrument is his Declaration Of A Desire For A Natural 
Death, and that he had willingly and voluntarily made and 
executed it as his free act and deed for the purposes expressed 
in it. 
"I further certify that and , witnesses, 
appeared before me and swore that they witnessed 
declarant, sign the attached declaration, believing him to be of 
sound mind; and also swore that at the time they witnessed the 
declaration (i) they were not related within the third degree to 
the declarant or to the declarant's spouse, and (ii) they did not 
know or have a reasonable expectation that they would be 
entitled to any portion of the estate of the declarant upon the 
declarant's death under any will of the declarant or codicil 
thereto then existing or under the Intestate Succession Act as  it 
provides at that time, and (iii) they were not a physician 
attending the declarant or an employee of a n  attending 
physician or an employee of a health facility in which the 
declarant was a patient or an employee of a nursing home or 
any group-care home in which the declarant resided, and (iv) 
they did not have a claim against the declarant. I further certify 
that I am satisfied as to the genuineness and due execution of 
the declaration. This the of 
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Clerk (Assistant Clerk) of 
Superior Court 
or Notary Public '(circle one 
as appropriate) 
for the County of 
The above declaration may be proved by the clerk or the 
assistant clerk, or a notary public in the following manner: 
(1) Upon the testimony of the two witnesses; or 
(2) If the testimony of only one witness is available, then 
a. Upon the testimony of such witness, and 
b. Upon proof of the handwriting of the witness who is 
dead or whose testimony is otherwise unavailable, 
and 
c. Upon proof of the handwriting of the declarant, 
unless he signed by his mark; or upon proof of such 
other circumstances as will satisfy the clerk or 
assistant clerk of the superior court, or a notary 
public as to the genuineness and due execution of the 
declaration. 
(3) If the testimony of none of the witnesses is available, 
such declaration may be proved by the clerk or 
assistant clerk, or  a notary public 
a. Upon proof of the handwriting of the two witnesses 
who testimony is unavailable, and 
b. Upon compliance with paragraph c of subdivision (2) 
above. 
Due execution may be established, where the evidence re- 
quired above is unavoidably lacking or inadequate, by testimo- 
ny of other competent witnesses as to the requisite facts. 
The testimony of a witness is unavailable within the 
meaning of this subsection when the witness is dead, out of the 
State, not to be found within the State, insane or otherwise 
incompetent, physically unable to testify or refuses to testify. 
If the testimony of one or both of the witnesses is not 
available the clerk or the assistant clerk, or a notary public of 
superior court may, upon proper proof, certify the declaration 
as follows: 
"Certificate 
"I , Clerk (Assistant Clerk) of Court for the 
Superior Court or Notary Public (circle one as appropriate) of 
County hereby certify that based upon the evidence 
before me I am satisfied as  to the genuineness and due 
execution of the attached declaration by , declarant, 
and that the declarant's signature was witnessed by 
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, and , who at the time of the declaration 
met the qualifications of G.S. 90-321(c)(3).
"This the day of 
Clerk (Assistant Clerk) of 
Superior Court 
or Notary Public (circle one 
as appropriate) 
for - County." 
(e) The above declaration may be revoked by the declar- 
ant, in any manner by which he is able to communicate his 
intent to revoke, without regard to his mental or physical 
condition. Such revocation shall become effective only upon 
communication to the attending physician by the declarant or 
by an individual acting on behalf of the declarant. 
(f) The execution and consummation of declarations made 
in accordance with subsection (c) shall not constitute suicide 
for any purpose. 
(g) No person shall be required to sign a declaration in 
accordance with subsection (c) as a condition for becoming 
insured under any insurance contractor for receiving any 
medical treatment. 
(h) The withholding or discontinuance of extraordinary 
means in accordance with this section shall not be considered 
the cause of death for any civil or criminal purposes nor shall it 
be considered unprofessional conduct. Any person, institution 
or facility against whom criminal or civil liability is asserted 
because of conduct in compliance with this section may 
interpose this section as  a defense. 
(i) Any certificate in the form provided by this section 
prior to July 1,1979 shall continue to be valid. 
S 90-322. Procedures for natural death in the absence of a 
declaration. 
(a) If a person is comatose and there is no reasonable 
possibility that he will return to a cognitive sapient state or is 
mentally incapacitated, and: 
(1)  It is determined by the attending physician that the 
person's present condition is: 
a. Terminal; and 
b. Incurable; and 
c. Irreversible; and 
 ( 2 )There is confirmation of the person's present condi- 
tion as  set out above in this subsection, by a 
majority of a committee of three physicians other 
than the attending physician; and 
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(3) A vital function of the person could be restored by 
extraordinary means or a vital function of the person 
is being sustained by extraordinary means; 
then, extraordinary means may be withheld or discontinued in 
accordance with subsection (b). 
(b) If a person's condition has been determined to meet 
the conditions set forth in subsection (a) and no instrument has 
been executed as provided in G.S. 90-321 the extraordinary 
means to prolong life may be withheld or discontinued upon 
the direction and under the supervision of the attending 
physician at the request (i) of the person's spouse, or (ii) of a 
guardian of the person, or (iii) of a majority of the relatives of 
the first degree, in that order. If none of the above are available 
then at the discretion of the attending physician the extraordi- 
nary means may be discontinued upon the direction and under 
the supervision of the attending physician. 
(c) Repealed by Session Laws 1979, c. 715, s. 2. 
(d) The withholding or discontinuance of such extraordi- 
nary means shall not be considered the cause of death for any 
civil or criminal purpose nor shall it be considered unprofes- 
sional conduct. Any person, institution or facility against 
whom criminal or civil liability is asserted because of conduct 
in compliance with this section may interpose this section as  a 
defense. 
N.C. . Gen. Stat. SS 90-320 through 90-322 (July 1,1977). 
Oregon 
S 97.050 Definitions for ORS 97.050 to 97.090. 
As used in ORS 97.050 to 97.090 and subsections (5) to (7) 
of 97.990: 
(1) "Attending physician" means the physician with pri- 
mary responsibility for the care and treatment of a patient. 
(2) "Directive" means a written document voluntarily 
executed by a declarant in accordance with the requirements 
set forth in ORS 97.055. 
(3) "Life-sustaining procedure" means any medical proce- 
dure or intervention that utilizes mechanical or other artificial 
means to sustain, restore or supplant a vital function of a 
qualified patient that is used to maintain the life of a person 
suffering from a terminal condition and serves only to artifi- 
cially prolong the moment of death and when death is 
imminent whether or not such procedures are used. 'Life- 
sustaining procedure' does not include the administration of 
medication or the performance of any medical procedure 
deemed necessary to alleviate pain. 
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(4) "Physician" means an  individual licensed to practice 
medicine by the Board of Medical Examiners for the State of 
Oregon. 
(5) "Qualified patient" means an individual, 18 years of 
age or older, whom the attending physician and one other 
physician, upon diagnostic examination of the patient, certify 
to be suffering from a terminal condition. 
(6) "Terminal condition" means an incurable condition 
caused by injury, disease or illness which, regardless of the 
application of life-sustaining procedures would within reason- 
able medical judgment produce death, and where the applica- 
tion of life-sustaining procedures serve only to postpone the 
moment of death of the patient. 
S 97.055 Execution of directive; form; witness qualifications and 
responsibility; revocation of directive. 
(1) An individual of sound mind and 18 years of age or 
older may at  any time execute or reexecute a directive 
directing the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining 
procedures should the declarant become a qualified patient. 
The directive shall be in the following form: 
DIRECTIVE TO PHYSICIANS 
Directive made this day of 
(month, year). I , being of sound mind, wilfully and 
voluntarily make known my desire that my life shall not be 
artificially prolonged under the circumstances set forth below 
and do hereby declare: 
1. If at any time I should have an incurable injury, disease 
or illness certified to be a terminal condition by two physi-
cians, one of whom is the attending physician, and where the 
application of life-sustaining procedures would serve only to 
artificially prolong the moment of my death and where my 
physician determines that my death is imminent whether or not 
life-sustaining procedures are utilized, I direct that such 
procedures be withheld or withdrawn, and that I be permitted 
to die naturally. 
2. In the absence of my ability to give directions regarding 
the use of such life-sustaining procedures, it is my intention 
that this directive shall be honored by my family and physi- 
c i a n ( s )   as the final expression of my legal right to refuse 
medical or surgical treatment and accept the consequences 
from such refusal. 
3. I have been diagnosed and notified at least 14 days ago 
as  having a terminal condition by , M.D., whose 
address is                  , and whose telephone number is 
. I understand that if I have not filled in the 
physician's name and address, it shall be presumed that I did 
not have a terminal condition when I made out this directive. 
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4. This directive shall have no force or effect five years 
from the date filled in above. 
5. I understand the full import of this directive and I am 
emotionally and mentally competent to make this directive. 
Signed 
City, County and State of Residence 
I hereby witness this directive and attest that: 
(1) I personally know the Declarant and believe the 
Declarant to be of sound mind. 
(2) To the best of my knowledge, at the time of the 
execution of this directive, I: 
(a) Am not related to the Declarant by blood or 
marriage, 
(b) Do not have any claim on the estate of the Declar-
ant, 
(c) Am not entitled to any portion of the Declarant's 
estate by any will or by operation of law, and 
(d) Am not a physician attending the Declarant or a 
person employed by a physician attending the 
Declarant. 
(3) I understand that if I have not witnessed this directive 
in good faith I may be responsible for any damages that arise 
out of giving this directive its intended effect. 
Witness 
Witness 
(2) A directive made pursuant to subsection (1) of this 
section is only valid if signed by the declarant in the presence 
of two attesting witnesses who, at the time the directive is 
executed, are not: 
(a) Related to the declarant by blood or marriage; or 
(b) Entitled to any portion of the estate of the declarant 
upon his decease under any will or codicil of the declarant or 
by operation of law at the time of the execution of the 
directive; or 
(c) The attending. physician or an employee of the 
attending physician or of a health facility in which the 
declarant is a patient; or 
(d) Persons who at the time of the execution of the 
directive have a claim against any portion of the estate of the 
declarant upon the declarant's decease. 
(3) One of the witnesses, if the declarant is a patient in a 
house for the aged licensed under ORS chapter 442 at the time 
the directive is executed, shall be an individual designated by 
the Department of Human Resources for the purpose of 
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determining that the declarant is not so insulated from the 
voluntary decision-making role that the declarant is not 
capable of wilfully and voluntarily executing a directive. 
(4) A witness who does not attest a directive in good faith 
shall be liable for any damages that arise from giving effect to 
an  invalid directive. 
(5) A directive made pursuant to ORS 97.050 to 97.090 and 
subsections (5) to (7) of 97.990 may be revoked at any time by 
the declarant without regard to his mental state or competency 
by any of the following methods: 
(a) By being burned, torn, canceled, obliterated or 
otherwise destroyed by the declarant or by some person in his 
presence and by his direction. 
(b] By a written revocation of the declarant expressing 
his intent to revoke, signed and dated by the declarant. 
(c) By a verbal expression by the declarant of his intent 
to revoke the directive. 
(6) Unless revoked, a directive shall be effective for five 
years from the date of execution. If the declarant has executed 
more than one directive, such time shall be determined from 
the date of execution of the last directive known to the 
attending physician. If the declarant becomes comatose or is 
rendered incapable of communicating with the attending 
physician, the directive shall remain in effect for the duration 
of the comatose condition or until such time as the declarant's 
condition renders him able to communicate with the attending 
physician. 
S  97.060 Validity of directive as  to physician. 
A directive that is valid on its face is valid as to any 
physician for the purposes of ORS 97.050 to 97.090 and 
subsections (5) to (7) of 97.990 unless the physician has actual 
knowledge of facts that render the directive invalid or is under 
the direction of a court not to give effect to the directive. 
S 97.065 Effect of directive. 
(1) It shall be lawful for an attending physician or a 
licensed health professional under the direction of an attending 
physician, acting in good faith and in accordance with the 
requirements of ORS 97.050 to 97.090 and subsections (5) to (7) 
of 97.990, to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining procedures 
from a qualified patient who has properly executed a directive 
in accordance with the requirements of ORS 97.050 to 97.090 
and subsections (5) to (7) of 97.990. 
(2) A physician or licensed health professional or health 
facility under the direction of a physician who, acting in good 
faith and in accordance with the requirements of ORS 97.050 to 
97.090 and subsections (5) to (7) of 97.990, causes the withhold- 
ing or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures shall not be
guilty of any criminal offense, shall not be subject to civil
366 Foregoing Life-Sustaining Treatment: Appendix D 
liability and shall not be in violation of any professional oath, 
affirmation or standard of care. 
(3) A physician or licensed health professional or health 
facility shall not be guilty of any criminal offense, shall not be 
subject to civil liability and shall not be in violation of any 
professional oath, affirmation or standard of care for failing to 
assume the duties created by or for failing to give effect to any 
directive or revocation made pursuant to ORS 97.050 to 97.090 
and subsections (5) to (7) of 97.990 unless that physician has 
actual knowledge of the directive or revocation. 
S 97.070 Duties created by directive. 
(1) Except as provided in this section, no physician, 
licensed health professional or medical facility shall be under 
any duty, whether by contract, by statute or by any other legal 
requirement to participate in the withdrawal or withholding of 
life-sustaining procedures. 
(2) (a) An attending physician shall make a directive or a 
copy of a directive made pursuant to ORS 97.050 to 97.090 and 
subsections (5) to (7) of 97.990 part of the patient's medical 
record. 
(3) A physician or medical facility electing for any reason 
not to participate in the withholding or withdrawal of   life- 
sustaining procedures in accord with a directive made pursu- 
ant to ORS 97.050 to 97.090 and subsections (5) and (7) of 97.990 
shall: 
(a) Make a reasonable effort to locate a physician or 
medical facility that will give effect to a qualified patient's 
directive and shall have a duty to transfer the qualified patient 
to that physician or facility; or 
(b) At the request of a patient or of the patient's family, 
a physician or medical facility shall transfer the patient to 
another physician or medical facility that will reconsider 
circumstances which might make ORS 97.050 to 97.090 and 
subsections (5) to (7) of 97.990 applicable to the patient. 
S 97.075 Procedure prior to withdrawal of life-sustaining 
procedures. 
(1) Before withdrawing or withholding life-sustaining pro- 
cedures from a qualified patient who is mentally competent in 
the opinion of the attending physician, the attending physician 
shall determine that the directive is valid under the require- 
ments of ORS 97.050 to 97.090 and subsections (5) to (7) of 
97.990 and shall determine that all steps proposed to be taken 
are in accord with the desires of the qualified patient. 
(2) Before withdrawing or withholding life-sustaining pro- 
cedures from a qualified patient who is not mentally competent 
in the opinion of the attending physician, the attending 
physician shall determine that the directive is valid under the 
requirements of ORS 97.050 to 97.090 and subsections (5) to (7) 
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of 97.990 and shall weigh the directive with other surrounding 
circumstances such as information from the affected family or 
the nature of the patient's illness, injury or disease to deter- 
mine if the steps proposed to be taken are, in the opinion of the 
attending physician, in accord with the known desires of the 
qualified patient. If the declarant was a qualified patient at 
least 14 days before executing or reexecuting the directive, the 
directive shall be conclusively presumed, unless revoked, to be 
in accord with the desires of the qualified patient for the 
purposes of this subsection. 
S 97.080 Effect of directive on insurance. 
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, the 
making of a directive pursuant to ORS 97.050 to 97.090 and 
subsections (5) to (7) of 97.990 shall not restrict, inhibit or 
impair in any manner the sale, procurement or issuance of any 
policy of insurance, nor shall it be deemed to modify the terms 
of an existing policy of insurance. 
(2) No physician, health facility, health care service plan, 
insurer issuing disability insurance, self-insured employee 
welfare benefit plan, nonprofit hospital service plan or other 
direct or indirect health service provider shall require any 
person to execute a directive as a condition for being insured 
for, or receiving, health care services. 
(3) No policy of insurance shall be legally impaired or 
invalidated in any manner by the withholding or withdrawal of 
life-sustaining procedures from an insured qualified patient. 
§ 97.085 Construction of ORS 97.050 to 97.090 concerning mercy 
killing, exclusiveness and suicide. 
(1) Nothing in ORS 97.050 to 97.090 and subsections (5) to 
(7) of 97.990 shall be construed to condone, authorize or 
approve mercy killing, or to permit any affirmative or deliber- 
ate act or omission to end life other than to permit the natural 
process of dying as provided in ORS 97.050 to 97.090 and 
subsections (5) to (7) of 97.990. 
(2) Nothing in ORS 97.050 to 97.090 and subsections (5) to 
(7) of 97.990 shall impair or supersede any legal right or legal 
responsibility which any person may have to effect the 
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures in any 
lawful manner. In such respect the provisions of ORS 97.050 to 
97.090 and subsections (5) to (7)  of 97.990 are cumulative. 
(3) The withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining pro- 
cedures from a qualified patient in accordance with the 
provisions of ORS 97.050 to 97.090 and subsections (5) to (7) of 
97.990 shall not, for any purpose, constitute a suicide. 
S 97.090 Prohibited acts. 
(1) No person shall by willfully concealing or destroying a 
revocation or by willfully falsifying or forging a directive cause 
the withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining procedures. 
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(2) No person shall by willfully concealing or destroying a 
directive or by willfully falsifying or forging a revocation cause 
an individual's intent with respect to the withholding or 
withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures not to be given effect. 
Or. Rev. Stat. SS 97.050 through 97.090 (June 9,1977). 
Texas 
S 1. Short title. 
This Act shall be known and may be cited as the Natural 
Death Act. 
S 2. Definitions. 
In this Act: 
(1) "Attending physician" means the physician selected 
oy, or assigned by the physician selected by, the patient who 
has primary responsibility for the treatment and care of the 
patient. 
(2) "Directive" means a written document voluntarily 
executed by the declarant in accordance with the requirements 
of Section 3 of this Act. The directive, or a copy of the 
directive, shall be made part of the patient's medical records. 
(3) "Life-sustaining procedure" means a medical proce- 
dure or intervention which utilizes mechanical or other artifi- 
cial means to sustain, restore, or supplant a vital function, 
which, when applied to a qualified patient, would serve only to 
artificially prolong the moment of death and where, in the 
judgment of the attending physician, noted in the qualified 
patient's medical records, death is imminent whether or not 
such procedures are utilized. "Life-sustaining procedure" shall 
not include the administration of medication or the perfor- 
mance of any medical procedure deemed necessary to allevi- 
ate pain. 
(4) "Physician" means a physician and surgeon licensed 
by the Texas State Board of Medical Examiners. 
(5)  "Qualified patient" means a patient diagnosed and 
certified in writing to be afflicted with a terminal condition by 
two physicians, one of whom shall be the attending physician, 
and the other shall be chosen by the patient or the attending 
physician, who have each personally examined the patient. 
(6) "Terminal condition" means an incurable condition 
caused by injury, disease, or illness, which, regardless of the 
application of life-sustaining procedures, would, within reason- 
able medical judgment, produce death, and where the applica- 
tion of life-sustaining procedures serves only to postpone the 
moment of death of the patient 
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S 3. Directive for withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining 
procedures in event of terminal condition. 
Any adult person may execute a directive for the with- 
holding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures in the 
event of a terminal condition. The directive shall be signed by 
the declarant in the presence of two witnesses not related to 
the declarant by blood or marriage and who would not be 
entitled to any portion of the estate of the declarant on his 
decease under any will of the declarant or codicil thereto or by 
operation of law. In addition, a witness to a directive shall not 
be the attending physician, an  employee of the attending 
physician or a health facility in which the declarant is a 
patient, a patient in a health care facility in which the 
declarant is a patient, or any person who has a claim against 
any portion of the estate of the declarant upon his decease at 
the time of the execution of the directive. The signature of the 
declarant shall be acknowledged, and the witnesses shall 
subscribe and swear to the directive before a notary public. 
The directive shall be in the following form: 
"DIRECTIVE TO PHYSICIANS 
"Directive made this day of (month, 
year). 
"I, , being of sound mind, willfully and voluntar- 
ily make known my desire that my life shall not be artificially 
prolonged under the circumstances set forth below, and do 
hereby declare: 
"1. If a t  any time I should have an incurable condition 
caused by injury, disease, or illness certified to be a terminal 
condition by two physicians, and where the application of life- 
sustaining procedures would serve only to artificially prolong 
the moment of my death and where my attending physician 
determines that my death is imminent whether or not life- 
sustaining procedures are utilized, I direct that such proce- 
dures be withheld or withdrawn, and that I be permitted to die 
naturally. 
"2. In the absence of my ability to give directions regard- 
ing the use of such life-sustaining procedures, it is my intention 
that this directive shall be honored by my family and physi- 
cians as the final expression of my legal right to refuse medical 
or surgical treatment and accept the consequences from such 
refusal. 
"3. If I have been diagnosed as  pregnant and that diagno- 
sis is known to my physician, this directive shall have no force 
or effect during the course of my pregnancy. 
"4. I have been diagnosed and notified as having a 
terminal condition by , M.D., whose address is 
and whose telephone number is . I 
understand that if I have not filled in the physician's name and 
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address, it shall be presumed that I did not have a terminal 
condition when I made out this directive. 
"5. This directive shall be in effect until it is revoked. 
"6. I understand the full import of this directive and I am 
emotionally and mentally competent to make this directive. 
"7.  I understand that I may revoke this directive at any 
time. 
"Signed 
City, County, and State of Residence 
The declarant has been personally known to me and I believe 
him or her to be of sound mind. I am not related to the 
declarant by blood or marriage, nor would I be entitled to any 
portion of the declarant's estate on his decease, nor am I the 
attending physician of declarant or an employee of the 
attending physician or a health facility in which declarant is a 
patient, or a patient in the health care facility in which the 
declarant is a patient, or any person who has a claim against 
any portion of the estate of the declarant upon his decease. 
"Witness 
"Witness 
"STATE OF TEXAS 
COUNTY OF 
"Before me, the undersigned authority, on this day person- 
ally appeared , and , known to 
me to be the declarant and witnesses whose names are 
subscribed to the foregoing instrument in their respective 
capacities, and, all of said persons being by me duly sworn, the 
declarant, , declared to me and to the said witnesses 
in my presence that said instrument is his Directive to 
Physicians, and that he had willingly and voluntarily made and 
executed it as his free act and deed for the purposes therein 
expressed. 
"Declarant 
"Witness 
"Witness 
"Subscribed and acknowledged before me by the said Declar-
ant, , and by the said witnesses, and 
, on this day of , 19 
Notary Public in and for 
County, Texas" 
SS 4. Revocation of directive. 
(a) A directive may be revoked at any time by the 
declarant, without regard to his mental state or competency, by 
any of the following methods: 
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1.   by being canceled, defaced, obliterated, or burnt, 
torn, or otherwise destroyed by the declarant or by some 
person in his presence and by his direction; 
2. by a written revocation of the declarant expressing 
his intent to revoke, signed  and dated bv the declarant. Such 
. 
revocation shall become effective only on communication to an 
attending physician by the declarant or by a person acting on 
behalf of the declarant or by mailing said revocation to an 
attending physician. An attending physician or his designee 
shall record in the patient's medical record the time and date 
when he received notification of the written revocation and 
shall enter the word "VOID" on each page of the copy of the 
directive in the patient's medical records; or 
3. by a verbal expression by the declarant of his intent 
to revoke the directive. Such revocation shall become effective 
only on communication to an attending physician by the 
declarant or by a person acting on behalf of the declarant. An 
attending physician or his designee shall record in the patient's 
medical record the time, date, and place of the revocation and 
the time, date, and place, if different, of when he received 
notification of the revocation and shall enter the word "VOID" 
on each page of the copy of the directive in the patient's 
medical records. 
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, there shall 
be no criminal or civil liability on the part of any person for 
failure to act on a revocation made pursuant to this section 
unless that person has actual knowledge of the revocation. 
S 5. Duration of directive. 
A directive shall be effective until it is revoked in a 
manner prescribed in Section 4 of this Act. Nothing in this Act 
shall be construed to prevent a declarant from reexecuting a 
directive at any time in accordance with the formalities of 
Section 3 of this Act, including reexecution subsequent to a 
diagnosis of a terminal condition. If the declarant has executed 
more than one directive, such time shall be determined from 
the date of execution of the last directive known to the 
attending physician. If the declarant becomes comatose or is 
rendered incapable of communicating with the attending 
physician, the directive shall remain in effect for the duration 
of the comatose condition or until such time as the declarant's 
condition renders him or her able to communicate with the 
attending physician. 
S 6. Civil or criminal liability. 
No physician or health facility which, acting in accordance 
with the requirements of this Act, causes the withholding or 
withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures from a qualified 
patient, shall be subject to civil liability therefrom unless 
negligent. No health professional, acting under the direction of 
a physician, who participates in the withholding or withdrawal 
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of life-sustaining procedures in accordance with the provisions 
of this Act shall be subject to any civil liability unless 
negligent. No physician, or health professional acting under the 
direction of a physician, who participates in the withholding or 
withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures in accordance with 
the provisions of this Act shall be guilty of any criminal act or 
of unprofessional conduct unless negligent. No physician, 
health care facility, or health care professional shall be liable 
either civilly or criminally for failure to act pursuant to the 
declarant's directive where such physician, health care facility, 
or health care professional had no knowledge of such directive. 
S 7. Failure to execute directive. 
'(a) Prior to effecting a withholding or withdrawal of life- 
sustaining procedures from a qualified patient pursuant to the 
directive, the attending physician shall determine that the 
directive complies with the form of the directive set out in 
Section 3 of this Act, and, if the patient is mentally competent, 
that the directive and all steps proposed by the attending 
physician to be undertaken are in accord with the existing 
desires of the qualified patient and are communicated to the 
patient. 
(b) If the declarant was a qualfied patient prior to 
executing or reexecuting the directive, the directive shall be 
conclusively presumed, .  unless revoked, to be the directions of 
the patient regarding  the withholding or withdrawal of life- 
sustaining procedures. No physician, and no health profession- 
al acting under the direction of a physician, shall be criminally 
or civillv liable for failing to effectuate the directive of the 
qualified patient pursuant to this subsection. A failure by a 
physician to effectuate the directive of a qualified patient 
pursuant to this subsection may constitute unprofessional 
conduct if the physician refuses to make the necessary 
arrangements or fails to take the necessary steps to effect the 
transfer of the qualified patient to another physician who will 
effectuate the directive of the qualified patient. 
(c) If the declarant becomes a qualified patient subse- 
quent to executing the directive, and has not subsequently 
reexecuted the directive, the attending physician may give 
weight to the directive a s  evidence of the patient's directions 
regarding the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining 
procedures and may consider other factors, such a s  informa- 
tion from the affected family or the nature of the patient's 
illness, injury, or disease, in determining whether the totality of 
circumstances known to the attending physician justifies 
effectuating  the directive. No physician, and no health profes-
sional acting under the direction of a physician, shall be
criminally or civilly liable for failing to effectuate the directive
of the qualified patient  pursuant to this subsection. 
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S 8. Effect on offense of aiding suicide and insurance 
policies. 
(a) The withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining pro- 
cedures from a qualified patient in accordance with the 
provisions of this Act shall not, for any purpose, constitute a n  
offense under Section 22.08, Penal Code. 
(b) The making of a directive pursuant to Section 3 of this 
Act shall not restrict, inhibit, or impair in any manner the sale, 
procurement, or issuance of any policy of life insurance, nor 
shall it be deemed to modify the terms of an  existing policy of 
life insurance. No policy of life insurance shall be legally 
impaired or invalidated in any manner by the withholding or 
withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures from an insured 
qualified patient, notwithstanding any term of the policy to the 
contrary. 
(c) No physician, health facility, or other health provider, 
and no health care service plan, or insurer issuing insurance, 
may require any person to execute a directive as  a condition 
for being insured for, or receiving, health care services nor may 
the execution or failure to execute a directive be considered in 
any way in establishing the premiums for insurance. 
S 9. Tampering with directive. 
A person who willfully conceals, cancels, defaces, obliter- 
ates, or damages the directive of another without such 
declarant's consent shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor. 
A person who falsifies or forges the directive of another, or 
willfully conceals or withholds personal knowledge of a 
revocation as  provided in Section 4 of this Act, with the intent 
to cause a withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining proce- 
dures contrary to the wishes of the declarant, and thereby, 
because of any such act, directly causes life-sustaining proce- 
dures to be withheld or withdrawn and death to thereby be 
hastened, shall be subject to prosecution for criminal homicide 
under the provisions of the Penal Code. 
S 10. Mercy killing not condoned. 
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to condone, 
authorize, or approve mercy killing, or to permit any affirma- 
tive or deliberate act or omission to end life other than to 
permit the natural process of dying as  provided in this Act. 
S 11. Act as cumulative. 
Nothing in this Act shall impair or supersede any legal 
right or legal responsibility which any person may have to 
effect the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining proce- 
dures in any lawful manner. In such respect the provisions of 
this Act are cumulative. 
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4590h (August 29,1977). 
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Vermont 
SS 1.18 V.S.A. Chapter 111 is added to read: 
S  5251  . Purpose and policy. 
The state of Vermont recognizes that a person as a matter 
of right may rationally make an election as to the extent of 
medical treatment he will receive in the event that his physical 
state reaches such a point of deterioration that he is in a 
terminal state and there is no reasonable expectation that life 
can be continued with dignity and without pain. A person has a 
fundamental right to determine whether or not life sustaining 
procedures which would cause prolongation of life beyond 
natural limits, should be used or withdrawn. 
S 5252.    Definitions. 
The following definitions shall be applicable in the con- 
struction of this chapter: 
 (1)  "Attending physician" means the physician selected 
by, or assigned to the patient, who has primary responsibility 
for the treatment and care of the patient. 
(2) "Extraordinary measures" means any medical proce- 
dure or intervention which utilizes mechanical or other artifi- 
cial means to sustain, restore, or supplant a vital function 
which, in the judgment of the attending physician, when 
applied to the patient, would serve only to artificially postpone 
the moment of death and where, in the judgment of the 
attending physician, the patient is in a terminal state. 
(3) "Terminal care document" means a document which, 
when duly executed, contains the express direction that no 
extraordinary measures be taken when the person executing 
said document is in a terminal state, without hope of recovery 
from such state and is unable to actively participate in the 
decision-making process. 
(4) "Physician" means a medical doctor licensed to prac- 
tice in the state of Vermont. 
(5) "Terminal state" means an incurable condition causd 
by injury, disease or illness which regardless of the application 
of life-saving procedures would, within reasonable medical 
judgment, produce death and where application of   life-sustain- 
ing procedures would only postpone the moment of death. 
S 5253.    Terminal care document. 
A person of sound mind who is 18 years of age or older 
may execute at any time a document commonly known as a 
terminal care document, directing that no extraordinary mea- 
sures  be used to prolong his life when he is in a terminal state. 
The document shall only be effective in the event that the 
person is incapable of participating in decisions about his care 
and may, but need not, be in form and substance substantially 
as follows: 
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"To my family, my physician, my lawyer, my clergyman. 
To any medical facility in whose care I happen to be. To any 
individual who may become responsible for my health, welfare 
or affairs. 
"Death is as  much a reality as  birth, growth, maturity and 
old age-it is the one certainty of life. If the time comes when I, 
, can no longer take part in decisions of my own 
future, let this statement stand as an expression of my wishes, 
while I am still of sound mind. 
"If the situation should arise in which I am in a terminal 
state and there is no reasonable expectation of my recovery, I 
direct that I be allowed to die a natural death and that my life 
not be prolonged by extraordinary measures. I do, however, 
ask that medication be mercifully administered to me to 
alleviate suffering even though this may shorten my remaining 
life. 
"This statement is made after careful consideration and is 
in accordance with my strong convictions and beliefs. I want 
the wishes and directions here expressed carried out to the 
extent permitted by law. Insofar as they are not legally 
enforceable, I hope that those to whom this will is addressed 
will regard themselves as  morally bound by these provisions. 
Signed: 
Date: 
Witness: 
Witness: 
Copies of this request have been given to:" 
S 5254. Execution and witnesses. 
The document set forth in section 5253 shall be executed 
by the person making the same in the presence of two or more 
subscribing witnesses, none of whom shall be the person's 
spouse, heir, attending physician or person acting under the 
direction or control of the attending physician or any other 
person who has at the time of the witnessing thereof any 
claims against the estate of the person. 
S 5256. Action by physician. 
An attending physician and any other physician under his 
direction or control, having in his possession his patient's 
terminal care document, or having knowledge that such a duly 
executed document is part of the patient's record in the 
institution in which he is receiving care, shall be bound to 
follow as  closely as  possible the dictates of said document. 
However, if because of moral conflict with the spirit of this act, 
a physician finds it impossible to follow his patient's direc- 
tions, he shall forthwith have a duty to so inform his patient or
376 Foregoing Life-Sustaining Treatment: Appendix D 
actively assist in selecting another physician who is willing to 
honor the patient's directions, or both. 
S 5257.     Revocation. 
A person who has validly executed a document consistent 
with the provisions of sections 5253 and 5254 may revoke the 
same orally in the presence of two or more witnesses, at least 
one of whom shall not be a spouse or a relative as specified in 
15 V.S.A. SS 1 or 2, or by burning, tearing or obliterating the 
same or by causing the same to be done by some other person 
at his direction and in his presence. A terminal care document 
may be revoked only as provided herein. 
S 5258.    Duty to deliver. 
Any person having in his possession a ,duly executed 
terminal care document, if it becomes known to him that the 
person executing the same is in such circumstances that the 
terms of the terminal care document might become applicable, 
shall forthwith deliver the same to the physician attending the 
person executing said document or to the hospital in which 
said person is a patient. 
S 5259. Immunity. 
An attending physician, other physician, nurse, health 
professional or any other person acting for him or under his 
control, or hospital within which the person may be, shall 
forever be immune from any civil or criminal liability for any 
act or intentional failure to act if said act or intentional failure 
to act is done pursuant to the terminal care document. 
S 5260.  Suicide. 
The withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining proce- 
dures from a patient who has executed a document consistent 
with the purposes of section 5253 shall at no time be construed 
as  a suicide for any legal purpose. 
S 5261.  Freedom from influence. 
No physician, health facility, or other health provider, and 
no health care service plan, insurer issuing disability insur- 
ance, self-insured employee, welfare benefit plan, or nonprofit 
hospital service plan, shall require any person to execute a 
terminal care document as a condition for being insured for, or 
receiving, health care services; nor can health care or services 
be refused except as is hereinbefore provided because a 
person is known to have executed a terminal care document. 
§ 5262. Presumptions. 
This chapter shall not be construed to create a presump- 
tion that in the absence of a terminal care document, a person 
wants extraordinary measures to be taken. 
S 2.13 V.S.A.S1801 is amended to read: 
 S1801. Forgery and counterfeiting of papers, documents, etc. 
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A person who wittingly, falsely and deceitfully makes, 
alters, forges or counterfeits, or wittingly, falsely or deceitfully 
causes to be made, altered, forged or counterfeited, or pro- 
cures, aids or counsels the making, altering, forging or counter- 
feiting, of a writ, process, public record, or any certificate, 
return or attestation of a clerk of a court, public register, notary 
public, justice or other public officer, in relation to a matter 
wherein such certificate, return or attestation may be received 
as  legal proof, or a charter, deed, or any evidence or muniment 
of title to property, will, terminal care document, testament, 
bond, or writing obligatory, letter of attorney, policy of 
insurance, bill of lading, bill of exchange, promissory note, or 
an order drawn on a person or corporation, or on a state, 
county or town or school district treasurer, for money or other 
property, or an acquittance or discharge for money or other 
property, or an acceptance of a bill of exchange, or endorse- 
ment or assignment of a bill of exchange or promissory note, 
for the payment of money, or any accountable receipt for 
money, goods or other property, or certificate of stock, with 
intent to injure or defraud a person, shall be imprisoned not 
more than ten years and fined not more than $1,000.00. 
S 3. Effective date. 
This act shall take effect from passage. 
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, SS 5251 through 5262 and tit. 13, S1801 
(April 8, 1982). 
Virginia 
S  54-325.8:l.  Policy statement; short title. 
The General Assembly finds that all competent adults 
have the fundamental right to control the decisions relating to 
their own medical care, including the decision to have medical 
or surgical means or procedures calculated to prolong their 
lives provided, withheld or withdrawn. 
The General Assembly further finds that the artificial 
prolongation of life for persons with a terminal condition may 
cause loss of individual dignity and secure only a precarious 
and burdensome existence, while providing nothing medically 
necessary or beneficial to the patient. 
In order that the dignity, privacy and sanctity of persons 
with such conditions may be respected even after they are no 
longer able to participate actively in decisions concerning 
themselves, the General Assembly hereby declares that the 
laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia shall recognize the right 
of a competent adult to make an oral or written declaration 
instructing his physician to withhold or withdraw life-prolong- 
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ing procedures or to designate another to make the treatment 
decision for him, in the event such person is diagnosed a s  
suffering from a terminal condition. 
The provisions of this article shall be known and may be 
cited as the "Natural Death Act of Virginia." 
S 54-325.8:2. Definitions. 
As used in this Act: 
"Attending physician" means the primary physician who 
has responsibility for the treatment and care of the patient. 
"Declaration" means (i) a witnessed document in writing, 
voluntarily executed by the declarant in accordance with the 
requirements of  S 54-325.8:3  or (ii) a witnessed oral statement, 
made by the declarant subsequent to the time he is diagnosed 
a s  suffering from a terminal condition and in accordance with 
the provisions of  S 54-325.8: 3. 
"Life-prolonging procedure" means any medical proce- 
dure, treatment or intervention which (i) utilizes mechanical or 
other artificial means to sustain, restore or supplant a sponta- 
neous vital function or is otherwise of such a nature as to 
afford a patient no reasonable expectation of recovery from a 
terminal condition and (ii) when applied to a patient in a 
terminal condition, would serve only to prolong the dying 
process. "Life-prolonging procedure" shall not include the 
administration of medication or the performance of any 
medical procedure deemed necessary to provide comfort care 
or to alleviate pain. 
"Physician" means a person licensed to practice medicine 
in the Commonwealth of Virginia. 
"Qualified patient" means a patient who has (i) made a 
declaration in accordance with this Act and (ii) been diag- 
nosed and certified in writing by the attending physician, (and, 
in any case where the patient is comatose, incompetent or 
otherwise physically or mentally incapable of communication, 
by one other physician who has examined the patient] to be 
afflicted with a terminal condition. 
"Terminal condition" means a condition caused by injury, 
disease or illness from which, to a reasonable degree of 
medical certainty, (i) there can be no recovery and (ii) death is 
imminent. 
"Witness" means a person who is not a spouse or blood 
relative of the patient. 
S 54-325.8:3. Procedure for making a declaration; notice to 
physician. 
Any competent adult may, at any time, make a written 
declaration directing the withholding or withdrawal of life- 
prolonging procedures in the event such person should have a 
terminal condition. A written declaration shall be signed by the 
declarant in the presence of two subscribing witnesses. A n  
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oral declaration may be made by a competent adult in the 
presence of a physician and two witnesses by any nonwritten 
means of communication at any time subsequent to the 
diagnosis of a terminal condition. 
It shall be the responsibility of the declarant to provide for 
notification to his attending physician that a declaration has 
been made. In the event the declarant is comatose, incompe- 
tent or otherwise mentally or physically incapable, any other 
person may notify the physician of the existence of a declara- 
tion. An attending physician who is so notified shall promptly 
make the declaration or a copy of the declaration, if written, a 
part of the declarant's medical records. If the declaration is 
oral, the physician shall likewise promtly make the fact of such 
declaration a part of the patient's medical record. 
S 54-325.8:4. Suggested form of written declaration. 
A declaration executed pursuant to this Act may, but need 
not, be in the following form, and may include other specific 
directions including, but not limited to, a designation of 
another person to make the treatment decision for the declar- 
ant should he be (i) diagnosed as suffering from a terminal 
condition and (ii) comatose, incompetent or otherwise mentally 
or physically incapable of communication. Should any other 
specific directions be held to be invalid, such invalidity shall 
not affect the declaration. 
Declaration made this day of 
(month/year),                    willfully and voluntarily make 
known my desire that my dying shall not be artificially 
prolonged under the circumstances set forth below, and do 
hereby declare: 
If at  any time I should have a terminal condition and my 
attending physician has determined that there can be no 
recovery from such condition and my death is imminent, where 
the application of life-prolonging procedures would serve only 
to artificially prolong the dying process, I direct that such 
procedures be withheld or withdrawn, and that I be permitted 
to die naturally with only the administration of medication or 
the performance of any medical procedure deemed necessary 
to provide me with comfort care or to alleviate pain. 
In the absence of my ability to give directions regarding 
the use of such life-prolonging procedures, it is my intention 
that this declaration shall be honored by my family and 
physician as the final expression of my legal right to refuse 
medical or surgical treatment and accept the consequences of 
such refusal. 
I understand the full import of this declaration and I am 
emotionally and mentally competent to make this declaration. 
(Signed) 
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The declarant is known to me and I believe him or her to 
be of sound mind. 
Witness 
Witness 
S 54-325.8:5. Revocation of declaration. 
A declaration may be revoked at any time by the declarant 
(i) by a signed, dated writing; or (ii] by physical cancellation or 
destruction of the declaration by the declarant or another in his 
presence and at his direction; or (iii) by an oral expression of 
intent to revoke. Any such revocation shall be effective when 
comunicated to the attending physician. No civil or criminal 
liability shall be imposed upon any person for a failure to act 
upon a revocation unless that person has actual knowledge of 
such revocation. 
§ 54-325.8:6. Procedure in absence of declaration; no presump- 
tion. 
Nothing in this Act shall be construed in any manner to 
prevent the withholding or the withdrawal of life-prolonging 
procedures from an adult patient with a terminal condition 
who (i) is comatose, incompetent or otherwise physically or 
mentally incapable of communication and (ii) has not made a 
declaration in accordance with this Act, provided there is 
consultation and agreement for the withholding or the with- 
drawal of life-prolonging procedures between the attending 
physician and any of the following individuals, in the following 
order of priority if no individual in a prior class is reasonably 
available, willing and competent to act: 
1. The judicially appointed guardian or committee of the 
person of the patient if one has been appointed. This paragraph 
shall not be construed to require such appointment in order 
that a treatment decision can be made under this section; 
2. The person or persons designated by the patient in 
writing to make the treatment decision for him should he be 
diagnosed as suffering from a terminal condition; or 
3. The patient's spouse; or 
4. An adult child of the patient or, it the patient has more 
than one adult child, by a majority of the children who are 
reasonably available for consultation; or 
5. The parents of the patient; or 
6. The nearest living relative of the patient. 
In any case where the treatment decision is made by a 
person specified in paragraph 3, 4, 5,  or 6, there shall be at least 
two witnesses present at the time of the consultation when the 
treatment decision is made. 
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The absence of a declaration by an adult patient shall not 
give rise to any presumption as to his intent to consent to or 
refuse life-prolonging procedures. 
S 54-325.8:7. Transfer of patient. 
An attending physician who refuses to comply with the 
declaration of a qualified patient or the treatment decision of a 
person designated to make the decision (i) by the declarant in 
his declaration or (ii) pursuant to S 58-325.8:6 shall make a 
reasonable effort to transfer the patient to another physician. 
S 54-325.8:8. Immunity from liability; burden of proof; presump- 
tion. 
A health care facility, physician or other person acting 
under the direction of a physician shall not be subject to 
criminal prosecution or civil liability or be deemed to have 
engaged in unprofessional conduct as  a result of the withhold- 
ing or the withdrawal of life-prolonging procedures from a 
patient with a terminal condition in accordance with this Act. 
A person who authorizes the withholding or withdrawal of  life- 
prolonging procedures from a patient with a terminal condition 
in accordance with a qualified patient's declaration or as 
provided in S 54-325.8:6 shall not be subject to criminal 
prosecution or civil liability for such action. 
The provisions of this section shall apply unless it is 
shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the person 
authorizing or effectuating the withholding or withdrawal of 
life-prolonging procedures did not, in good faith, comply with 
the provisions of this Act. A declaration made in accordance 
with this Act shall be presumed to have been made voluntarily. 
S 54-325.8:9. Willful destruction, concealment, etc. of declara- 
tion or revocation; penalties. 
Any person who willfully conceals, cancels, defaces, 
obliterates, or damages the declaration of another without the 
declarant's consent or who falsifies or forges a revocation of 
the declaration of another, thereby causing life-prolonging 
procedures to be utilized in contravention of the previously 
expressed intent of the patient shall be guilty of a Class 6 
felony. 
Any person who falsifies or forges the declaration of 
another, or willfully conceals or withholds personal knowledge 
of the revocation of a declaration, with the intent to cause a 
withholding or withdrawal of life-prolonging procedures, con- 
trary to the wishes of the declarant, and thereby, because of 
such act, directly causes life-prolonging procedures to be 
withheld or withdrawn and death to be hastened, shall be 
guilty of a Class 2 felony. 
S 54-325.8:10. Mercy killing or euthanasia prohibited. 
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to condone, 
authorize or approve mercy killing or euthanasia, or to permit 
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any affirmative or deliberate act or omission to end life other 
than to permit the natural process of dying. 
S 54-325.8:11.   Effect of declaration; suicide; insurance; declara- 
tions executed prior to effective date. 
The withholding or withdrawal of life-prolonging proce- 
dures from a qualified patient in accordance with the provi- 
sions of this Act shall not, for any purpose, constitute a suicide. 
Nor shall the making of a declaration pursuant to this Act 
effect the sale, procurement or issuance of any policy of life 
insurance, nor shall it be deemed to modify the terms of an 
existing policy of life insurance. No policy of life insurance 
shall be legally imparied or invalidated by the withholding or 
withdrawal of life-prolonging procedures from an insured 
qualified patient, notwithstanding any term of the policy to the 
contrary. A person shall not be required to make a declaration 
as  a condition for being insured for, or receiving, health care 
services. 
The declaration of any qualified patient made prior to the 
effective date of this Act shall be given effect as provided in 
this Act. 
S 54-325.8:12.  Preservation of existing rights. 
The provisions of this Act are cumulative with existing 
law regarding an individual's right to consent or refuse to 
consent to medical treatment and shall not impair any existing 
rights or responsibilities which a health care provider, a 
patient, including a minor or incompetent patient, or a patient's 
family may have in regard to the withholding or withdrawal of 
life-prolonging medical procedures under the common law or 
statutes of the Commonwealth. 
S 54-325.8:13.   Severability. 
If any provision of this Act is held invalid, such invalidity 
shall not affect other provisions of the Act which can be given 
effect without the invalid provision. To this end, the provisions 
of this Act are severable. 
Passed by the Virginia Assembly Feb. 1983,  awaiting Gover- 
nor's signature as of March 17,1983. 
Washington 
§ 70.122.010.  Legislative findings. 
The legislature finds that adult persons have the funda- 
mental right to control the decisons relating to the rendering of 
their own medical care, including the decision to have life- 
sustaining procedures withheld or withdrawn in instances of a 
terminal condition. 
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The legislature further finds that modern medical technol- 
ogy has made possible the artificial prolongation of human life 
beyond natural limits. 
The legislature further finds that, in the interes of protect- 
ing individual autonomy, such prolongation of life for persons 
with a terminal condition may cause loss of patient dignity, 
and unnecessary pain and suffering, while providing nothing 
medically necessary or beneficial to the patient. 
The legislature further finds that there exists considerable 
uncertainty in the medical and legal professions as to the 
legality of terminating the use or application of life-sustaining 
procedures where the patient has voluntarily and in sound 
mind evidenced a desire that such procedures be withheld or 
withdrawn. 
In recognition of the dignity and privacy which patients 
have a right to expect the legislature hereby declares that the 
laws of the state of Washington shall recognize the right of an 
adult person to make a written directive instructing such 
person's physician to withhold or withdraw life-sutaining 
procedures in the event of a terminal condition. 
S 70.122.020  Definitions. 
Unless the context clearly requires otherwise, the defini- 
tions contained in this section shall apply throughout this 
chapter. 
(1) "Attending physician" means the physician selected 
by, or assigned to, the patient who has primary responsibility 
for the treatment and care of the patient. 
(2) "Directive" means a written document voluntarily 
executed by the declarer in accordance with the requirements 
of RCW 70.122.030. 
(3) "Health facility" means a hospital as  defined in RCW 
70.38.020(7) or a nursing home as defined in RCW 70.38.020(8). 
(4) "Life-sustaining procedure" means any medical or 
surgical procedure or intervention which utilizes mechanical or 
other artificial means to sustain, restore, or supplant a vital 
function, which, when applied to a qualified patient, would 
serve only to artificially prolong the moment of death and 
where, in the judgment of the attending physician, death is 
imminent whether or not such procedures are utilized. "Life- 
sustaining procedure" shall not include the administration of 
medication or the performance of any medical procedure 
deemed necessary to alleviate pain. 
(5) "Physician" means a person licensed under chapters 
18.71 or 18.57 RCW.
( 6 )  "Qualified patient'' means a patient diagnosed and 
certified in writing to be afflicted with a terminal condition by 
two physicians one of whom shall be the attending physician, 
who have personally examined the patient. 
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(7) "Terminal condition" means an incurable condition 
caused by injury, disease, or illness, which, regardless of the 
application of life-sustaining procedures, would, within reason- 
able medical judgment, produce death, and where the applica- 
tion of life-sustaining procedures serve only to postpone the 
moment of death of the patient. 
(8) "Adult person" means a person attaining the age of 
majority as defined in RCW 26.28.010 and 26.28.015. 
§ 70.122.030 Directive to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining 
procedures. 
(1)  Any adult person may execute a directive directing the 
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures in a 
terminal condition. The directive shall be signed by the 
declarer in the presence of two witnesses not related to the 
declarer by blood or marriage and who would not be entitled 
to any portion of the estate of the delcarer upon declarer's 
decease under any will of the declarer or codicil thereto then 
existing or, at the time of the directive, by operation of law 
then existing. In addition, a witness to a directive shall not be 
the attending physician, an employee of the attending physi- 
cian or a health facility in which the declarer is a patient, or 
any person who has a claim against any portion of the estate of 
the declarer upon declarer's decease at the time of the 
execution of the directive. The directive, or a copy thereof, 
shall be made part of the patient's medical records retained by 
the attending physician, a copy of which shall be forwarded to 
the health facility upon the withdrawal of life-sustaining 
procedures. The directive shall be essentially in the following 
form, but in addition may include other specific directions: 
DIRECTIVE TO PHYSICIANS 
Directive made this day of (month, 
year]. I , being of sound mind, wilfully, and voluntar- 
ily make known my desire that my life shall not be artificially 
prolonged under the circumstances set forth below, and do 
hereby declare that: 
(a) If at any time I should have an incurable injury, 
disease, or illness certified to be a terminal condition by two 
physicians, and where the application of life-sustaining proce- 
dures would serve only to artificially prolong the moment of 
my death and where my physician determines that my death is 
imminent whether or not life-sustaining procedures are uti- 
lized, I direct that such procedures be withheld or withdrawn, 
and that I be permitted to die naturally. 
(b) In the absence of my ability to give directions regard- 
ing the use of such life-sustaining procedures, it is my intention 
that this directive shall be honored by my family and physi- 
c i a n ( s )   as the final expression of my legal right to refuse 
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medical or surgical treatment and I accept the consequences 
from such refusal. 
(c) If I have been diagnosed as pregnant and that diagno- 
sis is known to my physician, this directive shall have no force 
or effect during the course of my pregnancy. 
(d) 1 understanding the full import of this directive and I 
am emotionally and mentally competent to make this directive. 
Signed 
City, County, and State of Residence 
The declarer has been personally known to me and I believe 
him or her to be of sound mind. 
Witness 
Witness 
(2) Prior to effectuating a directive the diagnosis of a terminal 
condition by two physicians shall be verified in writing, 
attached to the directive, and made a permanent part of the 
patient's medical records. 
S 70.122.040   Revocation of directive. 
(1) A directive may be revoked at any time by the 
declarer, without regard to declarer's mental state or compe- 
tency, by any of the following methods: 
(a) By being canceled, defaced, obliterated, burned, 
torn, or otherwise destroyed by the declarer or by some person 
in declarer's presence and by declarer's direction. 
(b) By a written revocation of the declarer expressing 
declarer's intent to revoke, signed, and dated by the declarer. 
Such revocation shall become effective only upon communica- 
tion to the attending physician by the declarer or by a person 
acting on behalf of the declarer. The attending physician shall 
record in the patient's medical record the time and date when 
said physician received notification of the written revocation. 
(c) By a verbal expression by the declarer of declarer's 
intent to revoke the directive. Such revocation shall become 
effective only upon communication to the attending physician 
by the declarer or by a person acting on behalf of the declarer. 
The attending physician shall record in the patient's medical 
record the time, date, and place of the revocation and the time, 
date, and place, if different, of when said physician received 
notification of the revocation. 
(2) There shall be no criminal or civil liability on the part 
of any person for failure to act upon a revocation made 
pursuant to this section unless that person has actual or 
constructive knowledge of the revocation. 
(3) If the declarer becomes comatose or is rendered 
incapable of communicating with the attending physician, the 
directive shall remain in effect for the duration of the comatose 
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condition or until such time as  the declarer's condition renders 
declarer able to communicate with the attending physician. 
S 70.122.050   Liability of health personnel, facilities. 
No physician or health facility which, acting in good faith 
in accordance with the requirements of this chapter, causes the 
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures from a 
qualified patient, shall be subject to civil liability therefrom. No 
licensed health personnel, acting under the direction of a 
physician, who participates in good faith in the withholding or 
withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures in accordance with 
the provisions of this chapter shall be subject to any civil 
liability. No physician, or licensed health personnel acting 
under the direction of a physician, who participates in good 
faith in the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining 
procedures in accordance with the provisions of this chapter 
shall be guilty of any criminal act or of unprofessional conduct. 
S 70.122.060 Procedures by physician. 
(1) Prior to effectuating a withholding or withdrawal of 
life-sustaining procedures from a qualified patient pursuant to 
the directive, the attending physician shall make a reasonable 
effort to determine that the directive complies with RCW 
70.122.030 and, if the patient is mentally competent, that the 
directive and all steps proposed by the attending physician to 
be undertaken are currently in accord with the desires of the 
qualified patient. 
(2) The directive shall be conclusively presumed, unless 
revoked, to be the directions of the patient regarding the 
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures. No 
physician, and no licensed health personnel acting in good 
faith under the direction of a physician, shall be criminally or 
civilly liable for failing to effectuate the directive of the 
qualified patient pursuant to this subsection. If the physician 
refuses to effectuate the directive, such physician shall make a 
good faith effort to transfer the qualified patient to another 
physician who will effectuate the directive of the qualified 
patient. 
S 70.122.070  Effects of carrying out directive- insurance. 
(1) The withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining pro- 
cedures from a qualified patient pursuant to the patient's 
directive in accordance with the provisions of this chapter 
shall not, for any purpose, consitute a suicide. 
(2) The making of a directive pursuant to RCW 70.122.030 
shall not restrict, inhibit, or impair in any manner the sale, 
procurement, or issuance of any policy of life insurance, nor 
shall it be deemed to modify the terms of an existing policy of 
life insurance. No policy of life insurance shall be legally 
impaired or invalidated in any manner by the withholding or 
withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures from an insured 
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qualified patient, notwithstanding any term of the policy to the 
contrary. 
(3) No physician, health facility,. or other health provider, 
and no health care service plan, insurer issuing disability 
insurance, self-insured employee welfare benefit plan, or 
nonprofit hospital service plan, shall require any person to 
execute a directive as a condition for being insured for, or 
receiving, health care services. 
S 70.122.080 Effects of carrying out directive on cause of death. 
The act of withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining 
procedures when done pursuant to a directive described in 
RCW 70.122.030 and which causes the death of the declarer, 
shall not be construed to be an intervening force or to affect 
the chain of proximate cause between the conduct of any 
person that placed the declarer in a terminal condition and the 
death of the declarer. 
S 70.122.090 Criminal conduct-penalties. 
Any person who willfully conceals, cancels, defaces, 
obliterates, or damages the directive of another without such 
declarer's consent shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor. Any 
person who falsifies or forges the directive of another, or 
willfully conceals or withholds personal knowledge of a 
revocation as provided in RCW 70.122.040 with the intent to 
cause a withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining proce- 
dures contrary to the wishes of the declarer, and thereby, 
because of any such act, directly causes life-sustaining proce- 
dures to be withheld or withdrawn and death to thereby be 
hastened, shall be subject to prosecution for murder in the first 
degree as defined in RCW 9A.32.030. 
S 70.122.100 Mercy killing not authorized. 
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to condone, 
authorize, or approve mercy killing, or to permit any affirma- 
tive or deliberate act or omission to end life other than to 
permit the natural process of dying. 
§ 70.122.900 Short title. 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Natural 
Death Act." 
S 70.122.905 Severability. 
If any provision of this act or the application thereof to any 
person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall 
not affect other provisions or applications of the act which can 
be given effect without the invalid provisions or application, 
and to this end the provisions of this act are severable. 
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. SS 70.122.010 through 70.122.905 (June 7, 
1979). 
 
